The role of socialist competition in establishing labour discipline in the Soviet working class, 1928-1934 by Russell 1946-, John
THE ROLE OF SOCIALIST COMPETITION IN ESTABLISHING 
LABOUR DISCIPLINE IN THE SOVIET WORKING CLASS
1928 - 1934
by 
John RusseJ1
Thesis submitted for 
the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Centre for Russian and East
European Studies, 
Commerce & Social.: Science
Division,
University of Birmingham,
1987.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st of 2 files  
 
Introductory material and Part One: chapters 1-4 
 
The remaining chapters  
and the appendices  
 are in an additional file 
 
 

SYNOPSIS
Between 1928 and 1934 Soviet society experienced what 
amounted to two industrial revolutions: the adaptation of 
a largely non-industrial working population to industry and 
the introduction of new technologies and methods of manage- 
ment. These radical changes inevitably gave rise to prob- 
lems of labour discipline, expressed most graphically in 
soaring rates of labour turnover and absenteeism.
These problems were exacerbated by the pace, intensity 
and scope of Soviet industrialisation and by the social 
policies that accompanied this drive. As in any such 
process these problems had to be tackled by utilising a 
blend of measures based on compulsion, conviction and inc- 
entive .
The present work examines the blend employed by the 
Soviet regime during the period under review to stimulate, 
in the shortest possible time scale, a general will for 
industrialisation and, having established that will and 
destroyed opposition to it, channel the energies thus 
generated into the desired directions.
The distinctive element in this blend is identified as 
socialist competition, which the regime utilised to stimu- 
late support for and stifle opposition to industrialisaton, 
and, subsequently, to raise work skills to the level re- 
quired by the modern industry being constructed.
Moreover, socialist competition allowed the regime to 
implement a management system geared to the maximum priority 
of production interests, while preserving a commitment, albeit 
in abstract terms, to the concept of a workers' state.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the many unique features of the Soviet 
industrialisation drive, the process itself would appear 
to fit the pattern of economic development experienced 
by all countries progressing from the stage of largely 
rural economies to those based on modern industries.
If the Soviet experience stands out for its unpreced- 
ented pace, intensity and scope, then these factors merely 
exacerbated problems that would have arisen anyway as part 
of the process of industrialisation. The essence of this 
process is change, and changes do tend to generate problems. 
The greater the scope and speed of change, therefore, the 
greater the problems to be expected.
Thus the problem of establishing a labour discipline 
commensurate with a modern industry was not a new one, nor 
were those of eliminating old workers' customs and traditions 
that were no longer held to be compatible with the new 
industrial order. That is why this thesis opens with an 
attempt to place the Soviet experience in an international 
context so as to determine what patterns of worker behaviour 
might have been expected given the transformations occurring 
in Soviet society.
For the USSR was experiencing what amounted to two 
industrial revolutions: the acculturation to industrial 
life of a labour force originating mainly from the country- 
side; and the adaptation of both old and new workers to the 
introduction of new technology and management systems. The 
telescoping together of these two processes greatly intens- 
ified the need for the Soviet regime to establish a new 
labour discipline, for the work habits of both the new re- 
cruits and the existing factory personnel were considered 
inappropriate to the new demands of production.
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The means with which to establish this new discipline 
at the Soviet regime's disposal were basically the same 
as were available to any other industrialising 'elite': 
i.e. methods based on compul sion, conviction or incent- 
ive. Obviously, the precise blend of these three compon- 
ents would depend to a large extent on the perceived aims 
and requirements of the 'elite' responsible for carrying 
out the policy of industrialisation. It is one of the 
tasks of the present research to establish the relative 
weight and interplay between each of these three factors 
in Soviet society during the period from 1928 to 1934.
In most societies the established pattern would be to 
stress initially methods of compulsion until such time as 
adequate incentive systems could be relied upon to produce 
the desired discipline. Conviction tended to play the 
relatively subsidiary role of justifying the changes under- 
taken and encouraging workers to change established habits 
and routines.
The Soviet leaders were faced, it might appear, with an 
unusual restraint: how could Soviet managers employ methods 
of compulsion against workers in what was ostensibly a 
workers' state? As we now know, in practice this proved 
to be hardly a restraining factor at all. Indeed, the 
received perception among Western observers of the Soviet 
drive to establish labour discipline was that it continued 
to rely, first and foremost, on coercive methods even after 
the appropriate incentive systems were in place. According 
to such a view, there was little or no role for conviction.
Yet, not only have official Soviet histories of this 
period maintained until this day that the new labour discip- 
line was achieved mainly by means of conviction supplemented 
by incentive measures (compulsion, they would claim, was used
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only against those who were acting against the common 
interest) \>ut oAso , they would insist, the contradiction 
inherent in a management policy geared to maximise the 
interests of production operating in a workers' state 
was resolved by allowing the workers to exercise control 
over the management of industry.
Now for workers in other countries, and for those in 
the USSR up until 1928, such control over industry would 
best be effected through their own trade union movement, 
charged to defend its members' interests against, among 
other things, encroachments by management and the interests 
of production.
However, in the Soviet case, quite the reverse occurred: 
commencing from the VIII Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in 
December 1928, the Communist Party steadily eroded trade 
union independence of action to the extent that, by the 
IV plenum of the Soviet Trade Union Central Council (VTsSPS) 
in September 1934, when the movement was decimated into 154 
little 'production 1 unions, there was little effective 
participation for them in the control of industry other than 
the right to produce more. The progress of this takeover 
of the trade unions constitutes the main theme of Chapter 
Two and also provides the parameters, in chronological terms, 
for the whole thesis.
The alternative means of ensuring worker participation in 
the management of industry, proposed in the course of Soviet 
industrialisation, was socialist competition. Originally 
opposed by the old trade union leadership for its anti-worker 
essence, this movement did, indeed, embody the 'management' 
approach to production, with the important qualification that 
it was a worker initiative and could thus be presented as the 
expression of 'genuine' worker interests as against the
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'narrow craft 1 and 'trade union' interests being pusued by
N
the old VTsSPS leadership and its supporters.
The essential feature of socialist competition was that 
it encouraged workers to place the interests of production 
ahead of their own personal requirements, to adopt a 
'socialist attitude to work' before the foundations of a 
socialist society had even been built. Given the absolute 
priority given to production during Stalin's rapid indust- 
rialisation drive, this in effect entailed the worker fore- 
going present satisfactions for future promises.
While this attitude, resting firmly upon conviction, may 
be maintained by the few in the short-run, it was scarcely 
a recipe for the long-term. Thus, as the initial enthusiasm 
evaporated and living and working conditions deteriorated 
from the spring of 1930, more and more workers chose to put 
their personal interests before those of production, seek 
better work and conditions and take breaks from the relent- 
less demands of factory life. Thus labour turnover and 
unsanctioned absenteeism eroded not only the levels of 
labour discipline, but also threatened the entire policy of 
rapid industrialisation. Chapter Three examines these two 
manifestations of worker behaviour.
Despite having outlived its utility as a means of gen- 
erating genuine enthusiasm for industrialisation, socialist 
competition did become a useful weapon in the hands of the 
regime to counter violations of labour discipline and also 
to free workers from the 'restraints' of labour legislation 
which limited the length of working days, overtime, number 
of days without rest and so on. A feature of the period 
under review was the distinctive interplay between so-called 
'socio-political' norms and legal norms. These are analysed 
in Chapter Four.
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In establishing the role of socialist competition in 
moulding a new labour discipline in Soviet industry during 
the period under review, three major areas are analysed: 
the growth of the shock brigade movement during the 'opt- 
imistic' phase of the socialist offensive from the birth 
of the mass movement in the autumn of 1929 until the end 
of the Leninist Enrolment in March 1930; the rise and fall 
of one of the many variations of shock work and competition 
the production communes, which I will argue were the last 
examples of collective action by the Soviet workers to 
genuinely exercise a degree of control over production; 
and the subsequent redirection of the movement to serve 
more precisely the interests of production by concentrating 
on raising skills and mastering technology. These are the 
subjects of Chapters Five, Six and Seven respectively.
Although I have identified socialist competition as 
essentially a 'management' approach carried out by workers, 
it is hoped to show that within the movement there was, 
nonetheless, a conflict between the 'autonomous 1 and 'man- 
agement 1 orientations. The replacement of the production 
communes by first the cost accounting brigades and, sub- 
sequently, by the Stakhanovite movement, represents the 
total victory of the latter over the former, not least 
because the moral imperatives that motivated many of the 
communards were not felt to be as appropriate to the bulk 
of the Soviet labour force as the material incentives that 
were duly introduced.
The time span covered by this research slots neatly be- 
tween the introduction of the seven-hour day in 1928 (which 
first highlighted the contradictions between the existing 
levels of discipline and the demands of production) and the 
birth of the Stakhanovite movement in August 1935 (which 
provided the Soviet regime with its ideal stereotype of 
desired worker behaviour and labour discipline).
-6-
I have chosen the VIII Congress of the Soviet trade 
unions as a starting point because this represented the 
last major forum at which workers' interests were ranged 
against those of Stalin's general line. Significantly, 
the incumbent leadet of VTsSPS, Tomskii, dismissed the 
embryonic movement for the 'socialist organisation of 
work' as premature during his closing speech to the 
Congress. Similarly, the plenary sessions of VTsSPS in 
September and December 1934 completed the emasculation 
of the Soviet trade union movement and ended their exist- 
ence as an independently functioning force within Soviet 
society (there was not to be another Congress until nearly 
15 more years had elapsed).
The problem is examined very much from the worker's 
perspective, rather than that of the management, Party, 
national or local leadership. Concentration is focussed 
on the workers in heavy industry, which is where the prior 
ity of industrialisation lay, with occasional reference to 
light industry, construction and railway transport. For 
the same reason, emphasis is given to the situation in the 
larger enterprises, both reconstructed (AMD, Krasnyi 
Putilovets etc.) and newly-built (Stalingrad Tractor and 
Nizhnii Novgorod Auto Works, for example).
The statistical data for this period varies from the 
reliable to the downright contradictory and is utilised as 
much to provide a flavour of the situation as to prove a 
particular point. The same may be said for quotes, which I 
have used liberally throughout this work. They form part of 
an attempt to recreate the atmosphere of those whirlwind 
years for Soviet society. Without a feel for that atmosphere 
it is easy to overestimate the role of socialist competition, 
as might the Soviet historian of this period, or deny it had 
any role at all, which a Western observer might be tempted to 
do.
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PART ONE
LABOUR DISCIPLINE DURING SOVIET INDUSTRIALISATION,
1928 - 1934.
This Section seeks to provide a background against which 
the role of socialist competition in establishing labour 
discipline within the period under review may be appraised. 
It fills the gap in the development of Soviet industrial 
relations between the introduction of the seven-hour, three- 
shift working day in 1928 to the appearance of the Stakhan- 
ovite movement in 1935.
As each of the topics covered in this Section merits a 
dissertation all to itself, they are presented not as 
exhaustive studies, but rather only insofar as they relate 
to the theme of this thesis.
Thus Chapter One attempts to determine what forms of 
worker behaviour and levels of labour discipline might 
have been expected in a society going through the stages 
of industrialisation experienced by Soviet society be- 
tween 1928 and 1934.
Chapter Two concentrates on the Party takeover of the 
Soviet trade union movement, which I consider the most 
important organisational change that facilitated the victory 
of a management approach to industrial relations in the 
world's first socialist state.
In Chapter Three, the two problems that dominated dis- 
cussions on labour discipline during this period - turnover 
and absenteeism - are analysed. The underutilisation of 
work time, which it is suggested presented (and arguably 
continues to present) the most fundamental problem of labour 
discipline in Soviet industry, could not be addressed until 
these problems were solved. Therefore, it falls largely out 
side the scope of this work.
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Finally, the distinctive role of legislation in 
Soviet society is examined from the perspective of 
its status, enforceabi]ity and interplay with extra- 
legal norms, not least those emanating from the socialist 
competition movement.
Inevitably, any treatment of the four topics contained 
in Part One involves a degree of repetition, such is the 
overlap between them. However, this has been kept to a 
minimum without, it is hoped, diminishing the feeling for 
the interlocking nature of the processes described.
In this way a framework may be provided into which the 
reader can slot the events and factual information that 
are dealt with in Part Two.
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CHAPTER ONE
WESTERN APPROACHES TO LABOUR DISCIPLINE; 
THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE
'The task was finally accomplished, though at needlessly 
high cost, and a society of peasants, craftsmen and versatile 
labourers became a society of modern industrial workers; but 
it is doubtful whether, within the structure of society and 
industry, the dilemmas of its beginnings have been resolved 
even today." 1
The author is referring to the acculturation of the first generation of 
English industrial workers, but his comments apply with equal force to the 
Soviet (or any other) industrialisation drive, highlighting the fact that, 
despite all the distinctive features of the Soviet experience, the process 
of moulding an industrial workforce did conform to a basic set pattern.
This Chapter seeks to relate the problems of labour discipline experienced 
within Soviet industry during the period 1928-1934 to the substantial body of 
theory and empirical data on the phenomenon in the West. In this way it is hoped to 
strike a balance between those features of the Soviet industrialisation drive 
which fit into the general pattern of economic development in other countries 
and those which appear to be specific to the USSR.
In placing Soviet concepts of labour discipline alongside corresponding 
Western concepts one must first establish that one is comparing like with like. 
Indeed, can there be said to exist today an equivalent concept in the West of 
what the Soviet commentators term 'labour discipline' - a clearly-defined 
phenomenon which invariably is accorded much attention in any contemporary Soviet 
tract on labour relations? Certainly, one may search in vain through a corresponding 
Western manual for any mention of discipline, a concept with pe jorative overtones 
considered appropriate to the less democratic environments of the school or military.
1 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management, London, 1965, p.208.
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However, if we analyse just what are defined in the USSR as problems of 
.iscipline in the period under review, it will become apparent that attention is 
'ocused first and foremost on uncontrolled labour turnover (tekuchest'), unsanctioned 
tbsenteeism (progul) and underutilisation of work time. Not only is there a large 
>ody of literature in the West devoted to such phenomena, but also, it emerges, that 
:hese problems occur, to a greater or lesser extent, in all societies experiencing 
:he adaption to modern industry of a workforce from a largely non-industrial back- 
ground. As such a process of adaptation was an integral feature of the initial 
/•ears of the Soviet industrialisation drive, such problems might be perceived as 
:haracteristic of societies at this stage of economic development rather than con- 
sequences of Soviet policy per se.
This process of adaptation is best presented in Western works as the new worker's
growing commitment to the industrial way of life. This theory stems from Wilbert E.
Score's definition of commitment as involving "both the performance of appropriate
*}
ictions and the acceptance of the normative system that provides the rules."
3 Certain writers contend that the psychological component of this definition
renders it different from the purely functional concept of discipline but, if we 
examine an official Soviet definition of labour discipline during the period under 
review, we will see that the psychological component is taken for granted:
"Labour discipline means a careful and conscientious fulfilment by the 
worker of all obligations assumed by him as a participant in the socialist 
construction of the USSR as defined in collective and personal contracts
and in the internal rules regulating enterprises."
So Moore's committed worker will tend to hold down a steady job, attend work
**
•egularly, perform effectively in production and generally have a positive attitude 
owards industrial life. He will behave, in other words, in what this Soviet definition 
ould presume to be a disciplined way.
W.E. Moore, The Impact of Industry, New Jersey, 1965, p.40.
Morris D. Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in India, Berkeley,1965,
Izvestiya,, 30 December 1930.
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However, while this concept @£ growing commitment is useful for studying 
the modernisation of largely non-industrial societies, when applied to economic 
development in general it is found to be too rigid. V hen viewed as a continual
•
process of change, economic development may be seen to generate various problems 
of adaptation to new and old workers alike. These include problems arising from 
the introduction of new technologies, forms of work organisation and changes in the 
value systems and attitudes of the work force. The greater the intensity and scope of 
these changes, the greater the problems of adaptation. Itiis highly significant that, 
whenever these changes are most profound, the same major problems of adaptation occur, 
namely absenteeism, labour turnover and underutilisation of work time. It is necessary 
to examine to what extent this is due to a reassessment by employErs of desired 
worker behaviour to meet new conditions, and how much it is due to worker responses 
to radical changes in their life and work situation.
Such an examination is crucial to an understanding of the period 1928 to 1934 in 
Soviet industry, For the unprecedented intensity, scale and relative sophistication 
(vis-a-vis its population) of the Soviet industrialisation drive necessarily ensured 
that these problems of adaptation would be exacerbated. Moreover, as we shall see, 
much more than the mere modernisation of an industrially-backward country was involved.
So it becomes immediately apparent that commitment (or discipline), is not a 
fixed, objective quality that the worker once acquires never to lose. Rather it is 
a variable, subjective and relative response to economic development characterised by 
fluctuations in the levels of commitment during periods of radical change. A striking 
modern example of this is the growing disillusionment among young people with factory 
work. This, and related problems, are highlighted in the following statement by the 
industrial relations manager of Fords (USA) in December 1969 ;
5 Auto Work and Its Discontents, B.J. Widick (ed), Baltimore, 1976, p.11.
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"For many traditional motivations of job security 
money rewards and opportunity for personal advance- 
ment are proving insufficient. Large numbers of 
those we have hired find factory life so distaste- 
ful they quit after a brief exposure to it. The 
general increase in real wage levels in our economy 
has offered more alternatives for satisfying economic 
needs.
There is also, again especially among the younger 
employees, a growing reluctance to accept shop 
discipline. This is not just a shop phenomenon; 
rather it is a manifestation in our shops of a trend 
we see all about us among today's youth.
This would lead one to question whether the process of adaptation is 
ever complete or irreversible and whether turnover, absenteeism etc. are 
not natural concomitants of the modern industrial production process. 
In turn, this gives rise to the concept of tolerable levels of turnover 
absenteeism and utilisation of work time, which cause these phenomena to 
be perceived as problems only when such levels are exceeded. This, it 
seems to me, explains the absence of a general concept of labour discip- 
line in the West at times of gradual economic development, and also the 
increasing volume of literature devoted to these forms of worker behav- 
iour at times of radical change.
On the other hand, if one concurs with Soviet commentators in reject- 
ing the notion of natural concomitants, but rather perceives these 
phenomena as manifestations of deviant behaviour, then one will not seek 
their reduction to tolerable levels but their complete eradication. As 
the worker behaviour demanded by the state (i.e. the employer) in the 
USSR is a communist attitude to work, until such time as all workers 
acquire such an attitude labour discipline will continue to be a subject 
for propaganda and agitation. Indeed, the observance of labour discip- 
line has been a constitutional obligation since 1936. Nonetheless, it 
is quite apparent that tolerable levels of discipline are accepted, 
albeit implicitly. Moreover, it may be observed that in the USSR, too, 
the volume of literature on these problems expands at times of change.
There are, perhaps, three levels on which a comparison could usefully 
be made: i) the acculturation of non-industrial workers to factory life;
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ii) the adaptation of the work force to radical changes in technology, 
organisation etc.; and iii) general types of worker behaviour in indust- 
rial society. This Chapter deals with the first two levels, the third 
will be covered in Chapter Three.
Of course, the identification of levels for comparison does not tell 
us anything about the applicability of Western theories to the Soviet 
drive for labour discipline during the period under review. There is no 
problem if one shares the view that the industrialisation of the USSR 
generally conformed to the overall pattern of economic development. Such 
is the approach of such diverse theorists as the Marxist who contends 
that the Soviets "deliberately embraced the capitalist mode of product- 
ion" and the convergence school which, despite noting the different 
'forced draft' nature of Soviet industrialisation, find a place for it
nevertheless in the overall scheme for progress to a post-industrial
7 
society.
Soviet scholars would contend that such comparisons are not tenable 
because the Soviet course of development was qualitatively different 
from that of the West and that, consequently, labour discipline is 
not the same in the two systems. Thus, due to class antagonisms, dis- 
cipline is established in the West first and foremost through compulsion 
whereas in the USSR, due to the absence of antagonistic classes, it is 
established mainly through conviction.
Hy approach in this respect is based upon the conclusion that 
production processes (and, incidentally, the urban environment) are 
neutral in industrial societies insofar as they produce the same kinds 
of tensions for everybody: i.e. the interests of the individual have to 
be reconciled with the interests of production. The variable element 
is the ability to accommodate and manage this tension. Viewed thus, the 
Soviet system, through its educational and character-forming policies, 
its ideological and patriotic rationalisations and so on, can at best 
merely reduce the impact of this tension, perhaps even to the extent of 
rendering it latent. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Soviet workers
6 Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital - the Degradation of 
Work in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1974, p.23.
7 Clark Kerr et al, Industrialism and Industrial Men, London, 1973,p.72
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are not always able to manage this tension and continue, on occasions, 
to manifest this by putting their own immediate interests before those 
of production. Such manifestations frequently take the form of turnover 
absenteeism and poor utilisation of work time. Thus, even if factors 
facilitating tension management are different (and there is little 
evidence to support this) the actual process would appear to be the 
same. On that basis the grounds for comparison between Western and 
Soviet forms of worker behaviour may be seen to exist.
Despite the divergence of views on the comparability of Soviet and 
Western concepts of labour discipline, there does exist a measure of 
agreement on certain points. For example, the usefulness of Western 
studies of turnover has been cautiously noted in Soviet works both in 
the period under discussion and in contemporary tracts. 9 Furthermore, 
it is agreed that discipline is not an inborn quality and that, as a 
consequence, workers must acquire it. More significantly, notions that 
low levels of discipline are necessarily manifestations of irrational 
behaviour have been questioned. Thus a Soviet labour expert recently 
wrote "I think it would be unwise to attribute all reasons for in- 
discipline. . .to purely subjective factors alone (to the personal 
qualities of this or that person, to remnants of out-dated morality or 
the influence of bcurgeios ideology)." She goes on to claim that 
contradictions exist between the socio-economic and technical- 
organisational content of work and that dissatisfaction with the latter, 
combined with insufficiently high level of individual consciousness, 
leads to violation of discipline.
Similarly, turnover is no longer regarded always as a politico- 
economic phenomenon (as under Stalin), but rather as a form of worker 
behaviour in the process of production that stems frpm the worker's 
requirements, interests and motives. Predictably, Soviet analysts 
have yet to go as far in this as their East European colleagues. A
recent article by a Hungarian labour expert, for example, actually ad-
12 vocated the encouragement of turnover in certain conditions.
• ••••*••••••••
8 S. Kheinman, '0 tekuchesti rabochego sostava promyshlennosti' in 
Puti industrializatsii, 1929, nos. 13-14, p.42.
9 E.G. Antosenkov and Z.V. Kuprianova, Tendentsii v tekuchesti raboch- 
ikh kadrov, Novosibirsk, 1977, p.40.
10 I.I. Changli, Trud- sotsiologicheskie aspekty teorii i metodolcgii 
issledovaniya, Moscow, 1973, p.444.
11 Antosenkov and Kuprianova, op. cit.,pp.25-26; D.P. Kaidalov and E.I.
Suimenko, Aktual'nye problemy sotsiologii truda, Moscow, 1974,p.83.
12 L. Koszegi, 'Labour Turnover and Employment Structure in European 
Socialist Countries', International Labour Review, vol.117,no.2,May- 
June 1978,p.313.
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Of course, such sociological investigations are restricted as yet 
to contemporary Soviet society, but there seems no reason why the same 
methods cannot be applied to the period under review in order to 
demonstrate the utility of a comparative approach. It is to be hoped 
that this will provide an alternative to what might be termed the 
'humanist* approach to Soviet studies, whereby aspects of Soviet society 
are analysed only in relation to historically contemporary or, even 
worse, present day Western societies. This has led many observers to 
perceive only that which is brutal and coercive in the tr*r»sformation
of Soviet society, emphasising such elements of compulsion as forced
13labour and terror. An example of this was provided by a Polish visit- 
or to the Soviet Union in 1932 who wrote:
"Today the whole world is sick but the Western crises and 
depression are rather like suffering in one's own bed, with 
a cup of tea at one's elbow and an old novel under the pillow, 
whereas in Russia the patient is lying on the operating table 
and undergoing surgical treatment without anaesthetics." 14
Apart from grossly misrepresenting the real condition of millions 
of working-class people in the West at this time, the writer has clearly 
failed to recognise that the Soviet Union was experiencing, virtually 
simultaneously, not only the effects of world depression, but also the 
impact of two industrial revolutions rolled into one: i) the acculturat- 
ion of a largely non-industrial work force and ii) the introduction of 
mass technology and scientific management. History provides ample 
evidence that the former is characterised by elements of brutality and 
coercion, and the latter by great social tensions. Given that such 
transformations inevitably appear to be painful processes, it could 
at least be argued that a short, sharp pain is preferable to a long 
drawn out one I
Another well-worn approach I would like to question is that which 
confines analysis to the Russian or Soviet environment, seeking to 
attribute, for example, the Russian worker's lack of discipline and 
lethargy to the long Russian winter or other traits of the national 
character. There is no evidence, for example, that Russian workers that 
have emigrated to North America are any less industrious than any others
13 The best known examples are Solomon S. Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet 
Union, New York, 1952 and Robert Conquest, Industrial Workers in the 
USSR, London, 1967.
14 Antoni Slonimski, 'Moja Podroz do Rusgi 1 , Warsaw, 1932, quoted in 
The Slavonic Review, vol.11, no.33, April 1933, p.725.
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It is hoped to demonstrate that many of these so called national character- 
istics were typical features of new industrial workers in peasant-based societies
The Xc&ulturAti.OnSs the Non-industrial Work Force
It is often assumed mistakenly that the process of acculturation is 
restricted to ^classical' industrial revolutions, Were this to be so we 
would be obliged to look at the period of considerable industrial ex- 
pansion in Russia around the turn of the century, rather than to the years 
from J928 to 1934. Such an approach, however, is to ration each country to 
just one industrial revolution, to characterise economic development as 
long periods of static interrupted by giant leaps forward from time to time, 
rather than as a dynamic process of constant change, punctuated by periods of 
more intensive and far reaching innovation. In other words, a society can 
and does have more than one industrial revolution (in Russia, for example, undei 
Peter the Great and Count Witte, in the USSR under Stalin and, arguably, Gorbachev).
A more useful concept, for our purposes, is that of industrialisation, by 
which is understood a period of radical change in productive technology char- 
acterised by an extensive transfer of manpower from the primary sector (agric- 
ulture) to the secondary (industry). This transfer is a continual process, but 
one that is most marked at times of rapid industrial expansion, a process often 
accompanied by measures aimed at increasing the efficiency of agriculture (e.g. 
the enclosures in England, collectivisation in the USSR and land reforms in Third 
World countries).
No significant redistribution of the population took place during Russia s 
Classical' revolution, which was curtailed by war and revolution. Of those that 
did switch to industry, many retained their links with the countryside. Thus, as 
late as 1902, 70 per cent of all industrial workers lived outside the large towns.
15* G.V.'Rimlinger, 'Tfcc -Expansion of the Labour Market in Capitalist Russia, 1861- 
1917» in Journal of Economic History, vol.21, no.l, March 1961, p.211.
-17-
16 
and the process of urbanisation was slow. It was only in the period under
review that a decisive transfer of the population commenced and urban areas came 
to be the focus of attention.
Inevitably industrialisation is advocated by the few and imposed upon the many. 
This is because the initial impetus for industrialisation occurs at a time when 
two more or less incompatible cultures clash. The old pre-industrial will tend 
to sanction modes of behaviour, customs and attitudes that are perceived as
running counter to the new culture of industrialism, Thus, when it is claimed that
17 
industrialisation needs an ideology and an ethic , it should not necessarily be
assumed that these are foisted upon an unwilling populace by a conspiritorial 
group of politicians and industrialists. The ideology and ethic will pre-date 
industrialisation. The industrialising elite will thus perceive themselves to be 
pioneers and crusaders with a self-righteous belief in their prescriptive policies 
for the rest of society. Furthermore, the population at large will be more or 
less receptive to the ethic that is central to the ideology. All ideologies of 
industrialisation, be they Methodist, Stalinist or nationalist, have embodied the 
notions that progress is desirable and positive and that self-discipline and 
self-improvement are virtues. If these values are inherent in the pre-industrial 
culture, as among the farmers of Japan, then the transition to the new industrial 
culture will be relatively easy. If, on the other hand, the old culture sanctions 
what are perceived by the industrialising elite to be wasteful, immoral and 
irrational modes of behaviour, then the old culture will have to be extirpated 
and replaced throughout society by a new culture that promotes progress.
This is why, it seems to me, the old adage about the machine imposing its own 
discipline needs to be qualified. For it is the ideology that demands the 
optimum (or in Stalin's case the maximum) utilisation of the machine that imposes
16 The urban population rose from 28.4 million (18.5 per cent) by the end of 1928 
to 39,1 million (23.7 per cent) by the end of 1932, I. Berlin and Yu, Mebel' 
'Strukturnye sdvigi v naselenii i proletariate 1 in Voprosy truda, 1932, nos
11-12, p.18.
17 Kerr et al, op. cit., p.53.
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the discipline. Similarly, factories were not built for the purpose of instilling 
discipline, but for the maximisation of income through the optimum utilisation 
of capital which, in turn, demanded a regular and reliable work force. After all, 
machines and workshops had existed long before the emergence of the factory system, 
In the pre-industrial culture, however, operatives exercised a degree of control 
over the pace and intensity of their work, these tending to be prescribed by the 
well-integrated social system in which they lived. In such systems subsistence, 
rather than maximisation of income was the prime consideration.
I agree with the view that it is misleading to talk about an idyllic, pastoral,
18 
pre-industrial ''Golden Age' for the wotk of both peasant and artisan was hard
and monotonous. It was rendered more or less tolerable, nonetheless, by the
ability to vary the pace and intensity of work. An eminent scholar of the
19 
industrial revolution in England has described this well:
"The working pattern was one of alternate bouts of intense 
labour and of idleness wherever men were in control of 
their working lives.''
He goes on to suggest that this might represent a natural human work rhythm. 
Viewed thus, such phenomena as high absentee rates after pay days and rest days, 
drinking sprees on religious holidays, poor time keeping, fighting and 
outbursts of violence directed at management and machines were characteristic of
the early years of most industrialisation drives, including that of the Soviet
20 
Union.
18 R. Blauner, ''.Work Satisfaction and Industrial Trends in Modern Society 1 , in 
^Problems of Modern Society, P. Worsley (ed.), London, 1973, p.117.
19 ,E.P. Thompson^, 'Time, Wotk^Piscipline and Industrial Capitalism' in 
^ Past and ^Present, no.38, December 1967, pp. 73-74.
20 G. Dukor, 'Sebestoimost', proizvoditel f nost' i trudovaya ditsiplina' in 
Bol'shevik, 1929, no.7, p. 32.
-19-
These were manifestations, not of Uow< or 'backward' culture, as was invariably 
claimed by the industrialisers, but of cultural differences. However, insofar 
as such phenomena were held to be incompatible with the interests of the 
industrialisers the latter were obliged to launch a moral attack on the entire 
culture that spawned and legitimised such modes of behaviour. The banning of 
traditional sports, feasts and customs, the moral condemnation of habits integral 
to the old culture and the advocacy of thrift, sobriety and industry seem to 
have accompanied all industrialisation drives, usually taking the form of a 
moral crusade (presented in the Soviet Union as the 'sharpening of the class 
struggle'). As it was the peasantry that best typified the old way of life, it 
was they that were usually scapegoated for the 'low' culture of the emergent
work force, although there is evidence to suggest that the artisan class was at
21 
least as guilty in this respect.
Inevitably, the process of adapting to the new culture and evolving new forms 
of effective human organisation will tend to lag behind the introduction of new 
technology and the consequent demands for tighter discipline made of the workers. 
For example, the concept of the maximisation of income may not have been sufficient- 
ly inculcated among the non-industrial work force to encourage peasants and 
artisans to enter the expanding factories for economic reward. However, the ethic 
of self-improvement that is the impetus behind industrial expansion, will be at 
work simultaneously in agriculture and the handicraft industries, threatening 
their independence, increasing mobility (a prerquisite of any industrialisation 
drive)_ and encouraging the rural population to seek alternative means of sub- 
sistence. Where economic incentive and pressure prove insufficiently effective,
physical compulsion will tend to be employed, the coercion of peasant labourers
22 
being the rule rather than the exception during industrialisation drives.
21 Compare, for example, the 'wine,women and gambling' life-style of Japanese 
artisans with the concepts of kokku-benrei (work and study hard) and kinku- 
chochiku (diligence and thrift) valued by farmers, Japanese Industrialisation 
and its Social Consequences, Berkeley, 1976, pp.23-24, 40. 
99 TJ F Mnnrp.. Industrialisation and Labor, New York, 1951, p.65.
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Whereas industrialisation represents for the politician and industrialist 
a political and economic task, the adaptation by the work force to industrial 
society represents a social process. Thus the attainment of political and 
economic objectives allow*politicians and industrialists to discount the un- 
avoidable high social costs of industrialisation by placing blame on the 
backwardness of the workers. On the other hand, the brutality, injustice and 
coercion, as well as the general suffering of the population that usually
accompanies the initial stages of industrialisation drives, cause social
23 
historians to question the human cost.
"This has considerable repercussions in applying Moore's concept of growing 
labour commitment, as elaborated by Clark Kerr and his associates. In common 
with most students of industrialising societies they concentrate almost ex- 
clusively on the adaptation of the peasant to industry, viewing the break of 
links with agriculture as the decisive step along the road to becoming a committed 
worker. A non-committed worker is thus one who enters industry for a fixed period 
aiming to earn a c ortain sum in order to return to agriculture when this has been 
achi eved ("the so called 'target' workers in the South African mines faU into 
this category 1, The next stage is the seasonal worker who regularly supplements 
his or her income from agriculture with industrial earnings. Clearly, this 
category of worker is more likely to be susceptible to the industrial culture 
and more responsive to the economic rewards of factory work, partimilarly if 
subsistence on the land is threatened. Many will tend to settle in the towns, thus 
gQieraiUy committing themselves to the urban way of life and weakening their 
links with the countryside.
23 See note 1 in this Chapter. The author emphasises the fact that the peasantry 
is not the sole source of new workers. In the Soviet experience this is 
important as other occupational groups formed a sizeable minority of ttie new 
recruits. Thus, of 12. 5 million new workers during the First Five-Year Plan, 
8.5. million were from the countryside, and 4 million from the towns (including 
1.7 million youngsters, 1.4 million adult woman. 0.4 artisans and 6.5 million 
students), A.M. Panfilova, Formirovanie rabochego klassa SSSR v go dy pervoi 
pyatiletki, Moscow, 1964, p. 122.
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At this stage the peasant has not yet chosen or settled into a specific job, 
trade or area. Only when this happens will he or she become a fully committed 
worker.
In the early stages of industrialisation the 'target' and generally 
committed workers will predominate, overall levels of commitment will be low 
and this will be manifested in high rates of turnover and absenteeism. As 
industrialisation progresses such behaviour will become less and less consistent 
with the demands of the industrialisers who will introduce a system of incentives 
and sanctions designed to reduce these rates. Providing that the appropriate 
system is introduced the worker, becoming more responsive to incentives and 
sanctions, will tend to adapt his or her behaviour to the system and rates of 
turnover and absenteeism will fall. Almost by definition, a committed work 
force presents no major problems of labour discipline. The biographies and
memoirs of many of the leading shock workers of the early five-year plans
25 
testify that a similar process occurred in the Soviet Union during this period.
However, this view of commitment has two basic flaws. First, it has no place 
for the new workers of non-rural background. These, it seems to me, do not remain
KltM^,
uncommitted due to any links with the land, but because they |(alternative means of 
subsistence and, consequently, a reduced dependence upon wage-earning. The 
second major criticism of the commitment theory is that it fails to explain how 
and why turnover and absentee rates, purportedly the major indicators of 
commitment, tend to rise when new technologies and organisational methods are 
introduced or when attitudes amongst the work force change.
The key concept, it seems to me, is security. In the pre-industrial society,
this resided in one's ability to perpetuate subsistence, in extended families and 
tight-knit neighbourhood groups in one's 'native region. Thus for many housewives
25 See, for example, A.K, Busygin,v Zhi-zn' moya "i moikh druzyei, M, 1939.
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arid children of workers there was little incentive to work for wages 
until pressure on the family budget increased (pither through rising 
levels of P. on sumption or falling stanfia-r-H S O-F living). Similarly, voting 
people have security in their youth and vigour, their potential and 
mobility and have a tendency to 'shop around' and see a little of life 
before committing themselves to a specific career.
Viewed from this nerspectivp. links with the land may be seen as a 
kind O-F safety-net in ti^es of hardship in industry. This was "Hlised 
bv the Soviet working class in t^e years prior to 'forced' industrial- 
Ts-n-Hnn, in both the flight back to the land during War Communism and bv 
the traditional land-holdings of thp prpdominai-ol^ hereditary, but relat 
ively low-paid industrial workers of the Urals. Once this safety-net 
was removed (in the Soviet case by the decrees forbidding workers to
•j r
return to collective farms before the expiry of their work contracts) 
the dependence on wage-earning was greatly increased and the general 
levels of commitment raised. Specific, or full, commitmpnt can only be 
ensured when opportunities for alternative employment within industry 
are cut to a minimum, this being achieved in the Soviet Union nniv o-Ft er 
a series of decrees restricting mobility and introducing internal pass- 
ports.
I propose that we substitute commitment with the concept of conscious 
discipline, by which I mean a conscious acceptance of elaborated and 
judicially-embodied rules. Clearly, during industrialisation drives, 
when traditions are being eliminated and the rules are being changed, 
very few workers will immediately acquire such a conscious discipline. 
What is more, subsequent radical changes in the work situation will 
cause further changes in the rules, so that, depending upon the worker's 
attitude to these changes, further periods of adaptation will be re- 
quired to maintain the desired levels of discipline.
But if the acquisition of conscious discipline takes time and the 
new methods of production demand new levels of discipline immediately, 
what other short term options are available to the industrialisers?
26 Sovnarkom and TsIK SSSR decree of 17 March 1933, Izvestiya, 
18 March 1933; Narkomyust SSSR decree of 14 August 1933, 
Izvestiya, 15 August 1933.
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The answer,perhaps, lies in two other forms of discipline: coercive 
(under which one is obliged to perform appropriate actions for fear of 
extreme negative sanctions) and self-discipline (by which one uni- 
laterally opts to perform such actions because they are consistent 
with convictions held). The respective means for implementing these 
forms of discipline are coercion and ideological pressure, which we 
have seen to be characteristic features of most industrialisation 
drives. However, as coercive discipline can be effective only as a 
transitional measure and self-discipline is a quality characteristic 
of the few, the aim will nonetheless be to create eventually a conscious 
discipline (i.e. the will to work in the desired manner).
This is why the initial stage of an industrialisation drive tends 
to be characterised by efforts to cultivate among the work force the 
will to work in the appropriate manner. This is usually achieved by 
sanctions, but also through utilising incentives both moral and 
material incentives. As the workers learn to respond to these in- 
centives their behaviour will be modified accordingly and a conscious 
discipline is gradually acquired. To the degree that this process 
advances, incentive measures will tend to increase while measures of 
coercion will be applied only at those manifestly lacking in discipline. 
As for those with self-discipline, the psychological benefits that 
accrue with acting according to one's beliefs will be bolstered by 
material benefits earned through working in the appropriate manner. In 
this way, even their discipline will become conscious and self- 
discipline will only be called upon in subsequent periods of radical 
change.
If we apply this approach to the first stage of Soviet industrial- 
isation (from 1929 to the beginning of 1931) we can see that there was 
an attempt to foster a general will to work in 'the Bol'shevik manner'. 
During the second stage, from early 1931 until 1934, the authorities 
sought to channel the energy thus generated into the appropriate 
channels. This helps explain why socialist competition was so vigour- 
ously promoted during the first stage as a means of destroying old work 
practices and fashioning new ones. Only once it had become more or
-24-
less accepted and institutionalised could attention be switched to 
increasing quality of output and reducing costs. This is borne out by 
the fact that during the initial stage the percentage of workers com-
peting rose from virtually nil to 65.5, while in the second phase it
27 
rose by only another 7.9 per cent to 73.4 per cent. Nonetheless, the
results of competition. in tpr™s of cost redaction, productivity 
aualitv were ™or« i^nrpssive in the spcond stage than in the first.
There are interesting parallels r.o be drawn in the English experiencp
both in the attempt to establish the will to work and in the means
90
employed to achieve this:
"This preoccupation (for moral reform) might seem to today's 
observer to be both impertinent and irrelevant to the worker's 
performance, but in fact it was critical, for unless the 
workmen wished to become 'respectable 1 in the correct sense, 
none of the other incentives would bite. Such approbious 
terms as 'idle 1 or 'dissolute 1 should be taken to mean strict- 
ly that the worker was indifferent to the employers' 
deterrents and incentives. According to contemporaries 'it was 
the irrationality of the poor, quite as nm'ch as their irreligion, 
that was distressing. They took no thought of the morrow... 
the workers wprp bv nature indolent, improvident and self- 
ind"lgentl '"
Indeed, even the concept of co-pptition h=»d ' t.« prpcedent in 
English industrial revolution. Such enlightened early industrialists as
Arkwright, Marshall and Owen all introduced embryonic forms of competit-
29 ion in their enterprises, seeking to foster a new attitude to work.
Despite some initial successes such movements were short-lived, not 
least because they ran counter to the predominant belief of the ruling 
class that workers were poor through their own inadeqnecies.
Clearly, a totally-different attitude to the workers p^isted in the 
Soviet Union so one might expect incentivp measures to be adopted more 
readily than in the English case. In the latter, coercive methods were
27 A. Devyakovich, 'Sotssorevnovanie i udarnichestvo' in Voprosy 
profdvizheniya, 1934, no.5, p.83.
28 Sidney Pollard, 'Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution', 
in The Economic History Review, vol.16, no.2, 1963, p.269.
29 ibid., pp.266-267.
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very prominent, especially in regard to child labour, and these still 
represent the chief means of achieving discipline in developing countr- 
ies.
With the notable exception of comrades' courts, many of the coercive 
measures that were applied by the Soviet authorities had precedents in 
earlier industrialisation drives, including self-indentures, passes 
stating that the worker had left his last place of employment with 
management permission, eviction from company-owned dwellings etc. 32 In 
most cases they were only marginally effective aue to labour shortages.
Thus the Soviet worker's attitude of nazhmut - uidu (if they pressure 
me, I'll quit) obliged the managment to use coercive measures sparingly 
and selectively, especially given the acute shortage of skilled cadres. 
It was only when the authorities were able U> t>ring pressure to bear on 
the managers to carry out coercive measures that the intended effect was 
achieved.
The most orominent forms of coercion applied during the Soviet 
industrialisation drive were the restrictions placed upon the freedom of 
movement (the turnover decrees) and the harsh sanctions imposed on 
absenteeism. Such a policy was justified at the time by the 'sharpening 
of the class struggle' theory. This ascribed a level of self-discipline 
to the workers that the existing work force clearly did not possess. By 
identifying those few who behaved in the ascribed manner as 'genuine 1 
workers, coercive measures could legitima^lv be applied to those who 
did not.
If in the West, conscious discipline was inculcated only after a long 
hard and sometimes brutal struggle during which sufficient numbers of 
workers accepted to a greater or lesser degree the bourgeois values of 
their employers, in the Soviet Union a shorter and more intensive 
struggle achieved similar results insofar as ascribed working class 
•"•iri-ups nropagated bv the employers (i.e. the Soviet state) ca^e t^ be 
accepted as more or less legitimate bv sufficient numbers of Soviet 
workers.
30 ibid.p. 263.
31 See, for example, F.H. Harbison and I.A. Ibrahim, 'Some Labor 
Problems of Industrialisation in Egypt* in The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.35, May 
1956, p.119.
32 For comrades' courts, see Chapter Four; for passes, see Daniel T. 
Rodgers, 'Tradition, Modernity and the American Industrial Worker: 
Keflections and Critique', The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
vol. VII, no.4, Spring 19/7, p.109.
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Soviet scholars might well claim that, on the eve of industrial- 
isation, there already existed a large nucleus of second and third 
generation industrial workers who passed on their conscious discipline 
to the new workers. However, this presupposes that the levels of 
discipline existing in 1928 were consistent with the demands of 'forced' 
industrialisation. In fact, there seems to inconsistencies between the 
acsribed modes of behaviour of the 'cadre' workers and their actual 
behaviour. This inconsistency was enshrined in the Labour Code of 1922, 
which afforded the workers unprecedented degrees of security (which 
often has a negative effect on discipline levels) and relied upon them 
to respond in the desired manner. To some extent there was a favourable 
response, absentee rates falling from an average of 24.8 days per 
worker in 1919/1920 to 5.72 days in 1928. 33 However, even this 
impressive reduction was considered insufficient, especially once the 
rationalisation drive had commenced in March 1927.
Similarly, it was specifically the conscious discipline that had 
evolved by 1928 that was the target of attack of socialist competition, 
an attack spearheaded by self-disciplined Komsomol youngsters. Gener- 
ally speaking, cadre workers only joined this movement once considerable 
ideological and moral pressure had been brought to bear and opposition 
to the Komsomol initiative had been proscribed.
Certainly, both Western and Soviet observers agreed that the levels 
of labour discipline existing in 1928 were not adequate for the require- 
ments of industrialisation. In March 1929, Georgii Malenkov, in noting 
significant falls in the levels of discipline in Soviet factories commen 
ted that Lenin's criticism that the Russian was a poor worker in compar- 
ison with workers of the leading nations "remains valid to this day in
34 
spite of the enormous achievements in this respect since then."
An American consultant observed "the lack of discipline which is so 
noticeable in Russian industry is not due...to any lack of rules and 
regulations, or to their non-enforcement: it is an inner self-discipline 
that is wanting.'' His 'inner self-discipline' (i.e. an internalisat 
ion of the rules and appropriate modes of behaviour) corresponds to our
33 V.Il'inskii,'Rabochii god v fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti
SSSR', in Statisticheskoe obozrenie, 1929, no.2, p.35: Trud v SSSR; 
statisticheskii spravochnik, Moscow, 1936, p. 96.
34 G. Malenkov, 'Povyshenie proizvoditel'nosti truda i zadachi nizovoi
partiinoi raboty' in Bol'shevik, 1929, no.6, p.69.
35 Joseph Freeman, The soviet Worker, London, 1932, p.95.
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concept of conscious discipline.
Thus it would appear that, despite the presence of a large proport- 
ion of cadre workers, discipline was low. Yet this is not inconsist- 
ent with the experience of other countries. In India, for example, at 
roughly the same time, a very high proportion of operatives had worked 
in the same textile enterprise for five years or more and yet "disc- 
ipline at the work place was fundamentally lax and ramshackle" 36 . 
Moreover in Japan, despite the widespread institution of shushin-koyo 
(lifetime employment with one firm) it is claimed that "the formation of
a disciplined and permanent working class was not achieved at least until
37 the 1930's" , further indication that security of employment is not
necessarily conducive to the improvement of discipline.
However, the existence of large numbers of cadre workers clearly has 
some advantages. For example, the ethic of modernisation and progress will 
tend to be stonger amongst them than in the peasantry even though the
cultural conf 1 lots *->»*t accompany industrialisation will tend to split the
38 
working class itself into 'modernist 1 and 'traditionalist' factions.
The former's attitude to work and the new forms of organisation will 
more closely resemble that of the employer than that of the traditional- 
ist colleague.
Several factors lead to the conclusion that there evisted a relative 
ly high proportion of 'modernise^ during the Soviet industrialisation 
drive:
i) the artificial retarding of economic development, education and 
urbanisation due to the Tsarist autocracy, war and revolution:
ii) the consequent delay in the Soviet industrialisation drive com- 
bined with the example of a developed West that fostered notions 
of 'catch up and surpass';
iii) the Marxist-Leninist ideological commitment to industrialisation, 
modernisation and progress;
iv) an ideology that accorded high status to workers in the new
industrial society compared to the low status they had hitherto 
enjoyed;
v) the relative weakness of craft traditions and trade unions that 
could perpetuate, in an organised way, traditions, advantages etc
36 Morris D. Morris, op. cit., pp. 88-90, 117.
37 Japanese Industrialisation, pp.36,62.
38 A. Dawley and P. Faler, 'Working-class Culture and Politics in the 
Industrial Revolution - Sources of Loyalty and Rebellion', in
Journal of Social History, vol.9, no.4, Summer 1976, pp.466-480.
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vi) the relative youth of the Soviet work force and the sharply- 
defined generation gap brought about by the extensive pro- 
gramme of education under Soviet rule that bred distaste and 
dismissal of old ways as well as enthusiasm to create, invent 
and build a brave, new world.
Furthermore, whereas the practice of capitalism in the early 
Western industrialisation drives (lay-offs, short time working, wage- 
cuts and unemployment) were considered at odds with methodist virtues 
of self-sufficiency, self-improvement and self-discipline by large 
sections of modernist-minded workers, the same cannot be said of the 
Soviet workers, few of whom were politically aware enough to grasp 
that Soviet practice contradicted socialist theory.
This is important, as it is usually those groups of modernists who 
have perceived these contradictions, rather than the traditionalists, 
who are most likely to rebel against such inconsistencies. At the 
same time, the majority of the modernists are likely to conclude that 
the higher pay, upward mobility and job security more than compensates 
for these shortcomings and will tend to form a base of loyal support for 
the changes.
If one applies this to the Soviet situation, it helps explain the 
positions of the various Party oppositionist factions, which were all in 
their time accused of worker adoration, and to the stand taken by such 
articulate and persuasive workers as Gozhev, the Leningrad riveter, who
opposed the introduction of socialist competition as an anti-worker
39 policy inconsistent with socialist principles.
Although, as we have seen, a successful competition movement was not 
a feature of earlier industrialisation drives, one aspect of it - the 
delegation of responsibility for discipline onto the immediate organi- 
sers of production, represented a characteristic feature of correspond- 
ing processes in other countries. This would usually take the form of 
sub-contracting or decentralisation of authority to the first-line 
supervisor (foreman, charge hand etc.) as well as the introduction of 
payment-by-results. Both forms played a crucial role during Soviet
39 Trud, 3 July 1929 (see Chapter Five).
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industrialisation, both being eminently suitable for a work force with 
a largely non-industrial background. We shall examine the impact of 
piece-rates in Chapter Seven, suffice it to point out that it has been 
recognised that "work is always task-orientated in non-industrial
societies...and...it may be appropriate to tie wages to tasks and not
40 directly to time in newly-developing areas." Piece work not only
provides the best method of task-related payment, but also it repres- 
ents "a moral force which corresponds to the machine as a physical
41 force" (i.e. it demands discipline insofar as it is geared to the
maximisation of income).
The importance of the delegation of responsibility to the first- 
line supervisor was that it introduced the new worker to a small group 
discipline which he could relate to his experience in the pre-industrial 
culture. Thus the Russian starosta (and subsequently the brigadir) had 
counterparts in the American gang boss, the Japanese oyakota and the 
Indian sirdar.
Given the intensity of the Soviet industrialisation drive, such a 
'divide and rule 1 policy was arguably more effective than the various 
forms of compulsion used elsewhere, particularly as the incentive scheme 
which accompanied its introduction was tailored specifically to appeal 
to the individualistic and materialistic aspirations of the former 
peasants. The experienced, self-disciplined workers were more inclined 
towards collective forms of work and payvin the production communes, 
which the peasants tended to join only when they perceived their income 
might rise significantly. The communes provide evidence that worker- 
inspired forms of work organisation tend to be collective, while 
management initiatives tend to be directed at more individualistic forms
Thus it may be seen, that the distinctive feature of the Soviet ex- 
perience as far as the new worker was concerned was the unprecedented 
pace at which he or she was obliged to adapt to industrial culture. In 
most other respects, the process of acculturation fitted into the 
general pattern of earlier and subsequent industrialisation drives.
40 E.P. Thompson, op. cit., p.91.
41 Herbert C. Gutman, 'Work Culture =»nd Society in Industrializing 
America. 1815-1919', The American Historical Review, vol.78, no.3, 
June 1973, p. 565.
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The Introduction of Scientific Management
If the initial entry of the new worker into the factory gave rise 
to profound problems, then the introduction of American efficiency 
systems came as no less a shock. In the latter case, however, the new 
worker was not necessarily at a disadvantage in comparison with the
experienced industrial worker, for the entire work force was required
42 to adapt. As an observer of this process in Western Europe observed:
"for those with lengthy factory experience the nature of work 
altered more dramatically during the decades around the 
turning of the century that at any point since the install- 
ation of the factories themselves."
As we have seen, in the early industrial revolutions it was often
the old-established workers who were least inclined to observe the new
43 discipline, while the first-generation workers would often labour
44 
considerably harder than the norm. During this subsequent process of
transformation, the well-developed conscious discipline of the older 
workers would sometimes prove a bigger barrier to change than the 
relatively inexperienced newcomers. As was observed in America:
"There is no question that, in all the industries faced with 
rapid conversion, the attitude of the established workers 
was suspicious if not actively hostile - and because of the 
new scope of technological change this involved a large 
minority of the whole labor force."
Clearly, the time-lag in Western Europe and America between the init- 
ial industrialisation drive and the introduction of the new techniques 
of scientific management was considerable, the impetus for the latter 
changes being prompted by the increasing international competition 
between industrialised countries at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The new methods were to be applied, therefore, to a committed work 
force, receptive both to the new norms of discipline required as well 
as to the new incentive systems that accompanied them. In the Soviet
42 Peter Stearns, Lives of Labour - Work in a Maturing Industrial 
Society, London, 1975, p.4.
43 Economic History Review, vol.16, no.2, 1963, p.255 (Sidney Pollard)
44 The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol.VTT, no.4, Spring 1977 
p.667 (Daniel T. Rodgers).
45 Peter Stearns, op. cit.> p.129.
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Union, on the other hand, the introduction of the new techniques coin- 
cided roughly with the massive expansion of the work force during the 
industrialisation drive, with the result that traditional forms of 
factory work and resistance to changes were relatively insignificant. 
Moreover, promotion into the rapidly expanding management apparatus 
drew the most experienced workers off the shop floor.
Similarly, the successful introduction of the new techniques req- 
uired that the ethic of modernisation and progress be strong amongst 
the work force. For obvious reasons, this was more likely to occur 
with a younger labour force. In Germany, for example, which had a 
high proportion of young workers, the adaptation was much smoother 
than in England, where the older, highly-skilled work force put up
more resistance. In Western Europe as a whole, the typical reaction
46 to the new production processes was one of "grumbling acceptance"
The Soviet work force was relatively young at the outset of the 
industrialisation drive and became younger as the First Five-Year 
Plan progressed, thanks to the influx of young recruits. The
average age of workers at the Serp i Molgt metalworks in Moscow, for
47 
example, fell from 31.8 years in 1929 to 27.4 years in 1932. Thus,
with a youthful work force, largely unhampered by deeply-ingrained 
'customs and practices', relatively receptive to payment-by-results 
and generally committed to diminishing the West's technological lead, 
the USSR had several factors that might facilitate the introduction of 
scientific management into industry. However, until the existing 
labour organisations and structures were rendered impotent, the newe^wi 
could and did utilise such traditional forms of protest as strikes and 
go-slows.
The generally-accepted 'father' of scientific management was F.W. 
Taylor, who elaborated and applied his theories to American industry
46 Peter Stearns, op. cit., pp. 134, 138-139.
47 Profsoyuznaya perepis* 1932-1933gg, Moscow, 1934, n IS.
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around the turn of the century. The basic principle underlying his 
methods was the separation of planning from the execution of the work, 
thus giving management exclusive responsibility for the former and 
control over the latter. The target of his attack was worker control 
over the production process, usually manifested in customs and practices 
which he termed 'soldiering 5 . This, he claimed, was to blame for the 
"enormous difference between the amount of work which a first-class man
can do under favourable circumstances and the work which is actually
48 done by the average man." Perceiving that both management and
workers were losers from the existing system, he sought to devise a 
system under which both would gain, the former through reduced product- 
ion costs and the latter through increased earnings.
To achieve this he advocated that work processes be mechanised, 
simplified and standardised as far as possible, that the optimum time 
and rate for each job be calculated and that an incentive system be 
introduced that would encourage the worker to fully utilise wotik time.
For every job there was one best way and it was the management, not the
49 
worker, that determined this. Thus:
"It is only by enforced standardisation of methods, 
enforced adoption of the best implements and working 
conditions, and enforced cooperation that this faster
work can be assured."
Management was to take sole responsibility for the selection, 
training, organisation, deployment and disciplining of the work 
force, the worker's only function being to execute simple, repetitive 
operations in a machine-intensive process. Thp symbol of this new 
process was the stop watch, and the logical conclusion - the assembly 
line. Prior to World War I time-and-motion studies had swept through 
Western industry and, by 1913, Henry Ford had introduced the first 
assembly line.
48 F.W. Tayior, 'Shop Management* in Scientific Management, New York, 
1947, p.24.
49 F.W. Tayior, 'Principles of Scientific Management 1 in ibid., p.83.
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It was not so much the principle underlying Taylor's theory that 
generated worker opposition as the subsequent rate-cuts that came to 
be associated with time-studies (in this respect the Soviet worker's 
attitude to new technologies and methods was similarly soured).
Not suprisingly, such a management theory par excellence soon won the 
admiration of Lenin and several of his supporters in the Bolshevik 
leadership, despite reservations about the negative aspects of scien- 
tific management as practised under capitalism. However, there was no 
opportunity to introduce it during his lifetime although interest in 
Taylor's work remained high even after his death. It was only when 
Stalin had launched a rationalisation drive in 1927 that elements of 
scientific management began to appear in Soviet industry and it was not 
until he had launched the socialist offensive, curbed trade union 
autonomy, strengthened the principle of one-man management and en- 
couraged the spread of socialist competition that the situation was 
favourable for the introduction of new technologies and time-and-motion 
studies on a wide scale.
Clearly, a fundamental difference existed between Taylor's and 
Lenin's estimation of the working man. Taylor perceived the ideal 
worker in his system to be the strong, docile, obedient, but unthinking
Schmidt (who in the celebrated experiment shifted 47 tons of pig iron in
tag< 
52
one shift instead of the normal 12^ tons). But for scientific mana e-
ment, Taylor claimed, Schmidt would have worn himself out by midday. 
In the same vein, Henry Ford, the most ardent practioner of Taylor's
system observed that "the assembly line is a haven for those who haven't
53 got the brains to do anything else."
The possibility that the worker might have a mental input into his 
work was not entertained. In the Soviet Union on the other hand, the 
worker was actively encouraged to study techniques, make rationalisation 
suggestions and work on inventions. This not only saved the Soviet
50 Alan Aldridge, Power, Authority and Restrictive Practices, Oxford, 
1976, p. 30.
51 F.W. Taylor, 'Principles... 1 , in op. cit., pp.43-47.
52 ibid., p.59.
53 Auto Work, p.67.
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economy millions of roubles, but also provided the Soviet worker with 
greater job satisfaction, extra income, elevated social status and 
improved prospects of promotion from the shop floor. Nonetheless, there 
is more than a hint of Schmidt in some of the super-heroes of the shock 
construction sites during the first five-year plans.
More importantly, Taylor totally rejected the concept of cooperative 
work because "no form of cooperation has yet been devised in which each 
individual is allowed free scope for his personal ambitions. Personal
ambition always has been and will remain a more powerful incentive
54 to exertion than a desire for the general welfare." Not that all
labour experts in the West agreed with him, for subsequent research 
determined that cooperation within work groups and competition between 
them generally results in higher productivity.
Soviet industry appeared to have developed a means of incorporat- 
ing all of these characteristics in the cost accounting brigades (see 
Chapter Seven). These were set group targets but its members were paid 
by individual results. Furthermore, by retaining the right to appoint 
the brigade leader, management ensured control over the workers, while 
delegating responsibility for plan fulfilment, labour discipline and 
work distribution.
Thus, in the two most widely-noted defects in scientific management: 
the degradation of the worker and the loss of control by the operative 
over the work process, the Soviet employee would appear to have fared 
better than his Western counterpart in the former, while unprotected by 
independent trade unions, considerably worse in the latter, although the 
appalling living aftd working conditions of many Soviet workers were degr 
rading in themselves.
Moreover, there were significant differences in the incentive systems 
introduced by Taylor, on the one hand, and Stalin, on the other, most 
notably in the essentially regressive nature of Taylor's piece rates 
and the ostensibly progressive rates in the Soviet system.
54 F.W. Taylor, 'Shop Management 1 , in op. cit., p.37.
55 Victor H. Vroom, Work and Motivation, New York, 1964, p.230.
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Here distinctions must be drawn between theory and practice. For 
example, Taylor only advocated the use of wage deductions as a discip- 
inary measure and even suggested that the money accruing from this 
should be returned to the workers in the form of mutual benefit funds 
etc. Moreover, he explicitly rejected the Towne-Halsey plan which fived 
norms on the work of the fastest worker. Taylor's preference was to 
base norms on the work of a first-class man and that he should be en- 
couraged for breaking ranks. The real loser under this system was 
"the man who can work hard and who does not" for he " has no place in 
scientific management"
As regards the Soviet claim that their piece-rate System protected 
the earnings of the average worker, here too some qualification is re- 
quired. Periodic rate cuts and norm revisions, justified and in many 
cases initiated by the most productive workers, had the effect of 
obliging the avera§e worker to intensify his work in order to retain 
his level of earnings. Tn the final analysis, the opinion expressed
by a leading official of the Soviet trade union movement is not that
59 different from Taylor's conclusion:
"only the worker who fulfils and overfulfils the plan in a
Bolshevik manner is entitled to be provided for and have his
material well-being improved by the workers' state."
The relative ease with which piece rates were introduced into 
Soviet industry is probabl}' explained by the weakness of the trade 
unions and the high proportion of new workers in the work force. For, 
in Western countries, it would appear to have been the more militant, 
unionised groups of cadre workers that were most opposed to their 
introduction and the new, young and lower-skilled that most favoured 
them, the latter being less sensitive to the exploitative nature of 
piece rates and lacking the working class solidarity that has tradition' 
ally opposed their introduction.
56 F.W. Taylor, 'Shop Management 1 , in op. cit., pp. 38-39, 197.
57 ibid., pp. 51, 57-58.
58 _ibid., p.81.
59 Trud, 2 January 1933.
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This is not to say that cadre workers were opposed as individuals to 
piece rates. They were preferable, for example, tfc . constant close 
supervision and allowed a modicum of control over the pace and intensity 
of work and, most importantly, their application almost invariably 
led to immediate increases in earnings. Thus in American industry at
end of the last century the Machinists' Union was bitterly opposed to
fiO piece rates while many machinists were actively in favour of them.
Whatever the lure of economic rewards, there can be little doubt that 
the introduction of piece rates and the attendant speed ups caused the 
situation on the shop floor to deteriorate. This, in turn, led to 
sharp rises in absentee and turnover rates. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, absentee rates rose to 6-10 per cent in German and
L ai 
62
American industry, while turnover rates in French, German nd American
industry averaged around one hundred per cent per annum.
Despite the economic rewards offered in factories utilising new 
technologies, a high proportion of new workers would leave after the 
briefest exposure to the assembly line, while many cadre workers would 
seek refuge in plants still using the old techniques. For these reasons 
turnover at the Ford plant reached 380 per cent in 1913, the year that
/TO
the conveyor belt was introduced.
A feature of labour turnover during periods of new technology is the 
high level of skilled workers on the move. The rapid expansion of 
complex technologies creates a shortage of skilled workers and the 
opportunity for upward mobility increases. In German metal and
engineering industries in the first decade of the twentieth century,
64 
skilled turnover rates were actually higher than unskilled. As we
shall see, similar trends were to be observed in Soviet factories 
during the period under review.
60 Irwin Yellowitz, Industrialization and the American Labor Movement, 
New York, 1977, p. 85.
61 Peter Stearns, op. cit., p.242; The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, vol VII, no.4, Spring 1977, p.662 (Daniel T. Rodgers).
62 ibid., p.663; Peter Stearns, op. cit., pp. 243,247.
63 Harry Braverman, op. cit.,p.149.
64 Peter Stearns, op. cit., p.244.
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Similarly, the less than complete adaptation to the new incentive 
schemes was demonstrated in the Western countries by workers compensat- 
ing for the strenuous work by taking frequent one day 'holidays'. 65 Tt 
is tempting to conclude that the 15 November 1932 decree on absenteeism 
that made one day's absence a firing offence, was evidence of the same 
process in Soviet industry.
Thus it may be seen that high turnover and absentee rates were to 
be anticipated in the Soviet industrialisation drive. Indeed, if one 
allows for the effects of the exceptionally poor living and working 
conditions, the rates were not excessively higher than those in other 
countries at similar stages of economic development.
The point is that they were perceived as being too high in a society 
bent on creating a modern industry and an appropriately disciplined 
work force in an unprecedentedly short time span.
The 'success' of the Soviet drive for labour discipline was that 
an incentive system was eventually found that was most suitable for the 
work force then existing, thus maximising sources of loyal support 
without having to jettison the illusion of workers' control. The 
'failure' was that the energy and resources expended on the political 
need to prevent the worker from his natural tendency to exercise actual 
control over his work process, objectively were unjustified in terms of 
economic benefits and social costs. The belatedly recognised need 
to apply Western methods of sociological inquiry into worker behaviour 
is evidence of this.
However, it is not enough to copy Western methods of work organ- 
isation and management. That lesson should have been learned during the 
period under review. As a Western commentator observes a propos the 
Soviet metalworking industry in the thirties: 66
"such copying was impossible because technology and production 
organisation are inseparably linked, and becaused matured, in- 
tricate organisational methods cannot be 'adopted'"
65 Peter Stearns, op. cit. p.242.
66 David Granick, 'Economic Development and Productivity Analysis: the 
Case of Soviet Metalworking', in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
May 1957, D.232.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND TO 
THE DRIVE FOR LABOUR DISCIPLINE.
The dispute over the state of labour discipline among 
industrial workers formed an integral part of the intra- 
Party struggles over the rates of industrialisation. Those 
who advocated forcing the pace as quickly as possible clearly 
perceived the existing levels of discipline as an obstacle to 
the implementation of this policy, whereas those that sought 
a more moderate, balanced pace were apt to devote more atten- 
tion to the human and social costs involved. At the beginn- 
ing of the period under review, in the latter half of 1928, 
both sides were hardening their respective attitudes to the 
question of labour discipline.
In organisational terms, the sides might best be presented 
as, on the one hand, the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions (VTsSPS) - the body charged with leading the defence 
of the economic and material interests of the workers, and nil 
the People's Commissariat of Labour (Narkomtrud) - the State 
organ entrusted with the supervision and inspection of labour 
legislation. On the other side stood the Supreme Economic 
Council (Vesenkha) - the State body representing the manage- 
ment of nationalised industry and thus immediately responsib- 
le for production discipline, and the Communist Party and 
Komsomol, insofar as these organisations generated the polit- 
ical will for rapid industrialisation.
The forum for much of the dispute was the Press, represen- 
ted on the one side by Trud (the trade union daily) and 
Voprosy truda (the monthly journal of Narkomtrud) and on the 
other by Pravda and Komsomol'skaya Pravda (the daily organs 
of the Party and Komsomol respectively) and Vesenkha's daily 
publication Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta, which from 1 
January 1930 became known, appropriately as Za industrializ- 
atsiyu (or 'For Industrialisation').
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However, there was considerable overlapping within these 
groups. Tomskii, Chairman of VTsSPS from 1922 to 1929 and 
the successive Commissars of Labour, Shmidt (1918-1928) and 
Uglanov (1928-1930), were still prominent members of the 
Communist Party leadership, as were their allies in the 
Right Opposition, Bukharin (Editor of Pravda) and Rykov 
(Chairman of Sovnarkom - the Council of People's Commissars). 
The argument for Stalin's 'general Party line' was carried 
within the trade union leadership by Kaganovich, with assist- 
ance from Veinberg and, subsequently, Shvernik.
The Party 'Shake Up' of the Trade Unions
When the conflict came to a head at the VIII VTsSPS 
Congress in December 1928, the management representatives, 
led by Vesenkha Chairman Kuibyshev, pressed the mainly econ- 
omic case for stricter one-man management and tighter labour 
discipline, while the union spokesmen, led by Tomskii, laid 
greater stress on the social need for defending the workers' 
interests and improving their standard of living. However, 
the outcome of the debates was decided by the fact that 
Stalin's 'general line' came down firmly on the management 
side and labelled the trade union leadership's policies as 
khvostism (the head following the tail) and tred-unionism 
(putting economic interests ahead of political as the Western 
trade unions had done).
It would be wrong, however, to depict the struggle at the 
VIII Congress as between 'managers' and 'workers' for the 
leaders of both camps belonged to the 'industrialisers' who 
sought to improve output, develop a socialist work discipline 
and modernise Soviet industry: the disagreement stemmed from 
how best to achieve this and who should bear the brunt of the 
burden entailed.
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Indeed, foreign trade unionists at this time often found 
it difficult to distinguish between the warring factions of 
"Moscow communists" who they accused of adopting "a sixteenth 
century conception of strategy and tactics" in maintaining 
Party control over the unions. Tomskii had done little to 
dispel their fears when, at the VII VTsSPS Congress in 1926, 
he had declared that "we do not conceal from anyone that the
trade union movement has been, is and will be directed by the
9 Communist Party in the most centralised fashion."
In opposing Soviet membership of international trade union 
organisations, the official journal of the British TUC and 
Labour Party explained in 1928 that: 3
"In spite, therefore, of our strong, genuine desire 
to see Soviet Russia develop into the world's first 
Socialist State, despite our fixed determination that 
Soviet Russia be given a free hand in its internal de- 
velopment, free from outside Imperialist interference, 
despite our natural solidarity with all workers, of 
whatever creed, race, or colour, no good purpose at 
the present stage can possibly be served by proposals 
for joint committees, joint conferences, or affiliation 
of the Russian unions to our own organisations whilst 
they remain the tools of a narrow fanatic Marxian sect.
This highlights the contradictory position of trade unions
"~"j. £'• '
in the USSR during the New Economic Policy. On the one hand, 
they served as 'transmission belts' between the Party and the 
workers and thus were obliged to help improve production as 
well as to foster a socialist work discipline amongst the 
workers, while at the same time they were charged with defend 
ing their members' interests. As the cornerstone of Stalin's 
industrialisation drive was the absolute priority of the 
interests of production, it became a prime necessity to get 
the trade unions to shift their emphasis from defensive work 
and turn their 'faces to production'.
*******************************
1 The Labour Magazine, vol.7, no.8, December 1928, p.357.
2 Quoted in 'The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia', 
ILO Studies and Reports, Series A (Industrial Relations), 
no.26, Geneva, 1927, p.253.
3 The Labour Magazine, vol.7, no.4, August 1928, p.154.
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The change effected in the trade union leaders' perceptions 
of their responsibilities within the period under review are 
evident when comparing the following quotes. First, Tomskii 
in December 1928:4
"Trade unions unite workers irrespective of their 
political or religious beliefs. If we exclude all 
believers, who are we left with? The borders of our 
union would not be much wider than those of the Comm- 
unist Party, i.e. one hundred per cent orthodox comm- 
unists. A worker is a worker in spite of his prejud-
ices . "
Now Shvernik, VTsSPS First Secretary, speaking in June 
1933: 5
In the defence of the interests of the working class 
and of socialist industry, we can no longer tolerate 
that a flitter or loafer be supplied on an equal basis 
with the foremost shock worker. The trade unions will 
not allow it!"
In other words, Tomskii was using a socio-economic 
definition of a worker (i.e. all workers), whereas Shvernik 
utilised a narrowly political definition (i.e. only 'genuine 1 
workers). Herein lies the crux of the organisational changes 
within labour relations, for labour discipline became a pol- 
itical requirement that happened to coincide with the econo- 
mic demands that management were making while running counter 
to certain social demands that the workers were forwarding.
However, it would be wrong to assume that the winning over 
of the trade unions to the 'management' line, represented a 
complete abrogation of the commitment to improve workers' 
living standards. There remained throughout a political im- 
perative to keep alive the notion that the USSR was a genuine 
workers' state and that all policies adopted by its Governm- 
ent and Communist Party were in the interests of the workers. 
Indeed, those workers that followed the 'general' line most 
actively tended to be among the main beneficaries of industr- 
ialisation (e.g. Brezhnev , Ustinov and so on). 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Vc * /v /v * * * * * * * * * * *
4 Vos'moi s"ezd, p. 186.
5 N. Schvernik, New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions, 
Moscow-Leningrad, 1933, p.24.
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What changed during this period was the definition of the 
worker. In effect it was only the worker with the psychology 
of a manager (i.e. willing and able to put the interests of 
production before immediate personal needs) that was to be 
regarded as a 'genuine' worker. The others, irrespective of 
how experienced, proletarian or skilled they might be, might 
well be labelled 'backward' or 'a class alien element' on 
such occasions as they put their own interests first. The 
ideological justification for such a narrow definition was 
provided by the now-discredited theory of the 'sharpening of 
the class struggle'.
A ready and useful scapegoat for manifestations of 'back- 
ward' culture was provided during the conflict over labour 
discipline by the mass influx into the work force of rural 
migrants in the latter half of the 1920's. The increase in 
the number of reported incidents of drunkeness, hooliganism, 
abuse of administrative personnel and other types of 'back- 
ward' culture would appear to coincide with this influx. 
However, it is by no means clear that only the newcomers were 
to blame. For example, in 1925/26, before the flood of rec- 
ruits had made its presence felt, the rate of unsanctioned 
absenteeism (generally accepted as the best gauge of labour 
discipline) stood at 8.04 days per worker, a figure which had 
fallen to 4.09 days by 1929. Yet the census of 1926 reveals 
that 53.4 per cent of all industrial workers could be class- 
ified as skilled, and a further 26.3 per cent as unskilled, 
levels that were not to be achieved again during the period 
under review.'
This would suggest that skill levels and industrial ex- 
perience were not necessarily conducive to high levels of 
discipline. There is certainly no shortage of evidence on
Q
the indisciplined behaviour of 'cadre' workers.
7C
6 VJJsol'tsev, 'Poteri rabochego vremeni i ikh ispol'zovanie 
v sisteme nepreryvnogo proizvodstva', in Voprosy truda, 
1930, no. 6, p.36; Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR; statistich- 
eskii spravochnik, Moscow , 1932, p.446.
7 ' Izmenenie v chisTennosti i sostave sovetskogo rabochego
klassa, Moscow, 1961 , p.112. 
8. See, for example, I. Povalyaev, 'Avtobiografiya udarnika',
in Bor'ba klassov, 1931, nos. 3-4, p.79.
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Similarly, industrial experience (stazh) was not always 
a reliable indicator of cultural levels. If one accepts that 
the literacy rate is the best gauge in this respect, one may 
see from the results of the following survey, conducted among 
union members in 1929, that cultural levels varied widely 
according to region and industry:
TABLE 1
Industry & Region % workers entering Average stazh % workers
production prior 1917 (in years) ill it.
Coal (Donbas)
Cotton (Ivanovo)
Oil (Baku)
" (Groznyi)
Metalworking (Leningrad)
(Urals)
All industry
33.2
61.6
54.6
40.6
51.5
42.6
60.7
8.7
13.9
13.2
9.7
11.3
10.4
11.9
15.2
20.1
25.0
7.9
2.8
8.7
13.9
Source: Trud v SSSR, 1926-1930, Moscow 1930, pp. 26,30.
Thus, on the eve of the forced industrialisation drive, 
more than sixty per cent of the industrial workers had sta- 
rted work prior to the Revolution, had an average stazh of 
almost 12 years (i.e. precisely to the Revolution), and yet 
one in every seven was illiterate. If the level of discip- 
line of this work force was considered inadequate, then one 
would expect that during the Five-Year plan, when the prop- 
ortion of new workers rose sharply, the average length of 
industrial experience consequently fell and the illiteracy 
rate rose, that there would be a further deterioration.
However, these average figures mask the extraordinary 
heterogeneity of the Soviet working class at this time. For 
example, the seasonal labourers pictured at the Magnitogorsk 
construction site bear a striking resemblance to Repin's 
celebrated Volga boatmen9 , and in cultural terms, were worlds
it it * Vc * * it * it it it * it * it it V? it Vf * Vc it * it it it it it it it
9 See Louis Fischer, Machines and Men in Russia, New York, 
1932, opposite p.74.
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away from the skilled Leningrad metalworker with years of ex- 
perience in American industry!0. It is important to bear in 
mind, however, that it was the latter who might soon be class 
ified as backward, and the former as 'advanced 1 , depending 
upon their respective attitudes to the changes taking place 
in Soviet industry. Moreover, whereas over half of the indus- 
trial workers in 1929 were 'hereditary' proletarians (i.e. 
at least second or third generation workers)lithe situation 
changed dramatically as fc.K<*. ^v«e.-1*.<\r P\<N.O progressed, 68 per 
cent of the increment of workers and employees in industry 
came from the peasantry.12 Just how the situation changed 
may be seen from the fact that, at the Khar'k ov electro- 
mechanical works, 55.5 per cent of the workers in 1928/29 
had been hereditary proletarians and 33.9 per cent peasants. 
By 1932 the respective figures were 37.6 and 62.4 per cent. i3
During his speech to the VIII VTsSPS Congress, Tomskii had 
drawn attention to this heterogeneity (as, indeed, had Kuiby- 
shev), and had urged a differentiated approach towards the 
various sections of the working class. He drew clear distin- 
ctions, for example, between the skilled workers of large- 
scale industry who (like Tomskii himself and many of his col- 
leagues in the State, Party and union bureaucracy) had fought 
for and defended the Revolution and the ordinary 'cadre' 
workers who had broadly supported Soviet power, but were 
by no means 'active builders of socialism'. This was an im- 
portant distinction for the 1922 Labour Code (piloted into 
effect by Shmidt, the Labour Commissar) appeared to reflect 
the qualities of the former group and ascribe them to the 
latter, who, naturally enough turned this to their advantage. 
As industrialisation got under way, Soviet industry was vir- 
tually denuded of the first category of workers (and large 
numbers of the second) due to the demands of collectivisation
it /V * * Vc * Vc it * * * * * it * * * * it * if * it * * * it it it it it
10 N.B. Lebedeva and O.I. Shkaratan, Ocherki istorii sotsia- 
1isticheskogo soreynoyaniya, Leningrad, 1966, p.17.
11 Trud v SSSR,, 1926-393Ugg., Moscow, 1930, p.26.
12 See J.D. Barber,'The Composition of the Soviet Working 
Class, 1928-41', CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS no.16, 
University of Birmingham, 1978, p.16.
13 L.E. Ankudinova,'Izmeneniya v sostave rabochego klassa 
SSSR v periqde postroenlva_sot-sla] i.7.ma . 1 91 7-1937gg: in 
Iz istorii rabocnego tu as'sa'KSSK, Leningrad, PJFl , p. 134.
-45-
promotion into the State apparatus and expanded study facil- 
ities .
A more obvious distinction was to be drawn, however, 
between the two aforementioned groups of experienced workers 
and the newcomers originating from the countryside who, in 
Tomskii's words "regard the factory as a place to which need 
has driven them" 14 and who "live their own kind of inner 
life, are not being absorbed into the mass of workers and 
who have not yet been touched by the proletarian community in 
our socialist plants and factories." ^ 5 Nonetheless, he 
warned cadre workers not to dismiss these newcomers as mere 
'country bumpkins' (derevenshchina), reminding them that "our 
entire class at one time lacked culture." 1"
Another group that was to play a crucial role in breaking 
down the customs and practices of the old, established work- 
ing class consisted of new, young workers from an urban, 
proletarian background. The first beneficiaries of the Soviet 
educational system, their literacy levels were higher than 
any other group. However, as Tomskii observed, they had not 
been tried^and tested in revolutionary battles and had an 
alarming tendency to demand that which could not be given for 
another five or ten years. 17 It was this group, both in the 
Komsomol organisation and on the shop floor that was to prove 
the main support for the 'management' line on discipline.
For if the scapegoats for indisciplined behaviour were to 
be the rural newcomers, the initial examples of the new att- 
itude to work (and the new socialist discipline) were prov- 
ided by the urban youngsters rather than the cadre workers. 
The latter harboured many undesirable qualities, a fact reco- 
nised by both sides in the dispute over labour discipline.
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15 ibid. , p.31 ~
16 ibid., p.32.
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In the sort of realistic appraisal of the Soviet worker 
that was soon to disappear from discussions on questions of 
labour in the USSR, Bukharin suggested that "the 'ideal' 
type of 'good lad' ('ideal'nyi* tip 'khoroshegQ parnya'), 
who drank heavily, played cards, fought, swore and loafed 
around at work, should be "spiritually shot" (dukhovno ras- 
strelyan) -*-°
The danger of ascribing values mistakenly to workers, 
rather than appraise them realistically is well exemplified 
by the regime's attitude to religion. In 1929 an all-out 
assault on religion was launched, most demonstrably by 
blowing up the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Moscow to clear 
a space for a massive new Palace of Soviets to be built in 
time for the fifteenth anniversary of the Revolution in 
November 1932. An even greater impact was achieved, how- 
ever, by the introduction of a continuous working week in 
October 1929, which effectively dispensed with Sundays along 
with all the old religious holidays. As part of the same 
process it was even contemplated changing the names of the 
week, calculating the year from the anniversary of the Oct- 
ober Revolution and using this event, rather than the birth 
of Christ, as the basis of the calendar.20
Yet in 1928/29 more than 38 per cent of workers' families 
in Moscow and Leningrad (and over sixty per cent in other
Soviet cities) still hung icons on the walls of their dwel-
21 lings. Of course, these figures more than likely reflected
custom and tradition rather than religious devotion, as did 
the sharp increase in expenditure on alcohol and the high 
absentee rates on former religious holidays. However, Toms- 
kii had noted that religion was on the increase in his speech 
to the VIII VTsSPS Congress, remarking that many workers were 
turning to the baptists. He laid the blame for this squarely 
on the inadequate facilities provided by the workers' clubs,
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18 Quoted in S. Bezborodov, Vreditel' u stanka, Leningrad, 
1930, p.44.
19 George A. Burrell, An American Engineer Looks at Russia, 
Boston. 1932, p.210.
20 Trud, 3 October 1929.
21 A.V. Vvedenskii, Zhilishchnoe polozhenie fabrichno- 
zavodskogo proletariata bbSK, M-L, ]932. p.57.
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claiming that "if the club cannot fulfil his needs, he will 
go to the baptists or to the inn (traktir)". concluding 
that "the struggle against alcoholism, baptism, anti- 
semitism and so on, is a struggle within the working class." 2
The opposing view, in defining the worker in narrow 
political terms, maintained that the alcoholic, baptist 
and anti-semite by definition could not be 'genuine 1 workers 
and therefore should be a prime target for the unions in 
their struggle for tighter labour dicipline. Tomskii had 
cautioned against such an approach, warning:23
"The attempt to turn trade unions into poor little 
political departments...which are to struggle only 
for the raising of productivity, and for labour 
discipline... is mistaken."
Indeed, there were those amongst his followers in the 
trade union movement, notably, Kozelev, who not only main- 
tained that production discipline was largely a question 
for management, but also, somewhat disingenuously, commented 
that as trade unions were not primarily political bodies, 
they should not be dragged into the intra-Party dispute. 2Zf
Of the questions generated by the dispute over labour 
discipline at the VIII VTsSPS Congress, two stand out: i) 
which side, the 'Rightists' or the 'Stalinists' was more 
closely in touch with the demands and aspirations of the 
workers and ii) who or what was to blame for the falling 
levels of discipline, if indeed they were falling?
It is generally conceded that the trade union movement 
in Soviet Russia had lost touch with its membership during 
the Civil War. However, the same charge might well be 
levelled at the Party and Komsomol, let alone the manage- 
ment organs. Certainly, Tomskii appeared to reflect the
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22 Vos'moi s"ezd, p.46.
23 ibid., p.44.
24 ibid., pp.96-97; quoted by Shvernik at XVI Party Congress 
XVI S"ezd vsespyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii tb),; 
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views of the majority of the delegates gathered at the 
Congress, even if his platform was defeated, whereas his 
most vociferous opponent, Zhdanov (representing the Kom- 
somol) was greeted with stony silence. 25 However, as the 
latter was putting forward not only the Party's 'general 
line', but also that of the young urban workers who were 
showing increasing impatience with the slow pace of progr- 
ess towards socialism, the 'Stalinists 1 too could claim to 
represent 'real' workers. The truth was, of course, that 
the Soviet working class was itself deeply divided over 
the question of industrialisation, being for in general 
terms but not always prepared to achieve this through 
personal sacrifice. There was no doubt that sacrifices 
were going to have to be made, Stalin himself had made
this quite clear during his address to the V Komsomol
9 A 
Conference in March 1927. and one of his spokemen at
the trade union forum reiterated the point thus: 2 '
"We must explain to the masses that huge sacrifices 
on the part of the working class still lie ahead if
we are to complete that which we have started to 
build."
To judge from the contribution of a previous speaker,\^
representing the Shakty mining district, those sacrifices 
were already quite considerable:
"The living conditions of the miners in general are 
still extremely hard. The lack of accommodation at 
the mines makes it impossible to create a solid cadre 
of workers skilled in production. We have to date 
accommodation for only 13 to 15 per cent of the work- 
ers. Due to lack of rooms, the remaining workers are 
forced to seek accommodation in the neighbouring 
villages, hamlets and peasant settlements. This obl- 
iges the workers to expend much time and energy, more 
especially due to the lack of roads in our district 
and a shortage of requisite footwear. From this we 
get absenteeism, losses in production, and a fall in 
discipline."
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Tomskii would appear to have been disp]aying a deal 
more realism, therefore, when he drew much attention in 
his speech to the appalling living conditions endured by 
Soviet workers:29
"Surely we can see that the workers live in crowded, 
awful housing, that they lack the elementary every- 
day comforts, that there are nurseries enough only 
for a trifling percentage of workers' children, that 
our canteens are disgusting, that wages are still 
low? Surely we see this, surely we want things to 
be better for the workers?"
The two approaches may be seen to characterise the dual 
nature of the Soviet trade unions as 'transmission belts', 
the one side utilising the union forum to bring to the att- 
ention of the Party the needs and sufferings of the working 
class, and the other attempting to coopt the unions to the 
struggle of winning over the masses to the policy of ind- 
ustrialisation advocated by the Party.
The fact that, from a purely economic point of view, the 
two policies were not necessarily incompatible, was high-' 
lighted by Kuibyshev on behalf of Vesenkha. He assured 
Congress that among the basic aims of the Five-Year Plan 
was the systematic raising of the material and cultural 
levels of working people. However, he made a point of list' 
ing this aim behind those of industrialising the national
economy and strengthening the country's defence capacity,
30 serving notice of where his priorities lay.
However, whatever the merits of the respective argu- 
ments put forward at the Congress, the political battle 
had already been lost. In objecting to the introduction 
of Kaganovich into the VTsSPS leadership, Tomskii had ten- 
dered his resignation even before the Congress had opened. 
This was formerly rejected on 9 February 1929 at a meeting 
of the Party's Politburo (and the Presidium of the Central
***********************
29 Vps'moi s"ezd, p.50
30 ibid. I p.372.
-50-
Control Committee) 31 , although Tomskii took no further 
part in VTsSPS affairs after the Congress. After Krol', 
an opponent of the Party 'shake up 1 (peretryakhivaniya) 
of the unions had tried unsuccessfully to propose a motion 
approving the political line and general direction taken 
by VTsSPS, Tomskii observed with, one suspects, an element 
of irony directed at the Party General Secretary: 32
"In the Leninist Communist Party there must be a 
discipline not only of iron, but of steel (stal'naya)"
Thus, even if Tomskii and his supporters were more in 
touch with the workers, their political struggle had al- 
ready effectively been lost and was about to be crushed. 
On the question of the levels of discipline, the evidence 
would appear to be contradictory. Absentee rates continued 
to fall consistently until the spring of 1930 and there was 
no apparent rise in other forms of violations (it should be 
borne in mind that labour turnover, at this stage, was not 
classified as a violation of labour discipline). Yet the 
calls for tighter discipline, which had commenced in 1925 
and had intensified with the launch of the policy of rational 
isation in 1927, had become a matter of grave concern by 1928
a year which saw the first enterprises being switched to the
33 seven-hour day.
Contemporary accounts suggest that the deterioration in 
labour discipline commenced in the Donbas coalmines in May
1928 and spread to other areas and industries. Two relevant 
observations may be made in this respect. Firstly, the Don- 
bas mines were in the glare of nationwide publicity in May 
1928 due to the trial of the 'bourgeois wreckers' that com- 
menced in Shakhty in May 1928, 34 The effect of this trial 
was that administrative and technical personnel became wary 
of issuing orders to the workers, let alone make mistakes in
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in their work, for fear of being labelled a 'Shakhty wreck- 
er' (Shakhtiinskii vreditel f ) 35 . Incidences of abuse and 
attacks directed at specialists were reported from all over 
the country and 'spets baiting 1 (spetseedstvo) figured prom- 
inently on the pages of the national press.36oiscipline, 
particularly in the Donbas region, was consequently felt 
to be deteriorating, whatever the official figures might 
report.
Secondly, as we have seen, conditions in the Donbas were 
amongst the worst in the country and the fall in living 
standards, which was soon to be the lot of the average 
Soviet industrial worker, appeared to have commenced earlier 
here. Moreover, the number of rural migrants seeking work 
in the Donbas anticipated the national trend. The 1929 
union census revealed that 63 per cent of all Donbas miners
o ~i
were children of peasants,-3 ' whereas the figure for all
38 industries and regions was 42.6 per cent. As it was this
group of workers that was being made scapegoat for the fall 
in discipline, it would make sense for the authorities to 
concentrate attention in the campaign against violations 
in the areas where such 'backward* workers predominated.
Although the appeals for tighter discipline issued by 
the Party plenum in November and the VIII VTsSPS Congress 
in December of 1928 appear to have made no calculable impact 
there were a number of victories for those push- 
ing for a harder line on this question. Thus Vesenkha 
persuaded VTsSPS at the end of 1928 to include undertakings 
on raising productivity in the new collective agreements 
about to be signed. These agreements, concluded annually by 
representatives of management and trade unions, determined 
wages, output standards and other conditions of work, and 
were to become a major target for those who sought to reduce
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the power of the trade unions.
Another victory in the campaign for labour discipline 
was the establishment by the Council for Labour and Defence 
(STO) of a Government commission under Narkomtrud to study 
the question. The commission met for the first time on 
13 February 1929, 39 but, although some findings were pub- 
lished, its work became increasingly irrelevant as socialist 
competition became the new universal panacea to such problems
Or\ Q> TAcNrc-K
and any suggested remedies were pre-empted by the passing >'oF* 
a Government decree on labour discipline that gave manage- 
ment the right to sack indisciplined workers without the 
approval of the unions. 41
Union approval in such matters had been enshrined in the 
Labour Code by the Rate-Setting and Disputes Committees 
(Rastsenochno-konf1iktnye kommissii or RKKs), which had 
equal numbers of management and union representatives. The 
new rules for these commissions, adopted as recently as 29 
August 192$, 42 confirmed that all cases of worker dismissal 
had to be approved by the RKK. Early in 1929, Kraval', a 
Vesenkha spokesman, complained of a 'vicious circle 1 in 
which the management would fire a worker and the RKK would 
reinstate him; or, if the dismissal was approved, the worker 
would be reinstated by a labour inspector or court; and even 
if all instances upheld the verdict, the labour exchange 
would nonetheless send the worker back to the very same job 
at the same plant. There is evidence that Kraval's complaint 
was justified. At the Krasnoe Sormovo shipyards in Nizhnii 
Novgorod, for example, of 769 cases brought by management to 
the RKK in 1928 to seek approval of dismissal, only 374 (48.6 
per cent) were upheld, a further 223 resulted in more lenient 
sentences and 172 were totally rejected. 4-3 Thus, despite
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the fact that it contravened the Labour Code, the new 1 
extending management rights in the enterprise represented 
an important shift of power towards the administration.
However, throughout this period of change, the 'Rightists' 
were still occupying positions of power in VTsSPS, the reg- 
ional union councils, individual unions and in Narkomtrud. 
The 'shake up' of the unions could only be effected, there- 
fore, when the Opposition had been defeated within the Party 
itself. To all intents and purposes, this was achieved in 
April 1929.
On 15 April, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii had voted for
amendments to the Five-Year Plan at a meeting of the Party's
/ /
Politburo. On 23 April a joint session of the Central Comm- 
ittee and Central Control Committee adopted not only a draft 
resolution on the Plan (for forwarding to the forthcoming XVI 
Party Conference), but also a resolution "On Intra-Party 
Affairs", which removed from their posts Tomskii (VTsSPS) 
and Bukharin (Pravda and Comintern).
The XVI Party Conference, meeting later that month, duly 
endorsed both resolutions and the following month the V Con- 
gress of Soviets approved the Five-Year Plan in its Stalinist 
variant and it became law. From this point on the planned 
economy, implying control over wages and output standards, 
reduced significantly the status of the collective agreement, 
hitherto the focal point of trade union power in the Soviet 
economy.
The resolution on intra-Party matters had turned its 
attention specifically to the role of trade unions in this 
new phase, demanding that:
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"Trade unions, which are called upon to play a dec- 
isive role in the construction of socialist industry, 
in the upsurge of labour productivity and labour dis- 
cipline, in organising the production initiative of 
the working class and socialist competition, and also 
the education on a class basis of new strata of the 
proletariat, must decisively squeeze out aJ 1 remnants 
of narrow class exclusiveness and trade-unionism, as 
well as bureaucratic inattention to the masses and a 
scornful attitude to the tasks of defending the every- 
day needs and interests of the working class."
Earlier in April the Party's Central Committe had issued 
a decree "On the Cultural and Educational Work of Trade 
Unions"^, which stated that "the most important task of the 
union's cultural work must be the cultivation in the workers 
of a conscientious attitude to production and...the intensif- 
ication of the struggle to raise labour discipline." The 
decree then offered an ideological justification for this:
"In connection with the sharpening of the class struggle 
within the country and the active attempts by kulak 
and capitalist elements to spread their influence among 
petty-bourgeois strata, and even among individual cross 
strata of the proletariat, the trade unions, relying 
mainly on the mass of workers at large, must intensify 
the struggle against petty-bourgeois views and attitu- 
des (money-grubbing, slackness) among backward elements 
especially new strata of the working class that have 
come from the countryside. Trade unions must launch 
an intensified campaign against religious trends, esp- 
ecially against sectism, as well as against anti- 
semitism, exposing their counter-revolutionary essence.
Thus, even as the removal of Tomskii was proceeding, the 
Soviet trade unions were adopting stances that he had spec- 
ifically warned against at the VIII Congress. In the event 
the II VTsSPS plenum which formalised Tomskii's dismissal, 
along with that of Mikhailov and Ugarov (chairmen of the 
Moscow and Leningrad trade union councils respectively), 
Melnichanskii (Textile Union) and Yaglom (former editor of 
Trud and head of the Postal and Telegraph Union) and many 
other Tomskii supporters, did not meet until the end of 
May. Aleksandr Dogadov was appointed First Secretary, as 
it turned out on a temporary basis - within a year he would 
also be denounced as an Oppositionist and replaced by
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48 by Shvernik. Nonetheless, it was significant that no
replacement was found for Tomskii as Chairman, power having 
shifted decisively to the VTsSPS Secretariat.
The plenum undertook to carry out a thoroughgoing purge 
of the trade union hierarchy. The Moscow Regional Trade 
Union Council had its membership changed by 93 per cent 
and its Leningrad equivalent by 100 per cent! I n his 
report to the IX VTsSPS Congress in 1932 (trade union con- 
gresses were supposed to convene every two years, but four 
years were to elapse between the VIII and IX, and a further 
seventeen before the X VTsSPS Congress met in 1949!), one of 
the major beneficiaries of the shake up, Veinberg, described 
how representatives of the leading workers were sent to 
work in place of the dismissed 'Rightists', claiming that 
"the shock worker became the central figure not only in 
production, but also in the trade union movement."50
Kaganovich, the Party secretary that Stalin had sent to 
VTsSPS to ensure political control, summed up the process 
thus, in his address to the XVI Party Congress in 1930: 51
"The greater part of the leadership both of VTsSPS and 
of individual unions has been replaced. It could be 
said that this was a violation of proletarian democracy, 
but, comrades, it has long been known that for us 
Bolsheviks democracy is no fetish."
Almost immediately following the VTsSPS plenum, the 
management newspaper, Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta, talked 
of the trade union leadership crisis being overcome:52
"Until recently the trade union leaders were inclined to 
omit from their everyday duties their share in the cam- 
paign for tightening labour discipline, raising individ- 
ual output and fulfilling the plan. They also consider- 
ed the signing of collective agreements to be the best 
means of extracting maximum concessions from industrial
*******************************
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managers at the minimum cost to the unions. But the 
situation has changed and, unless we are mistaken, 
the change will be real and lasting."
Of course, the Party shake up of the trade unions could 
not but effect Narkomtrud. The Commissariat's organisational 
position in labour relations of midway between the manage- 
ment and the unions had been confirmed in a Government 
statute of 26 September 1928. 53 However, the significant 
shift in power at the work place in favour of the managers, 
had left Narkomtrud seemingly high and dry on the union side, 
all the more so as their leaders actively supported the 
'Rightists'. Indeed, the Labour Commissar, Uglanov, had 
told the VIII VTsSPS Congress only the previous December 
that "Narkomtrud was and is the brainchild of the trade 
unions." 54 Narkomtrud ' s efforts in the early 
months of 1929 were geared more to ensuring that existing 
labour legislation was being observed than to carrying on 
a campaign for tighter discipline. The pages of the Comm- 
issariat's journal, Voprosy truda, thus gave more space to 
criticism of management infringements of work and safety 
regulations than to workers' violations of internal rules.
Moreover, the early findings of the Narkomtrud invest- 
igations into the state of labour discipline notably
avoided any reference to 'class enemies' or 'sharpening of 
class struggles', but laid much of the blame for the poor 
state of discipline on poor organisation and management. ^
However, the Chairman of the Narkomtrud committee, and 
Deputy Commissar of Labour, Tolstopyatov, was astute enough 
to see which way the wind was blowing and had published in 
the- June issue of Voprosy truda, an article entitled "On 
New Rails" in which he offered the following assessment of
it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it
53 Statute of the People's Commissariat of Labour of the 
USSR, approved by Tslk and Sovnarkom SSSR on 26 Septem- 
ber 1928, Izvestiya Narkomtruda SSSR, 1928, nos. 44-45, 
673-676.
54 Vos'moi s"ezd, p. 362
55 A. Sokol'skii, op. cit . , pp. 47, 63, 88.
-57- 
the situation: 56
"The most immense importance is acquired by the work of 
labour sections dealing with the raising of labour 
discipline, which, as a result of the ever increasing 
increment of the ranks of workers with new cadres, 
coming in the main from the countryside and not having 
acquired sufficient production skills, not yet accust- 
omed to the iron discipline of the factory and not 
having been remoulded in the factory crucible, will 
demand even greater attention. As regards the self- 
seekers, money grubbers and loafers, there can be no 
other policy than the strict implementation of the 
rules of internal order and as much assistance in this 
as possible from organs of Narkomtrud, management and 
union organisations. In the struggle for tightening 
labour discipline, methods of coercion in regard to 
the backward workers will have and must have a place 
in the immediate future, but, in applying methods of 
administrative coercion, it is necessary to combine 
them with measures of social influence and re-education
However, given the importance of Narkomtrud's work in the 
sphere of unemployment and sorting out labour legislation, 
it was not felt necessary at this stage to conduct such a 
thoroughgoing purge of this Commissariat as had been visited 
on the unions. Further clashes lay ahead, however, the first 
being over the introduction of the continuous working week 
(nepreryvka).
This was the first bold new initiative to be introduced 
by management following the shake up of the trade unions. 
Larin had raised the issue at the V Congress of Soviets in 
May but, according to one commentator, was not taken serious- 
ly by anyone other than Stalin. Yet by the middle of June 
the press was full of little else. On 8 June 1929, Trud 
reported that Vesenkha RSFSR had instructed its rationalis- 
ation department to work out a model plan for a continuous 
working week. In the same issue, the RSFSR Labour Commissar, 
Bakhutov, expressed reservations over the idea, as did 
Uglanov later in the month. ' Larin responded vigo rously, 
urging that "the scorn of the masses" should be turned upon
* /'c /V /'c * * # Vc /V >V * * * * /V Vc * Vc * >V /V Vc * * * Vc * Vc * *
56 I. Tolstopyatov, 'Na novye rel'sy', in Voprosy truda, 
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57 Trud, 23 July 1929.
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this "bureaucratic sabotage of our economic successes" 
by the vacillators, adding that, perhaps, the GPU ought 
to investigate the matter. 58
Bakhutov was eventually dismissed just prior to the 
introduction of the continuous working week, to be replaced 
by Romanov. Uglanov distanced himself from Tomskii and 
Bukharin by recanting his views publicly in Pravda on 
18 November 1929, just prior to the Party plenum that 
launched the 'socialist offensive 1 . However, his opposition 
to the continuous working week was brought up against him 
when he was removed in the summer of 1930. 59
The nepreryvka, which was eventually adopted in its 
five-day variant (i.e. each worker would have four days 
work in every five) serves as a good example of the contra- 
dictions between the policies of the Party and the perceived 
interests of the workers themselves. Thus the Party port- 
rayed this innovation as striking a great blow against 
religion and the old ways of life and as a major means of 
raising productivity. The latter opposed it on mainly 
social grounds as the following complaints from workers 
at Moscow's Serp i Molot works illustrate (they were printed 
in Pravda on I October 1929, the day of the projected intro- 
duction of the nepreryvka;
"Is there to be no rest at all? What is there for us 
to do at home, if our wives are in the factory, our 
children are at school and nobody can visit us, so 
that there is nothing to do but go to a State-run 
cafe? What sort of life is it if we are to rest in 
shifts and not together as a whole proletariat? It 
is no holiday if you have to have it alone, is it?"
Rather like the other Stalinist innovation into industry 
in 1929, socialist competition, the authorities provided 
impressive statistics proving the quantitative growth of 
the proportion of workers on the continuous working week (it 
was claimed that by 1 April 1930 63 per cent of all industr- 
ial workers were covered by it). However, just as with
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socialist competition, the figures were clearly inflated, 
and obscured the widespread opposition to these changes. 
In 1931, a start was made to return to a six-day interrupted 
working week in major industrial establishments. Stalin 
blamed the nepreryvka for dragging in an unwanted 'companion' 
(nezakonnaya sputnitsa) into industry in the shape of 'lack 
of responsibility' (obezl ichka), the elimination of which 
was the third of six conditions in his "New Situation - New 
Tasks" speech in June 1931. 61
Of course, concerted union action would have prevented 
the introduction of the continuous work week, but the 
resistance of VTsSPS had already been bjrpken. At the 
XVI Party Congress in the summer of 1930 was obliged to rec- 
ant his errors and admit that the Party shake up of the
fa 9 
unions had been justified. Shortly afterwards Veinberg
came to the podium and gave the 'official' version of 
the take over of VTsSPS: 63
"The Party drew the corresponding conclusions: they 
removed from office the old leadership, put an ena 
to the system of feudal trade-union princedom with 
its distinctive monopoly in the defence of workers' 
interests and its specific 'trade-unionist' underst- 
anding of this defence."
As for the current tasks of the VTsSPS, Veinberg was 
brief:
"The basic task of the trade unions is that very slogan 
that the working masses have advanced 'the five-year 
plan in four years'".
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Faces to Production
Within twenty-four A in ear]y September 1929, two 
measures were introduced that were to set the course 
towards Stalin's vision of labour relations. On 5 Septem- 
ber, the Party Central Committee issued a decree "On 
Measures to Regulate the Management of Production and to 
Implement One-Man Management" . The following day Trud 
published what amounted to the manifesto of the new trade 
union leadership: the appeal from the VTsSPS Presidium 
to all trade union organisations, union members and all 
working men and women to 'turn their faces to production 1 
and develop socialist competition. ^
One-man management and socialist competition were to be 
the two main planks of Stalin's industrial relations' plat- 
form. The Party decree sharply defined the separate roles 
within production of the factory 'triangle': the director, 
Party secretary and trade union organiser. The director 
and his management staff were now to be directly responsible 
for fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan (prom- 
finplan) and for all production tasks. The trade unions 
were to concentrate on servicing the cultural and everyday 
needs of their members while, at the same time, being ener- 
getic organisers of such mass activity as socialist competit- 
ion. They were expressly forbidden to interfere directly 
in the management of the enterprise. This last proviso 
applied also to Party organisations in the factory who were 
to concentrate on ensuring that Party directives were implem- 
ented by management and unions.
In a tacit admission that the workers might not understand 
the necessity for such measures, the Party decree entrusted 
Party and union officials in the enterprises with the task of 
making the workers aware that management directives were in 
the interests of the workers' well-being and would help con- 
solidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.
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Thus, by the time Stalin had made his keynote speech 
"The Year of the Great Breakthrough" on 7 November 1929, 
most of the factors which were to change industrial rel- 
ations in Soviet industry during the course of the next 
decade and beyond were already in place: the seven-hour, 
three-shift day and the continuous working week, which were 
to soak up not only all the unemployed but also the mass 
inflow of migrant labour from the countryside as collect- 
ivisation got underway; one-man management, under which 
the director could determine what were the interests of 
production in the enterprise he was responsible for (which 
in effect invariably meant sacrificing resources earmarked 
for social and cultural purposes and diverting them towards 
production); socialist competition and shock work, which 
were to provide the worker with an opportunity to part- 
icipate in the management of production (even if, in pract- 
ice this meant little more than the right to produce more).
By the time the Party plenum met in mid-November 1929, 
Stalin's position was strong enough to oust Bukharin and 
effectively isolate Tomskii and Rykov and to push ahead 
with an increased pace of industrialisation. It was left 
to Kaganovich to report on the Party gathering to the III 
VTsSPS plenum at the end of November 1929. Although 
Dogadov retained his position as First Secretary, the 
Party faction was strengthened by the addition of Polonskii 
to the Secretariat. 66
In his main report Dogadov appeared to follow the correct 
line by roundly criticising the old leadership, maintaining 
that "the basic link of trade union work and of their re- 
organisation in order to face production and get closer to 
the masses, is socialist competition, which reflects the 
development of new forms of communist labour..." and insist- 
ing that the centre of gravity of union work should shift
£ -I
from the factory committee to the group, section and shop. 
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In his report on the plenum in the Party journal, 
Evreinov (who had taken over the editorship of Trud 
from Yaglom but was shortly to be fired from that post 68 ), 
confirmed that "socialist competition was directed at craft- 
ism and trade-unionism...", mapping out the long-term future 
of the union movement thus:
"The protective functions of trade unions will remain 
until the disappearance of bureaucratic distortions 
in the state apparatus, until the unions themselves, 
freed from narrow craft interests and all remnants of 
the capitalist past and having raised the cultural 
level and class consciousness of the masses united in 
them, grow into the state and comprise with it an 
integral whole."
However, as we have seen, protective functions were to be 
supplemented by production activity in union work. This took 
the form of promoting socialist competition and shock work. 
On the basis of the Party decree on one-man management, a 
joint enactment by Vesenkha SSSR and VTsSPS led to the app- 
ointing of the chairman of Production Conferences (see 
Chapter Five) in 100 major enterprises as assistants to the 
plant director with special responsibility for organising 
socialist competition. Another joint directive by the two 
bodies on the same day "On the Collective Agreement" , made 
this document a two-sided contract by imposing upon the 
workers the duty to fulfil the enterprise promfinplan during 
the course of the economic year, and hitting out at money- 
grubbing attitudes among certain backward workers.
Within just a year of Tomskii dismissing 'socialist 1 
forms of work organisation as premature, his successors
among the VTsSPS leadership took the lead in praising com-
72 petition at the Congress of Shock Workers in December 1929.
And it was VTsSPS that, in conjunction with the Komsomol 
Central Committee, launched on 21 January 1930 the Leninist
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Bol'shevik, 1929, no. 21, pp.34-36.
70 Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta, 19 November 1929.
71 Trud, 20 November 1929.
72 Trud, 5 December 1929 published a greeting from the III 
VTsSPS plenum to the Congress in which it called shock 
work "not only an example of labour heroism, but also the 
cornerstone of rationalisation measures at the factory."
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Enrolment of Shock Workers.
At the same time, in the sphere of organisational 
questions, attention was being focussed on union re- 
elections. By this time the link between the production 
and organisational sides of union work was explicit. Thus, 
the Party appeal of 25 January 1930 74 that approved of 
the Leninist Enrolment called specifically for the election 
of shock workers into union organisations. The example in 
this was to be set by the million-strong Metalworkers' 
union, led since October 1929 by Nikolai Shvernik, who was 
to preside over the Soviet trade union movement during its 
very darkest years and was, for his pains, elected Chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
Thus it may be seen that, from a long-term perspective, 
the III VTsSPS plenum did mark a turning point. It not 
only started the shift of power away from the factory com- 
mittee, which Tomskii at the VIII VTsSPS Congress had called 
"a historically-formed organisation, having the greatest 
revolutionary traditions that are known to every worker" and 
"one of the greatest hubs of our revolution", but also 
irrevocably weakened opposition within the trade union move- 
ment, an opposition characterised by one observer as:
"Displaying inertia, conservatism, a petty-bourgeois 
lack of faith and vacillation in the face of difficult- 
ies .. .defending trade-unionist' trends within the 
union movement...narrow craft attitudes and manifest- 
ations of bureaucratic ossification in a part of the 
trade union apparatus, they presented and continue to 
present opposition to the reorganisation (perestroika) of 
trade union work."
In an attempt to finally rid itself of such elements, 
VTiSPS 'invited' the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate 
(Rabkrin) to purge its membership of those who had created 
within the union structure "a solid nest of routine and
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ossif icatior., bureaucrat =>nd alienation from the masses, 
sluggishness and procrastination in their pace of work."
Although resistance to the shake up of the unions 
appeared to manifest itself in the trade union structure, 
there is little evidence of organised worker opposition 
to the move. This is probably because, by the beginning 
of 1930, the workers could perceive that the unions were 
an ineffective counter balance to the management. A Party 
journal reports at this time of workers and "even some 
communists" complaining that "the director can do what he 
likes", "the working class was in charge only in 1918 and
1919" and "the Communist Party is gradually replacing dem-
7 R ocracy with one-man management".
At the same time, it should be recalled, the factory 
committe«.re-elections were taking place against the back­ 
ground of the headiest days of the Leninist Enrolment, 
when the mood of optimism at least among a section of the 
working class, was at its greatest. In some areas and 
individual enterprises, shock workers had virtually taken 
over the role of workers' representatives on union committ­ 
ees. As Kaganovich was able to report to the XVI Congress, 
in the Metalworkers' union, shock workers now constituted 
51 per cent of all those elected to the new factory committ­ 
ees in Moscow, 70.5 per cent in Leningrad and 84.6 per cent 
in Nizhnii Novgorod. At the Krasnyi Putilovets and Baltic
shipyards in Leningrad, the respective figures were 95 and
79 72 per cent.
If the II VTsSPS plenum witnessed the first stages of 
the union shake up and the III plenum took that process a 
stage further, then the IV plenum that met in May 1930, 
cemented^once and for all, Party control over the union 
movement. The appointment of Nikolai Shvernik as First 
Secretary put an end to any remaining contradictions in the 
way that VTsSPS fitted into the overall scheme of industr­ 
ialisation. Like Tomskii, Shvernik had been a skilled
* it * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
78 P. Zimin, 'Ne raskachalis'', in Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, 1930, no.2, p.57. ———————————————————
79 XVI S"ezd, p.64.
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worker before the RevoJution, but unlike him had no
previous experience of trade union work until taking 
over the Metalworkers' union in October J929. The IV 
plenum relieved not only Dogadov of his post, but also 
Akulov (the second secretary) and nine other members of 
the VTsSPS Presidium of theirs. 80 This effectively left 
only Veinberg and Evreinov (who had both supported the 
'general line' at the VIII VTsSPS Congress) as survivors 
of the leadership elected less than eighteen months pre­ 
viously. Having shaken up the personnel of the trade 
unions, the new leadership was now set to attack the very 
structure of the movement.
By the time the XVI Party Congress opened on 26 June 
1930 the new VTsSPS leadership was quite in step with 
the Party line that was to triumph so resoundxcxdy at this 
forum. Congress heard a major debate on the new tasks of 
the trade unions and passed a resolution embodying the new 
policy. Entitled "On the Tasks of Trade Unions in the Recon­ 
struction Period", the resolution: 81
"Fully and wholly approves of the measures taken by 
the Central Committee in strengthening the Leninist- 
Bolshevik leadership of the union movement. The most 
important task of the Party and trade unions is the 
raising to a new plane of the movement for socialist 
competition and shock work, genuinely transforming 
this movement into a school of class instruction of 
the working masses, the improvement of the leader­ 
ship of this movement , the one hundred per cent 
involvement in the shortest possible time in social­ 
ist competiton and shock work of all communists and 
Komsomol members working in enterprises, the raising 
of production skills of communists and the genuine 
shifting of emphasis in Party and union work to the 
workshop and the brigade...
...The XVI Congress most emphatically stresses that 
the decisive, fundamental link in activating and im­ 
proving the entire work of trade unions and in the 
involvement of the wide working masses in the manage­ 
ment of production is socialist competition and its 
brain child shock work, which is the greatest move­ 
ment of the proletariat."
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Despite the crushing victory of the Stalinists at the 
Congress, voices of doubt about the Party policy toward 
the unions were still to be heard, both within and outside 
the Party itself. With the movement towards shock work­ 
shops, shock factories and factory communes shades of a 
syndicalist threat were perceived, while at the other 
extreme calls for the introduction of labour conscription 
were
Even at plants where the shock workers had taken over 
the factory committee such as at Krasnyi Putilovets, there 
were still reports of 'apolitical' moods and speeches. 83 
There was much talk about the various unions getting together 
to form one big union. The Party journal was quick to con­ 
demn this:
"The 'theoreticians' of one union usually wax 
eloquent about the 'interests of the workers', of 
the enormous economic resources, the significantly 
higher level of the working class, on the growth 
of communist workshops and so on. . .
...Some 'leftists' want all production in the hands 
of the union... this is a profound political mistake."
At the XVI Congress, Shvernik too, had been keen to 
dispel any thoughts about trade union power :^5
"The trade unions must coordinate their work on 
improving the material situation of workers in 
the closest harmony with production tasks... 
at the same time all talk about the immediate 
concentration in the hands of the trade unions 
of the entire management of production must be 
denounced. "
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Throughout the Congress and after, Shvernik's speech 
had generated controversy and discussion on the pages of 
the trade union daily, Trud. Thus, on 17 July 1930, it had 
published a discussion on possible mergers between trade 
unions, one participant advocating 11 bigger unions instead 
of the existing 23.
Other opponents to the Party policy towards the'.Workers, 
as embodied in its trade union policy, emerged as a result 
of the XVI Congress. On 4 July 1930, Trud had noted with 
satisfaction the prolonged applause accorded at the Congress 
to the speech of Sergei Syrtsov, Chairman of the RSFSR Sov- 
narkom. While praising socialist competition and shock work 
as "the greatest idea" (velichaishaya ideya), he had strongly 
criticised the degree of banality (izvestnyi shablon) with 
which it had been implemented:
"Methods of shock work are natural and necessary, 
but not always, not in every sphere, and not in 
every form."
Along with Lominadze, another Bolshevik who had spoken 
candidly at the Congress about the falling level of real 
wages and deteriorating living conditions for workers, he 
was acknowledged leader of the so-called T Right-"leftist" 
bloc. Until their removal by Party decree on 1 December 
1930, Syrtsov and Lominadze kept up their criticism of 
Stalin's attack on the living standards of the workers and 
the 'yo-heave-ho' mentality that this had brought to pro­ 
duction (not least through Stalin's new planned targets 
set at the Congress).
Such protests were dismissed as manifestations of 
'worker adoration 1 (rabochelyubiye). However, as the 
industrial crisis of the summer of 1930 deepened, the 
'right-"leftists"' did seem to mirror a general feeling 
of discontent. Workers were asking in the summer of 1930
Qf.
what the unions had left to defend^and were begining to
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vote with their feet, in search of better conditions. Labour 
turnover in July 1930 reached unprecedented levels, partic­ 
ularly in the producer goods industries. 8 ^
In this month Uglanov was finally removed from his post 
as Labour Commissar, to be replaced shortly thereafter by 
Anton Tsikhon, formerly chairman of the Builders' union. He 
was to preside over the Commissariat until it was merged with 
VTsSPS in 1933. Before long Voprosy truda was criticising 
Uglanov and the old leadership for blaming turnover on poor 
management and living conditions and for neglecting to mentr 
ion "the sharpening of the class struggle and the strengthen­ 
ing of petty-bourgeois influence on certain backward sections 
of workers." 88
Thid criticism was echoed in the Party decree of 20 
October 1930 which complained that Narkomtrud and its local 
organs had been unable under the "old opportunistic leader­ 
ship" to reorganise their work in accordance with the tasks 
set before them in the reconstruction period. Particular 
criticism was aimed at the old leadership's attitude to 
unemployment, accusing them of maintaining hundreds of
thousands of 'unemployed' at the labour exchanges at a cost
89 of tens of millions of rubles.
The elimination of unemployment (ironically by the 
Narkomtrud decree of 9 October 1930)90 meant that the 
Commissariat had lost one of its central functions. Tsikhon, 
speaking at an All-Union Conference on Labour in November 
summed up the new orientation with commendable brevity: 91
A "The most fundamental and central of all decisions
is contained in three words - (the)socialist Organisat­ 
ion (of) 1 abour : the organs of Narkomtrud, the employees 
of Narkomtrud, must become the active organisers of 
labour."
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The Conference on Labour had been convened to discuss 
the future responsibilities of labour organs now that un­ 
employment had been eliminated, to discuss ways of best corn- 
batting labour turnover and to begin drafting a new Labour 
Code to replace the existing one, which all agreed was of 
little relevance to the current situation. However, there 
was evidently still some opposition left both in VTsSPS and
in the remodelled Narkomtrud as the following quote il lustr­ 
es? ates:
"The existing Labour Code is not just inadequate, it 
needs to be broken up completely and fundamentally 
reworked and this, besides, in an atmosphere of well- 
known opposition on the part of Narkomtrud (and VTsSPS) 
especially in the shape of their 'proverbial 1 legal 
experts."
The conflict between the legal apparatus and the
bureaucracies within the trade union and labour organs is
Q ^  also highlighted:^ J
"Legal practice, albeit timidly, introduces absolutely 
necessary changes which 'worsen' the position of the 
worker, on the basis of experience it expresses the 
wish for new laws to be published. These wishes are 
met with a rebuff, or at least, are held up by both 
trade union and Narkomtrud organisations."
Anticipating complaints that such an approach might be 
against the interests of the workers, the author unequivoc­ 
ally states that "all other interests must be subordinated to 
the interests of production." 94
In the event the Labour Code became one of the casualties 
of the switch to material incentives during the course of 
1931, when the work of Narkomtrud was further re-directed to 
the training of cadres for production.
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Thus, despite these remnants of opposition, there could 
be little doubt by the end of 1930 that Stalin's line had 
triumphed. The old leaderships had been driven out of the 
unions and Narkomtrud, the last major oppositional grouping 
within the Party had been isolated, show trials were being 
staged or prepared for dissenting planners, economists and 
statisticians in order to discourage further opposition and 
a package of new legislation was being piloted through that 
would considerably restrict the liberty of the worker to 
change jobs. Everyone, it seemed, now had their 'faces to 
production', What was now required was a reorganisation of 
all aspects of the production process to ensure that it 
improved its performance.
The Break Up of the Trade Unions, 1931-1934.
The first hint of a reorganisation of the unions came, 
appropriately enough, in the management newspaper, Za Ind- 
ustrializatsiyu , on 13 January 1931. It took a further 
four days for Trud to announce, on 17 January, that a special 
commission set up by the VTsSPS Secretariat had approved the 
scheme. Nonetheless, the resolution passed at the V plenum 
of VTsSPS that broke up the existing 23 unions into 45 new 
ones, came as a shock when published in Trud on 6 February.
Entitled "On Further Improving the Work of Trade Unions", 
the resolution explained that the reorganisation had been 
carried through on the production principle with the aim of 
decentralising union work. Kaganovich, in his speech to 
the IX VTsSPS Congress in 1932, went so far as to call them 
production unions, adding that the move "completes the 
struggle against the Rightists on organisational questions". 
The object of the exercise, in Kaganovich's view was to carry 
on a "twin fight against inter-union cooperation and caste- 
like shop activity." 95 j n effect, the new Central Committee
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of each of the new unions was to take over questions of 
production, labour organisation, wages, rate-setting, labour 
protection, housing etc. while VTsSPS would only be left with 
the more general problems of legislation, cultural and intern 
ational work.
Thus came to an end the revolutionary tradition of such 
unions as the Metalworkers' whose 1.5 million workers were 
now to be split among seven unions, the Miners' (into four 
new Unions), the Textile Workers' (into four) and the 
Building Workers' (into four). Ostensibly this reorganisat­ 
ion .was to bring the smaller unions closer to the masses, but 
one can imagine the concern with which the regime watched 
these old unions grow as the numbers of industrial workers 
rose sharply upwards.
A second, and no less important, aspect of the reorgan­ 
isation was the further weakening of the other great trad­ 
ition of Soviet trade unions, the factory committees, by
shifting the focus of union work onto the trade union group
~T/fc 
(profgruppa) on the shop floor. This clearly made sense if
the improvement of production was to be the union's main 
task.
The fruits of the reform were not long in ripening. An 
early example was provided by the first congress of the new 
Coal Miners' Union at the end of May 1931. Despite the 
appalling living conditions, turnover rates and accident 
record, the congress concentrated almost exclusively on
production questions (falling productivity in the coal mines
96 was one of the major headaches for the planners in 1931).
It was reported to the congress, however, that only 72 
per cent of workers in the industry, were members of the 
union. y ' This was no doubt partly due to the high pro­ 
portion of new workers flooding into the industry, but the 
union policy of setting the pace in reviewing output stand>- 
ards and cutting rates could not have endeared them to all.
96 'Congress of Coal Miners in the Soviet Union', in
Industrial and Labour Information, vol.39, no.l, July 
1931, pp.H-Jb.
97 ibid. , p. 16.
* Confirmed by the Party decree "On Party and Mass Work in the Shop and
Brigade", Pravda, 25 March 1931.
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However, at this stage the unions were merely following 
the Party line. Almost immediately before the announce­ 
ment of the union reform had been made, Stalin had made 
his keynote speech to the industrial managers (on 4 February 
1931) in which he ushered in a new phase of industrial policy 
under the slogan "technology is decisive". 98
The subsequent emphasis on individual planning targets and 
rewards for productive work had the effect of loosening workr 
er solidarity and collective action. So, although union mem­ 
bership fell throughout the first nine months of 1931, it was 
due as much to the turmoil caused by the influx of new work­ 
ers, the high turnover rates and the confusing new union 
structure. By the time that the unions were in a position to 
launch a concerted campaign for membership, Stalin had al­ 
ready introduced measures such as the wage reforms in heavy 
industry and preferential provisions for shock workers that 
would make union membership a logical step for any worker 
seeking to improve his or her standard of living.
Nonetheless, the fall in union membership in 1931 did 
give cause for concern. In the year from 1 October 1930 
the percentage of workers who were members of a union fell 
from 74.7 per cent to 69.7 per cent. Moreover, only 68 per 
cent of members, it was claimed, were paying their dues at 
this time.100 This would imply that less than half of the
labour force were fully paid-up members of unions. However, 
the average figure for membership mask wide variations from 
plant to plant, ranging from 45.2 per cent at the Magnitog­ 
orsk construction site to 97 per cent at the Nizhnii auto- 
works and 97.5 per cent at Krasnyi Treugol'nik^u!
* * >V * * * * * >V >V /'? * * >V >'c * * * * >V -fe * Vc * * * >'c * * * *
98 I.V. Stalin, Sochineniya, vol. 13, Moscow, 1952, p.29.
99 Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR, M, 1936, p.515.
100 N. Shvernik, Profsoyuzy v bor'be za organizatsiyu truda 
i zarplatv. M, 1932, p.42
101 Trud v SSSR; statisticheskii spravochnik, M, 1932, p.178
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The union recruiting drive coincided with the next 
round of elections to the factory committees, which 
brought a fresh wave of shock workers into the union 
organisations in Hovember 1931.^ 02 By the end of the year
virtually all (97 per cent) of union members were paving
103 their dues. Thereafter membership continued to rise,
reaching 74 per cent by 1 October 1932 and nearly 80 per 
cent by the end of 1934. 104 This was due, in part, to 
a halving of union subscriptions from two to one per cent 
of wages in September 1933. 105
While taking the lead in promoting reviews of output 
standards and rate-cuts, the unions had also thrown their 
weight behind the cost accounting brigades which spread 
rapidly throughout Soviet industry in 1931 (see Chapter 
Seven). This was yet another example of the new leadership 
ignoring the experience of Tomskii who, as long ago as 1923 
had warned' 106
"The very fact of the necessity to concentrate all the 
attention of trade unions on the defence of the 
economic interests of the workers is in sharp cont- 
ast to the participation of unions in industry, as it 
is not possible at one and the same time to run a 
factory on the basis of cost accounting and be the 
spokesman and defender of the economic interests of 
wage earners."
However, as Stalin had made cost accounting the sixth 
of his conditions in his speech "New Situation - New Tasks" 
on 23 June 1931 there was every reason to ignore the advice 
advice of the former union leader.
•k * >V •>'(• •/'? Vc /'? Vf -k -k /'? Vc -k -k >'c -k -k it -k /'- -k -k Vc Vc -k -k Vc /V -k
102 N. Shvernik, Profsoyuzy SSSR nakanune vtoroi pyatiletki, 
Moscow, 1932, p.94.
103 N. Shvernik, Profsoyuzy v bor'be, p.42:
104 Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR, p.515.
105 Izvestiya, 17 August 1933
106 Quoted by Kaganovich at XVI Party Congress, XVI S"ezd, 
p. 63.
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The VI plenum of the VTsSPS in December 1931 concentrated 
almost exclusively on questions of technical standard set- 
ing, evidence of how far the unions had moved in 1931 
towards becoming an arm of management. During the year 
VTsSPS had presided over the break up of the old traditional 
unions, had emasculated the factory committee, implemented 
preferential provisions for shock workers, had helped stamp 
out the production communes (see Chapter Six) and had been 
in the forefront of the campaign to raise output standards 
and cut rates. They still negotiated the collective con- 
agreement, but this had now become a localised contract 
served the interests of production to the extent that it 
really only left the worker with the right to produce more.
Early in 1932, the unions were to effectively lose 
any control over another of their former safeguards. The 
XVII Party Conference in January-February 1932 in making 
the foreman and brigade leader the "immediate organisers 
of production" gave them the right to discipline the 
workers under their control without the worker having 
recourse to the Rate-Setting and Disputes Commission.
Shortly thereafter the IX VTsSPS Congress was finally 
convened (it shutild have met in December 1930 when it 
was preparing the break up of the old unions). The Party 
line on trade union affairs was accepted totally, there 
being none of the controversy that had characterised the 
VIII Congress. Virtually all of the worker delegates were 
members of cost accounting or shock brigades and 76 per 
cent of all delegates were affiliated to the Communist 
Party. 107
The relationship between the Soviet trade unionist and 
the Party was made explicit by Veinberg, writing in Trud
* /V * * * >V Vc /'? * * * >'c V- * * Vf * * Vc >V Vf /V * /V if * * *
107 'Soviet Trade Union Congress', in Industrial and
Labour Information, vol.43, no.2, July 1932, pp 65-72
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on 24 January 1933:
"We must treat trade unionists who repudiate the 
directions of the Communist Party in the matter of
wages with the same severity as the Party applies to 
members who disorganise the grain front or any other 
battle front of the socialist economy. Trade unionists 
are sometimes heard to ask whether, as unionists, they 
ought to protest when wages above the standard rates 
are paid. These unionists are afraid of what the 
workers will think of them. This is an absolute dis­ 
grace and reveals a complete misunderstanding of the 
duties of Soviet trade unions. It is typical 'trade- 
unionism' . We must have done with this sort of 
'protection of the workers' interests."
Small wonder that it was not deemed necessary to convene 
another Trade Union Congress until 1949!
Veinberg was commenting in the wake of the Government 
decrees making one day's arbitrary absenteeism an offence 
which obliged managers to fire the offender and passing 
factory housing and workers' provisions into the haftds of 
management. As the managers were by now also solely res­ 
ponsible for rate-setting and pay, the promotion of soc­ 
ialist competition appeared to be the only area of trade 
union activity left in their competence.
However, in 1933 even competition seemed to be on the 
wane, even though the official figures showed that more 
than two out of every three workers were competing. The 
cost accounting brigades were certainly in terminal decline 
and no other major initiative in shock work had taken 
their place. There appeared a very real danger in mid- 
1933 that the trade unions really did have nothing left to 
defend.
Ostensibly on the personal initiative of Stalin, a
decree was promulgated on 23 June 1933 merging Narkomtrud 
and VTsSPS "j_n order to meet the requirements of the trade
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unions and secure a better execution of the ditties of 
the Labour Commissariat of the USSR".-108
At the III plenum (of the ninth convocation) of 
VTsSPS on 29 June, a resolution was adopted approving 
of the move which was characterised as "a decision which 
stems from the entire course of socialist construction."
In fact, of course, Narkomtrud had very little left 
to do: unemployment was gone, wages and hiring of personnel 
were the job of management and labour legislation was 
reduced to ad hoc decrees. It did still have responsib­ 
ility for the $-our billion ruble social insurance budget 110 . 
It was this function that the regime obviously felt could 
be better handled by the unions. Indeed, the plenary 
resolution stated that "benefits and assistance will be 
based on shock worker and union cadres" and used against 
"flitters, truants and money grubbers".m
The IV VTsSPS plenum, which was not held until September 
1934 had a similar suprise, also on the personal initiative 
of Stalin. Due to the fast growth of the existing unions, 
it was felt that they were getting too big (four of the 
forty-seven had more L-han one million members), and it 
was resolved to "reorganise" them into 154 new unions 
(sixty five of which would be based outside Moscow). Thus 
the old Iron and Steelworkers' union was split into South, 
East and Central). 112
On 31 December 1934, the very last day of the period under 
review, Shvernik quoted with approval Stalin's speech of
a few days earlier in which he had introduced the slogan
113 "cadres that have mastered technology are decisive".
In his speech to the closing session of the V VTsSPS plenum 
on that day, Shvernik felt it necessary to advise his coll­ 
eagues "One must remember that the union official is not a 
clerk, but an organiser of the masses."U^- 
***************************
108 Izvestiya, 24 June 1933.
109 Trud, 12~July 1933.
110 N.M. Shvernik, Speech at the Seventeenth Congress of 
the CPSU, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, p.8.
111 Trud, 12 July 1933.
112 W. SHvernik, 0 perestroike profsoyuzov, M, 1934,pp 4-17.
113 N. Shvernik, 'Ob itogakh V plenuma VTsSPS 1 , in Voprosy 
profdvizheniya, 1934, no. 12, p.20.
114 ibid., p.18.
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In reviewing the changes that had taken place since 
the shake up of the unions had commenced with the intro­ 
duction of Kaganovich into VTsSPS, a writer in Voprosy 
profdvizheniya at the beginning of 1935 remarked: 114
"These measures were part of the genera] reorganisation 
(perestroika) undertaken by the Party in our country 
with the aim of raising organisationa] work to the 
level of the political tasks."
So successful and thorough was the Party takeover of 
the Soviet trade unions that, before 1935 had ended, 
Stalin was expressing concern at the passivity of 
union organisations and established a commission of en­ 
quiry to discover the reasons. The man that he chose to 
head this commission was, of course, Kaganovich! -^
**************************
114 S. Kotlyar, 'VII s"ezd sovetov i zadachi profsoyuzov 1 
in Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1935, no.1, p.11.
115 Robert Conquest, Industrial Workers in the USSR, 
London, 1967, p. 153.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE STATE OF LABOUR DISCIPLINE, 
1928 - 1934
As we have seen, the demands for labour discipline 
vary from society to society and from one period to 
another. If we agree that the demand is usually for a 
pattern of behaviour that is perceived to be consistent 
with the production processes utilised, then it follows 
that, as the production processes change (for example, 
with the introduction of new technology), then the 
demands for discipline also change. Thus the harm done 
to production by a worker being arbitrarily absent for 
one day is likely to be greater in a factory using complex 
technology than that caused by a worker on a less soph­ 
isticated process taking three days off. By the same token, 
certain manifestations of worker behaviour, such as volunt­ 
arily quitting work, may be considered a violation of labour 
discipline during one historical epoch, but not in another.
Insofar as it tends to be the employer (factory owner 
or State) that determines just what constitutes discipline, 
usually within certain parameters established by Government 
legislation and sometimes with the approval of trade unions 
or other associations of employees, problems of labour dis­ 
cipline may be said to occur when the actual behaviour of 
workers falls to a given degree short of the expectations
of managment. If expectations are set too high, then more 
A
problems of discipline will occur.
Thus, in the Soviet Union during the period under review, 
too many workers were quitting their jobs voluntarily and 
too many were absent without permission. Labour turnover 
and absenteeism came, therefore, to be perceived as the two 
most serious manifestations of indiscipline, although there 
was a progressively increasing perception that many workers' 
overall attitude to work was falling well below expectations
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Usually the demand for labour discipline is part of an 
economic contract between employer and worker, the former 
utilising incentives and sanctions in order to persaude 
the employee to subordinate his immediate personal interests 
to those of production. If the employee does not respond 
he may be fired and the contract is terminated. In the 
Soviet Union the situation is more complicated, for the 
employment contract implicitly embodies certain social and 
political considerations as well as purely economic. Part of 
the social contract might be said to be the understanding 
that the interests of production are geared towards the 
interests of society, of which the workers are the ack­ 
nowledged masters. The political contract is, therefore, 
that the interests of production are indivisible from those 
of the worker, who must needs have a disciplined and consc­ 
ientious attitude to production. Indiscipl ined behaviour 
in a Soviet factory may thus be portrayed as anti-social 
behaviour worthy of political censure.
However, if in spite of such social and political pressure 
sufficient numbers of Soviet workers continue tu put their 
personal interests before those of production and quit their 
jobs, take unsanctioned holidays and work only as hard as 
they can get away with, then the Soviet manager is basically 
in the same position as his Western counterpart and has rec­ 
ourse to either the 'carrot' (incentives) or the 'stick' 
(sanctions).
The situation is further complicated, however, by the 
political need to present conviction as the major factor 
in establishing discipline. This is where socialist compet­ 
ition plays an important role. Once competition had failed 
to prove the panacea to all of Soviet industry's ills in the 
early years of the industrialisation drive, but had hel 
establish firm management control over production ,
-80-
it lost all spontaneity and became a formalised ritual 
within the matrix of Soviet industrial relations. Few 
workers, and one suspects, even fewer managers, really 
believe in competition as a source of discipline: the 
former have little conception of being 'genuine masters 
of production' and the latter know only too well that the 
mass of workers will respond only to incentives or sanctions. 
However, as participation in competition is one of the ind-- 
ices by which both managers and workers are judged, and as 
it has long since become part of the tradition of the Soviet 
work place, both pay it the necessary lip service.
The evolution of the attitude of the authorities towards
the question of establishing labour discipline is graphically
r 
illustrated by compaing the following quotes. The first wasK 1 
written before the spread of mass competition'?
"The Soviet worker also strives first and foremost to 
obtain as high a wage as possible, and in doing so does 
not think that he, as a member of the working class, is 
in the last resort interested in giving as much as poss 
ible to the Soviet state. In consequence, one may not 
rarely come across an absence of labour discipline, and 
the existence of absenteeism etc. in the State enterpr­ 
ises... This forces the Soviet organs (in agreement with 
the trade unions) to ensure that the very forms of 
wages should incite them to increased diligence. This 
explains the existence of standards of output and piece 
rate payment in Soviet state industry. Obviously, in 
distinction from the capitalist system, these measures 
are of a temporary character in Soviet Russia: as the 
socialist consciousness of the worker is developed and 
as the old individualistic outlook is outlived, both 
piece work and the compulsory minimum standard will 
become unecessary."
The second was written during the 'optimistic' phase of
r\
the socialist offensive during the Leninist Enrolment:
"Together with normative (collective agreement, legis­ 
lation, rules of internal order etc.) and material
*******************************
1 I. Lapidus and K. Ostrovityanov, An Outline of Political 
Economy, London, 1929, p.132.
2 I. Reznikov, 'Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie i Narkom- 
trud', in Voprosy truda, 1930, no.2, pp. 7-8.
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Uncentive systems of pay, deductions for producing 
waste etc.) factors that determine a given level of 
labour discipline, a new factor has appeared on the 
scene - t.he voluntary self-discipline, conscious self- 
limitation of the worker who has taken the path of 
communist labour. . .
...A shock W9rkshop is not just three or five hundred 
workers, it is a collective of pioneers of communist 
labour, voluntarily and consciously subordinating their 
persona] interests to the interests of socialist pro- ~ 
duction and to general class principles"]
The struggle with the loafer and the money grubber 
in production at the present time represents a specific 
reflection of the class struggle in the country. There­
fore^ they are not just breaking the rules, therefore, 
but enemies of the people.
Therefore one must not approach infringements of 
labour discipline with a formal juridic al approach: 
here is required first and foremost a social, class 
approach. "
3 And, thirdly, an article written in 1934:
"The task of educating these new-cadres with a 
socialist labour discipline and a socialist attitude 
to work acquires significance of the first order; it 
must be resolved on the basis of intensive work on 
conviction, the explanation of new forms of relation­ 
ships between people which the socialist enterprise 
creates, and also on the basis of compulsion, a pit- 
less struggle with loafers, layabouts, truants and 
flitters. In conditions of modern technology the 
violation of socialist labour discipline causes huge 
losses to the state and to the conscientious shock 
worker . "
The continued presence of piece rates and output standards 
in Soviet industry to this day would suggest that the soc­ 
ialist consciousness foreseen in the first quote and ident­ 
ified among the shock workers in the other two, has never 
become the norm among industrial workers in the USSR.
N. Golyandin, 'Osvoenie tekhniki i problema kadrov 1 in 
Trud v pervoi pyatiletki, Moscow, 1934. p. 39.
-82-
Labour Turnover
During the period under review tekuchest' (turnover), 
along with progul (absenteeism) came to be regarded as
one of the major problems of labour discipline in Soviet 
industry. Similarly, the term letun (flitter) became a 
form of abuse on the level of progul'shchik (truant), 
lodyr' (loafer), rvach (money grubber), and shkurnik (self 
seeker).
As these epithets tended to be applied to whole cross 
strata of the working class, it was found expedient to 
counter them with a term describing a worker who did dis­ 
play the desired qualities in production. This was found 
in the udarnik (shock worker), who by definition, would 
not be expected to quit his job voluntarily or take days 
off without permission, but could be relied on to work 
conscientiously and productively. Thus at the Sverdlov 
textile mill (Moscow) in 1931, a worker had to score 100 
points on the following criteria in order to become a 
shock worker (and qualify for the special provision card):
1. Self-indenture to the end of the Five-Year Plan SO -points
2. Actively engage in social work.................. 10 "
3. Rationalising suggestions....................... 5 JJ
4. Fully utilise work day and be punctual.......... 10 "
5. Solicit ous attitude to tools and machinery .... 5 "
6. Economical use of materials..................... 10 "
7. High quality output............................. 15
8. Rewards ........................................ 10 jj
9. Good attendance record.......................... 5 '
10 No abs ences....................................10
This reveals the relative importance attached to various 
elements of discipline and illustrates the serious attention 
accorded to labour turnover. At this factory, in principle, 
one could not become a shock worker without promising to stay 
at the plant. Whether this list of criteria was effective is
***************************** 
4 Zin. Grishin, op. cit., p.151.
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open to some doubt. Just a year earlier, for example, this 
factory was suffering badly from labour turnover because 
its production had little room for raising skills. 5 More­ 
over, given the widespread practice of 'luring' (pere- 
manivanie) in which factories competed for the services 
of skilled, disciplined workers, one would imagine that 
anyone qualifying as a shock worker at the above p]ant would 
be much sought after.
This introduces the notion of 'beneficial' turnover, 
whereby a worker might put his or her talents to better 
use, improve qualifications, move to a more important sector 
of the economy or to improve his family situation. In a 
rapidly-expanding economy such as the USSR's during the 
period under review, with its educational and technical 
training policies, opportunities for rapid mobility up­ 
wards and the heavy priority given to certain industries, 
regions and individual projects, much of the job changing 
that occurred during the first years of industrialisation 
must have brought some benefit to the economy.
It could even be argued that, as anything from one 
quarter to one third of all Soviet workers leaving their 
jobs were being dismissed for breaches of labour discipline, 
then this had the beneficial effect of clearing the factory 
of undesirable elements (were it not for the fact that, 
given the labour shortage, they would find employment with 
little effort elsewhere). Finally, given the significant 
proportion of temporary or seasonal workers in Soviet in­ 
dustry, particularly during the early years of industrial­ 
isation, then the 'lay offs' and 'end of contract' dis­ 
missals were hardly manifestations of indiscipline.
*##*#**#*************•*******
5 Z. Mokhov, 'Rost tekuchesti rabochei sily v 1929/30g' in 
Voprosy truda, 1930, no.6, p.23.
6 Mokhov, ibid. , p.25, termed it an everyday phenomenon, 
noting tnat the Deputy Director at Moscow s Dinamo 
works had challenged the AMO management to a competition 
in luringl
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What remains are the so-called 'voluntary quits', when 
workers terminate their employment at an enterprise for 
their own personal reasons. As we haveseen this is a char­ 
acteristic feature of industrialising societies employing 
large numbers of new workers from a predominantly rural 
backrgound (who have not yet adjusted to urban industrial 
life) or youngsters (who will tend to be more likely to im­ 
prove skills, shop around etc.) Given the wide variations in 
pay, living and working conditions within industries and 
areas of the Soviet Union during the period under review one 
might expect a high turnover rate.
Moreover, new technologies were being introduced to old 
and new factories alike during this period, effecting rad­ 
ical changes among the small, spontaneous- social systems 
that industrial sociologists now recognise play such a major 
role in worker satisfaction. Wherever this occurred on a 
wide-scale in countries that had industrialised prior to 
the USSR, turnover rates had risen sharply as workers either 
sought refuge in plants utilising the old technology or 
found it easier to adapt to the changes in a completely new 
environment. The speed and scope of industrial innovation 
in the Soviet Union during the period under review must, 
therefore, have been expected to push up turnover rates, 
especially in heavy industry.
Thus the rates were perceived to be intolerably high at 
a time when, from an objective standpoint, they were not ex­ 
cessively so, given the appalling state of living and work­ 
ing conditions that obtained. Indeed, the figure of 85 per 
cent (of the average number of workers) leaving Soviet in­ 
dustry in 1935 was considerably higher than those being ex­ 
perienced in Western countries at that time, let alone the
levels accepted tolerable in modern industrial society 7^ but 
approximated the levels in Western industries at the turn of the century.
•X-XTr-KTr-XTrTtTr-X-X-KK-XlC-X-KftXfCVt-XTC-XTCTSKK « ~ .,
7 In German industry in 1967-1972 the turnover rate was 5 
per cent, in the USA in 1970 it was 4.8 per cent and in 
the USSR in 1971 it was 21 per cent, Wolfgang Teckenberg, 
Labour Turnover and Job Satisfaction: indicators of Indus­ 
trial Conflict in the USSR?', in Soviet Studies, vol.XXX,
April 1978, no.2, p.194.
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Moreover, the Soviet turnover rate adhered to more general trends elsewhere
For example, it has been well established that the new 
worker is much more likely to leave than the 'cadre' 
worker. Therefore, the more new workers at a given 
plant the higher the rate of turnover to be expected. The 
following table illustrates the scale of the problem in­ 
volved in Soviet industry:
TABLE 2
Absolute Numbers for Hiring & Firing in Soviet Industry
(in thousands) 1929-1933 
Year No. Hired No. Fired Net change
1929 
1930
1931
1932
1933
3577 
6482
6983
6554
6347
3367 
5600
6318
6987
6286
+ 232 
+ 752
+944
+ 534
no rise
Source: Byulleten' ekonomicheskogo kabineta prof. S.N.
Prokopovicha, no]116,October 1934, Prague, p.14.
Thus, although the increment in the number of industrial 
workers in Soviet industry rose between 1929 and 1933 by 
just over two million , nearly thirty million were hired 
(and almost 28 million fired) during this period.
This affected, in particular, the Group 'A' (producer 
goods) industries. Thus, in 1931, 4.3 million workers 
were hired and 3.9 million left and in 1932 4.2. million 
arrived and 4.4 million left. As light industry (Group 
'B') witnessed a slower growth in its labour force, its 
turnover rate was correspondingly lower (in 1931 1.9 mil­ 
lion came and 1.8 million left, and in 1932 1.7 million
Q
came and 1.8 million left).
Viewed thus, 1932 was a worse year for turnover than 
1930, despite the fact that the overall rate had dropped 
from 152.4 per cent in 1930 to 135.3 per cent in 1932. 
However, it was perceived as being a greater problem in 
the former year and that is when measures began to be 
adopted to restrict the freedom of movement of Soviet
1abour. 
***************************
8 Byulleten' Prokopovicha, no.116, p.15.
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Similarly, it has been established that the first 
three months of work at a factory represent the period 
in which the worker is most likely to leave. 9 After this 
he or she is more likely to respond to incentives, become 
better integrated into the work environment and seek other 
means, notably absenteeism, of putting personal interests 
ahead of those of production). Given the huge numbers of 
hirings (over 6 million in every year from 1930 to 1933) 
it would thus be reasonable to expect that a proportion 
of these workers would change jobs twice, three times or 
even more during the course of one year.
Thus, a 100 per cent turnover rate does not necessari­ 
ly indicate that the entire staff is replenished annually, 
but is more likely to represent a work force in which a 
proportion is stable, a smaller proportion changes once 
or twice per year and the remainder come and go in an 
endless stream. What is not reflected in these figures 
at all is the amount of internal turnover (switching jobs 
within the same factory). In the larger plants this could 
assume enormous scales, being estimated at 5000 per cent 
per annum in one large metalworks early in 1930.
Soviet data suggest that, in common with the ex­ 
perience of other industrialising countries, it is the 
process of change rather than lack; of stazh at a given 
plant that is the unsettling factor causing turnover. 
According to an investigation in 1929 of Moscow regional 
industry, 52.7 per cent of those leaving in the first 
three months quit voluntarily and a further 13.9 per cent 
were sacked for unsuitability. The respective figures for 
the 'cadre' workers (with more than five years experience) 
were 20.3 and 0.4 per cent. 11 Figures for the Rykov metal 
*****************************
9 Mary Harris, 'Social Aspects of Labour Turnover in the 
USSR' in British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol.11; 
no.3, November 1964, pp.410-411.
10 Z. Mordukhovich, Na bor'bu s tekuchest'yu rabochei sily, 
Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, p.62.
11 M. Vovsi and R. Shostak, 'K voprosu o tekuchesti rabochei
sily v promyshlennosti' in Puti industrializatsii, 1930, 
no.14, p.30.
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works in the period 1926 to 1928, reveal that workers 
with less than three months service accounted for only 
5.2 per cent of the labour force, but 40.8 per cent of 
the turnover, whereas those with five years or more 
service at the plant constituted 10.9 per cent of the 
work force and just 0.4 per cent of those quitting. 12
Several other generalisations may be drawn from the 
turnover figures. Thus women tend to have lower turnover 
rates than men, 13 workers in light industry tend to leave 
more infrequently than workers in heavy industry, 1 ^ 
skilled have lower rates than unskilled 15 > ancj ] Ower 
paid groups are more likely to quit than higher grade 
groups 1 ^.
However, it should be stressed that these are only 
correlates of turnover, revealing the groups most likely 
to quit. The main determinants of labour turnover are 
pay and conditions (in the Soviet case during the period 
under review the latter, arguably, were of more importance). 
This was recognised even by Stalin, who identified 'wage 
levelling 1 (uravnilovka) as the main cause of turnover in 
his key speech to the industrial managers on 23 June 1931.1'
In their turn, pay and conditions are a factor in the 
level of job satisfaction, which is the variable that most 
influences the decision to stay or quit. If the worker is 
more or less satisfied with his or her overall work and 
living situation and can perceive no alternative means of 
bettering it, he or she will tend to stay at the factory.
12 S. Kheinman, '0 tekuchesti rabochego sostava promyshlen- 
nosti SSSR 1 , in Puti industrial izatsii, 1929, nos 13-14, 
p. 41
13 Thus the cotton industry, which employed predominantly 
women, had well below average turnover figures throughout 
the period under review, see Appendix B.
14 See Appendix B
15 M Rakovskii, ' Sotsorevnovanie i tekuchest' rabochei sily 1 , 
Puti industrial izatsii, 1930, nos. 15-16, p. 32 claims 
that in spring of 1929 in the metal industry, skilled 
turnover was 8 per cent and unskilled 25 per cent, rates 
which had doubled by the first half of 1930.
16 A. Mints, 'Rynok truda v periode rekonstruktsii 1 in Puti 
industrial izatsii, 1930, nos. 11-12, p. 73
17 I.V. Stalin, Sochineniya, vol.13, M. 1952, pp. 55-56.
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If dissatisfied, or perceiving better conditions else­ 
where the worker will tend to quit as and when the opp­ 
ortunity arises or levels of dissatisfaction become high.
Thus, it would have been highly unlikely if there had 
been a high level of satisfaction among workers sleeping 
on earth floors, near starving for lack of adequate pro­ 
visions, or those who had been sent to the most unpleasant 
and difficult work on arriving fresh from the countryside. 
No amount of moral appeals, laws restricting movement or 
even improvements in pay would solve this particular prob­ 
lem until the living and working conditions had been tack­ 
led. Stalin admitted this in his June 1931 speech, too.
Consequently, the extremely high turnover rates for
the coal industry (in the Donbas mines, turnover had already
18 reached 300 per cent in 1926/7) f came down not so much
after the wage reforms in the autumn of 1931, but when 
provisions and housing conditions finally started to im­ 
prove in the spring of 1933 (see Appendix C). Similarly, 
for the country as a whole, turnover rates started to fall 
not so much following the Government legislation of late 
1930 - early 1931, but when the food situation started to 
get better in 1933. The same trend may be seen in the 
sphere of housing, which fell from 5.73 square metres per 
urban dweller at the beginning of 1929 to 4.64 square metres 
by 1 January 1933. ]9
Indeed, it may be argued that the turnover tates com­ 
menced to rise in the second half of 1928/29 (i.e. from 
April 1929) with the fall in the level of real wages and the 
start of the deterioration in living standards that was to 
characterise the situation in the Soviet towns throughout the 
First Five-Year plan. However, analysts of turnover at 
*****************************
18 V. Httffding, 'Labour Conditions in Soviet Russia', in 
The Slavonic (and East European)Review, vol.7, no. 20,
January 1929, p. 
19 Istoriya SSSR, vtoraya seriya, vol.8, Moscow, 1967, p. 513
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this period identify the inadequately rapid promotion of 
workers to higher skill grades as the major reason for 
voluntary quits, followed by wage differentation. Only 
the indisciplined behaviour of the cohort of middle-aged, 
unskilled workers is attributed directly to shortcomings
among the workers, the bulk of the blame for turnover
? n being laid squarely on the management and planning organs.
Throughout this period, indeed until the mass campaign 
against turnover commenced in the summer of 1930, it was 
regarded as, first and foremost an economic and social 
problem. However, the findings of the Government committee 
on labour discipline, reached in early 1929, prompted one 
analyst to conclude that "turnover is the main evil in 
establishing the correct labour discipline." 21
Although, as we have seen, the peasant migrants into the 
work force became the scapegoat for all forms of falling 
discipline, there is evidence that links with the land 
could have a stabilising effect. In 1927/8, the Krasnoe 
Sormovo shipyards in Nizhnii Novgorod had one of the lowest 
turnover rates in heavy industry (25-30 per cent), due im
part to the fact that 70 per cent of its workers were con-
22 nected with the land. The Moscow regional survey detects
no significant patterns of leaving between workers with or 
those without land, other than the obvious fact that the 
former constituted a higher proportion of those laid off. 2 ^
It seems to have been the effects of collectivisation 
that sent the workers scurrying back to the countryside. 
In early 1930, Krasnoe Sormovo was reporting that "as a 
rule it is the best and most highly-skilled section of 
workers that leaves the factory in such increased outflows 
of manpower." Morale at this enterprise was by now very 
low. During the collectivisation campaign village workers
*****************************
20 Puti industrializatsii, 1930, no.14, p.36 (Vovsi and 
Shostak).
21 A. Sokol'skii, op. cit., p.49.
22 ibid., p.51.
23 Puti industrializatsi;. 1930, no 14, p.31 (Vovsi and 
Shostak)
24 Voprosy truda, 1930, no.6, p.22 (Mokhov)
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had been obliged to join the collective farms or be sacked. 
Following Stalin's "Dizzy with Success" speech in March 1930 
"they all quit". 25
The first article to draw attention to the sharp rise 
in turnover was in the management newspaper, Za industriali- 
zatsiyu, which on 8 May 1930 had complained of the tendency 
for workers to "go to new places to sniff life for themselves 
(sobstvennym nosom). Within days of this article the Metal­ 
workers' journal reported that groups of planers in the 
machine and boiler shops of Krasnyi Putilovets had undertaken
not to quit the plant without permission until the Five-Year
76Plan had been fulfilled. However, the same issue pointed
out that the luring of metalworkers by representatives of 
other factories had "assumed the most disgraceful forms". 
At Krasnyi Putilovets, for example, it was stated that "our 
factory is suffering from the hirers...people come ostensibly 
on a tour and walk around asking if you are agreeable to go 
to this or that factory." 27
A feature of the first articles on turnover was the 
high proportion of skilled workers reported to be leaving. 
In a desperate attempt to hold on to their better workers, 
managers would refuse to allow workers to leave "at their 
own request". This, in turn, led to skilled workers delib­ 
erately violating discipline in order to get the sack. Even 
so, managers were reluctant to fire them and the workers
would take mangement to the Rate-Setting and Disputes Comm-
/^ 
issions for not applying the law that required dismissal
after three days' absenteeism.28
****************************
25 Metallist, 20 May, 1930.
26 ibid.,
27 Voprosy truda, 1930, no. 6, p.25 (Mokhov)
28 ibid., p.26
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The early articles on turnover, particularly those 
in the Narkomtrud journals, Voprosy trcda and Na trudovom 
fronte » continued to blame management, poor living conditions 
and the shortage of skilled cadres for the rise? 9 This was 
reflected in the Narkomtrud decree of 30 May T930 which 
listed the following reasons: 30
1. Poor organisation of work due to low level of technical 
standard setting. The utilisation of too many temp­ 
orary workers.
2. Differentiation in rates of pay.
3. Poor system of promotion.
4. Inadequate training levels.
5. Desire of rural workers to move from small towns to 
larger ones.
6. Lack of permanent cadres in some sectors covered by 
large numbers of rural seasonal workers.
7. Lack of selection in manpower.
These were the solutions that the Labour Commissariat 
proposed:
1. More training, especially in heavy industry.
2. Expand standard setting.
3. Introduce benefits for long-service workers.
4. Organise more promotion within the enterprise.
5. Cut down on temporary workers.
6. Introduce given period of contracts for skilled workers 
and engineering and technical personnel.
7. Graduates from factory schools must serve out their time 
in the enterprise.
8. Improve housing and living conditions.
Again, the onus for much of the problem is laid on 
management rather than blaming 'backward 1 or 'class alien 
elements'. However, not all of Narkomtrud's regional 
offices were so complacent. The Leningrad labour office 
was taken to task by Na trudovom fronte for trying to solve 
the problem of labour turnover by the "militarisation of 
labour". 32
29 Na trudovom fronte, 1930, no.17. pp.10-11; nos. 19-20, 
p.9; Voprosy truda, 1930, no.6, pp.22-28, (Mokhov)
30 Voprosy truda, T9lO, no.6, p.27 (Mokhov)
31 ibid., p.28.
32 Na trudovom fronte, 1930, no.17, p.10.
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One should recall that the 'Rightist', Uglanov, still 
headed Narkomtrud at this stage and one can only assume
^ A
that his diagnosis and suggested cures help^speed his 
own demise. However, the XVI Congress of the Communist 
Party, held in June - July at the height of the discussions 
about turnover, paid them relatively little attention, 
although, ominously, on 30 June Lominadze was warning
Congress about "serious production difficulties in a number
33 of industrial cities", a point supplemented on the following
day by Mirzoyan, a delegate from the Urals* 3^
"Comrades, I think that no other detachment of our 
working class lives in such bad conditions as the 
Urals worker. In the largest workers' settlements 
there are no baths, no cinemas, no clubs, no paved 
streets..."
Moreover, as he went on to inform the delegates, the 
Urals worker was getting 20 per cent lower wages than 
the national average. In fact, the situation was even more 
complicated than he made them out to be for figures pub­ 
lished in a trade union survey conducted in March 1930 
revealed the following daily rates for a 7th grade (i.e high- 
skilled) fitter (slesar') in a variety of industries and 
areas:35
Electrotechnical 8.67 rubles
Iron & Steel (Ukr) 5-42
(Ural) 5.92
Transport eng, 7.80 "
Special engineering 7.20 "
Coal (Ukraine> 4.23
(Urals) 3.94
Textiles 4.59
Rubber 7.27
**************************
33 XVI S"ezd, p. 197.
34 ibid. ,~p. 265.
35 Z. Mordukhovich, pp. cit., p. 54; the same author notes 
that skilled textile workers in Leningrad were earning 
75 to 80 rubles a month, while unskilled labourers were 
getting from 95 to 130 rubles in the metal works, ibid. , 
p. 57; on 13 March 1930 a VTsSPS investigation into 
turnover resulted in a decree "On the Campaign Against 
Labour Turnover", which called for the correction of 
such anomalies, see ibid. , p. 55*, See also I. Zaromskii, 'Na 
bor'bu s tekuchest'yu rabochei sily' in Voprosy truda, 1930, no. 9, p. 2
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In other words, the Urals miner was getting only 45.4 
per cent of the wage of a worker of the same skill grade in 
the electrotechnical industry. Given the shortage of all 
skilled workers, there would be ample opportunity for
r"<t,c.t» v i r\ o
him to move and improve his situation. He was also^only 
two-thirds of the pay of a fellow Urals 1 worker of the same 
skill in the iron and steel industry.
Nonetheless, the main reason for turnover in the coal 
industry remained the poor housing facilities. A delegate 
from the Kusbas district in Siberia claimed that there was 
living space for just 18 to 19 per cent of the permanent
O £
miners there. Eikhe, the local Party secretary, also 
complained that some Kuzbas miners had only 1.4 square metres
living space and blamed this for a turnover rate that he
37 claimed was 94 per cent per month!
Ironically, it was subsequently claimed that the mass 
outflow from the Donbas coalmines commenced at the end of 
June (i.e. precisely as the Congress was sitting). In less 
than two months the mines lost 70,000 workers (or one- 
third of its complement). Again housing and working con­ 
ditions were chiefly held to blame. 38
In the autumn of 1930 the regime launched a three-pronged 
attack at turnover. Firstly, with the elimination of un­ 
employment, Narkomtrud was entrusted with the job of 
organising the hire of labour through 'staff offices' 
(upravleniye kadrov), thus, it was hoped, stemmimg the 
free flow (samotek) of labour from the countryside in 
favour of orgnabor (organised hire). Secondly, legislation 
was introduced to encourage workers to stay at their enter­ 
prise through moral appeals for self-inden 1 tures, increased
•v.
benefits for 'cadre' (in this case with two years' service) 
and shock workers and attempts to improve living and working 
******************************
36 Kopylev, XVI S"ezd, p.384.
37 Trud, 10 February 1931.
38 A. Izrailovich, 'Bor'ba za ugol'', in Bol'shevik , 1931, 
no.18, p.37; Trud, 17 July 1930.
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conditions. Thirdly, a much tougher line was taken against t 
the 'flitters 1 . This was initiated by the Party appeal of 
3 September 1930, 39 and the decree issued by RSFSR Sovnar- 
kora on 6 September 1930, which first stated that quitting 
work arbitrarily was tantamount to violating labour dis­ 
cipline. ° This was the first in a series of decrees to be 
issued over the next six months that sought to bring this 
problem under control. 4 ^
It would be wrong to claim that none of these approaches 
led to any improvement in the situation, although they were 
far from successful in eliminating the problem of turnover. 
Rates never again reached the heights of July 1930 either 
in industry as a whole (14.6 per cent or an annual rate of 
175.2 per cent), or in heavy industry (18.9 per cent or an 
annual rate of 226.8 per cent), including its worst sector, 
coal mining (38.2 per cent or an annual rate of 458.4 per 
cent), although light industry turnover peaked somewhat 
later, in October 1930 (at 12.6 per cent ot 151.2 per annum)
Certainly orgnabor made some inroads into the excessive­ 
ly high rates of turnover among collective farm migrants, 
even if the overall level in the industries where they 
worked remained high. Thus in the mines of the Ugol' amalg­ 
amation in the Ukraine, in September 1931, 26,481 workers 
who had arrived by samotek had left and only 14,622 had 
arrived, whereas of the 39,276 arriving through orgnabor, 
only 8,922 (23 per cent) had left. 43 On the other hand, 
of 7,000 miners coming to the Moscow mines in the period 
from July to September 1931, 5,000 (71.5 per cent) left. 44
*****************************
39 See Chapter Five.
40 Izvestiya, 8 September 1930.
41 See Chapter Four.
42 £otsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR, M, 1934, p.342.
43 Trud v SSSR - materialy k otchetu narkomtruda SSSR na 
IX VSPS, Moscow-Leningrad, 1932, p.I/.
44 A. Tsikhon, Doklad narkomtruda . . IX s"ezdu profsoyuzov, 
M, 1932, p.lTT
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Other aspects of the Party's campaign against turnover 
also met with only partial success. Self-indentures in 
Leningrad covered 24.2 per cent of all Leningrad workers 
by the end of September 1930 and had reached impressive 
figures at individua] enterprises by the end of the year.^ 5 
By the beginning of December, a survey revealed that 44.7 
per cent of metal workers studied had signed, as had 51.5 
per cent of communication workers, 33.5 per cent of textile 
and 27.5 per cent of woodworkers. °
However, as long as the shortage of skilled and semi­ 
skilled workers remained, there was little chance of getting 
these pledges to stick, especially when living conditions 
deteriorated in 1931 and 1932.
The switch to raising skills by means of material incenti­ 
ves and an extensive programme of training was heralded by 
Stalin's speech of 4 February and initiated with his address 
of 23 June 1931, to meetings of industrial managers. At the 
latter Stalin complained:
"You will be hard put to find an-enterprise where
the labour force has not changed in the course of the 
last half year, or even quarter, at least by 30 to 40 
per cent. What is the reason for labour turnover? 
It is in the incorrect organisation of wages, in the 
incorrect pay scales, in the 'leftist' wage levelling 
in the sphere of wages."
Stalin' new policy was aimed at eliminating turnover by
means of the abolition of wage levelling, the organisation 
*****************************
45 Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie na predpriyatiyakh 
Leningrada v gody pervoi pyatiletki, (1928-1932gg), 
1961, p.176. T^^
46 M. Raf ail, 'Profsoyuzy posle XVI s"ezda partii' in 
Bol'shevik, 1931,. no. 5,-. p,52:
47 I.V. Stalin, Sochineniya , vol.13, p.56.
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of wages so as to give priority to the key industries, 
and the improvement of workers' living conditions.
The first industry to get a taste of the new policy 
was the Donbas coalfield which, in July 1931, was ordered 
to scrap wage levelling within two months. Then in September 
1931 the economic organs were given the right to hire labour 
without going through the labour organs who, it was claimed, 
had only "inexperienced workers and idlers" on their books. 48
A week later key wage reforms in the metal and mining 
industries were introduced that pointed the way to wage 
differentations both between skilled and unskilled workers, 
but also between priority and non-priority industry. 49
At the XVII Party Conference early in 1932, Postyshev 
was able to report that the wage reforms had improved the 
skilled turnover rates in the iron and steel industry,
quoting figures from Southern metal works as evidence. 
However, a contemporary account suggested that the reforms 
may have come too late for "the old steel smelters have dis­ 
banded and work as navvies on the new construction sites"51
Despite the opportunities for higher earnings and the 
priority provisions directed to these new sites, they were 
experiencing great difficulty in holding on to their workers. 
More than 10,000 left Magnitogorsk every month from July to
c o
November 1931. Certain areas were still reporting extreme- 
ly Aturnover rates in both the coal and metal industries in 
1931.
48 Izvestiya, 19 September 1931
49 Trud, 23 September, 1931
50 AVii Konferentsiya VKP (b); stenograficheskii otchet, M, 
1932, p.52.
51 G. Lauer, 'Perevypol'nit' plan chernoi metallurgii v 1932g 
in Bol'shevik, 1932, no.3, p.35.
52 P.Pochinshchikov, S. Syskov, '0 rabote nizovogo partiinogo 
zvena (na opyte partorganizatsii Magnitostroya), in 
Bol'shevik, 1931, nos. 19-20, p.62.
53 For Donbas, see Na trudovom fronte. , 1931, nos 23-24,p.22; 
for Vostokstal' ,see V. Reutov,^ekuchest' rabsily - 
zleishii vrag sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva, Voprosy 
truda, 1933, no.l, p.65.
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The year of 1932 was to bring little relief to those 
leading the campaign against turnover. At the beginning 
of the year it was estimated that only 60 per cent of 
Donbas workers had worked at the same pit for the whole of 
January, 21.6 per cent had worked in two, and no less than 
18.3 per cent in three or morel 54
Throughout 1932 came reports of high turnover rates, 
especially amongst skilled cadres, from all over the 
country. A particular feature was the unprecedented 
rise in light industry, which was catching up with heavy 
industry.
In virtually every case the reasons given for the 
turnover were the same: dissatisfaction with wages, lack 
of housing and poor provisions. All these factors were 
confirmed in a major article on turnover in the trade union 
journal early in 1933, noting that in the coal industry 
poor labour organisation and living conditions were the 
main reasons, in metallurgy - failure to introduce wage 
reforms and living conditions, in engineering - standard 
setting and in textiles - wages.
At the Stalingrad tractor Works in September 1932, 10 
per cent of all workers left, but 12.9 per cent of planers, 
12.5 per cent fitters, 11.8 per uent of turners and 11 
per cent of electrical fitters. At Krasnoe Sormovo, 
whereas 7.5 per cent of all workers had left, the figures 
for turners and moulders were 10.2 and 20.2 per cent re­ 
spectively. -*" In b .Leningrad light industry factories 
in August 1932, 62.3 per cent of all workers leaving 
were semi-skilled or skilled workers. "
54 Na trudovom fronte, 1932, nos. 17-18, p. 9
55 Pershman, 'Tekuchest 1 rabochei sily i zadachi prof-
soyuzov' , in Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1933, no. 3, p. 42.
56 Pravda, 9 December 1932.
57 P. Vasil'ev, Ya Leipunskii, Voprosy oborachivaemosti
rabochego sostava v legkoi promyshlennosti, M, 1933^p.93
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However, by the end of the summer of 1932 absenteeism 
had replaced turnover as the major problem of discipline. 
To some extent turnover was to blame for this, as more 
and more workers were deliberately being absent for three 
days in order to get sacked, so that they could move on 
to other jobs. Both these problems were tackled in the 
series of decrees on absenteeism and the control of 
provisions which were introduced by the end of the year. 58
Many writers drew a comparison between the 'flitter 1
and the 'truant' calling both "the class enemies of the prole
ii 59 
etariat an^ trade union organisations were advised that
"the struggle against turnover and absenteeism, the struggle 
for a socialist labour discipline is the most important 
form of class struggle at the present stage." 60
However, the task set before the trade unions to eliminate 
turnover in 1933 was clearly so much rhetoric. Midway 
through the year, when the unions took over Narkomtrud, 
Shvernik launched a vicious attack on "malingerers', flitters 
shirkers and money grubbers for whom the interests of social­ 
ist construction are of utterly no interest or concern."
Labour turnover disappeared from the pages of labour 
and union journals as a matter of priority concern during 
1934 and was not a major subject of discussion at the XVII 
Congress in January - February of that year. The undoubted 
rise in living standards and the improved skill levels of the 
Soviet workforce combined with a reduction of new workers 
entering industry helped to maintain turnover levels below 
100 per cent for the rest of the decade.
58 See Chapter Four
59 Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1933, no. 3, p. 50 (Pershman)
60 ibid. , p. 51
61 S. Kuril 'skii, '0 sliyanie Narkomtruda SSSR i VTsSPS 1 in 
Sovetskoe stroitel ' stvo, 1933, no. 11, p. 16.
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ABSENTEEISM
As with labour turnover, a distinction should be 
drawn between simple correlates of absenteeism (age, 
gender, size of plant, time of year etc.) and determin­ 
ants (i.e. why workers take unsanctioned days off). It 
immediately becomes apparent that the main determinants 
of turnover (pay and living conditions) are by no means 
necessarily the main causes of absenteeism. On the other 
hand, such factors as the level of the worker's integration 
in the workplace, working conditions and job satisfaction 
may be seen to contribute to both forms of behaviour.
Absenteeism would seem to be a feature of all industrial 
societies, although it is evident that it is not typical 
of all or even most workers. At the same time, the 
attendance record of one Zabotin, a fitter at the October 
tram depot, who in thirty-five years of service had never 
once been absent without permission except during the
£ O
October Revolution, z is quite unusual.
It does appear that absenteeism becomes more prevalent 
during periods of intensive changes in the work and life 
situation of workers, seemingly acting as a safety-valve 
during the process of adaptation that falls short of the 
more drastic solution of quitting.
From Lenin onwards, Soviet leaders have displayed a 
particular distaste for this form of worker behaviour, 
perhaps because absenteeism is so overtly at odds with the 
desired attitude to work in a socialist society. It is 
the most explicit example of a worker placing his or her 
immediate personal interests before those of production. 
For this reason, it is probable that successive Soviet 
leaders have devoted too much effort to the largely pol­ 
itical task of eliminating unsanctioned absenteeism, and
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
62 Trud, 5 July 1930.
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too little to the social task of tackling the underlying 
reasons that give rise to it.
Thus the utility of virtually eliminating unsanctioned 
absenteeism in Soviet industry (where it currently constit­ 
utes a small proportion of all work days lost) 63 , may be 
questioned, particularly in view of the comparatively high 
rates of sickness, sanctioned absenteeism and underutilis- 
ation of the working day.
A parallel might be drawn here with the long-standing 
Soviet attitude to strikes. Their effective elimination from 
industrial relations in the USSR from 1929 undoubtedly pro­ 
vided the regime with an important political victory, but 
it is by no means obvious that the abs ence of strikes has 
been a great boon to the Soviet economy. For example, during 
1931 and 1932 each British worker lost on average less than 
two-thirds of one day per annum through strikes, one- 
tenth of the unsanctioned absentee rate in Soviet industry 
during those years.
Moreover, there is evidence that the lack of strikes 
tends to push up both absentee and sickness rates. " Thus, 
if the Soviet worker is effectively prevented from striking 
or arbitrarily taking a day off, one would expect that 
worker to find other means of accommodating the tensions pro­ 
duced by work in modern industry by taking unauthorised 
breaks, idling, malingering and working half-heartedly.
Absenteeism, therefore, illustrates most graphically some
****************************
63 The unsanctioned absentee rate has remained under 1 day 
per worker throughout the post-war period, see Yu. L.
Sokol'nikov, ' Sotsial isticheskaya distsiplina truda i 
puti ee uluchsheniya', in Sotsiologicheskie issledova- 
niya, 1976, no. 1, p.93.
64 International Labour Organisation Year Book, 1934-35, 
vol. 2, Geneva,1935, pp7 27, 75.
65 See Appendix 1b
66 Richard Hyman, Strikes, London, 1972, pp. 34, 54-55.
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of the conflicts between the political and economic im­ 
peratives of Soviet society. Having adopted the political 
decision to eliminate unsanctioned absenteeism (progul) 
as a manifestation of the petty-bourgeois attitudes of 
certain workers, the absentee laws that flowed from that 
of 15 November 1932, treated all absenteeism without good 
reason as anti-social, deviant behaviour.
This was clearly too inflexible a policy for application 
to a labour force living and working under the exigent 
conditions of the first five-year plans. For the law made 
no distinction between the good worker who lived 15 kms from 
the plant and failed to turn up for work due to transport 
difficulties and the habitual drunkard who took a day off 
to cure a hangover.
Obviously, it would be in the interests of the plant 
management to make such a distinction, particularly as it 
would have been far more aware of local conditions, the 
characters of the workers involved and the economic desir­ 
ability of firing either or both of them. As managers were 
judged, first and foremost, on their economic performance, 
they might find it in their interests to defy the law and 
sanction the first worker's abs ence, albeit in retrospect.
Similarly, in the first years of the industrialisation 
drive, local management would be able to gauge, more or less, 
the level of absenteeism on any given day and would keep on 
their books sufficient numbers of surplus workers to Cover 
the truants. This is common practice in industrialising 
countries.
The combination of laws insisting that factories shed 
their surplus labour and the introduction of more complex 
technological processes inevitably made absenteeism into
-102-
a more pressing problem that it had hitherto been. For
the loss caused by absence in such conditions would be 
all the greater.
It has been estimated that progul cost the Soviet 
economy 225 million rubles in the economic year 1927/28. 
In that year 13 million working days were lost (at 6.04 
days per worker) 67 . Xt may be calculated, therefore, that 
each day's absence cost the economy a little over 17 rubles. 
In 1931, the cost of absenteeism had risen to 714 million 
rubles through 24.6 million days being lost (at 5.96 days 
per worker) ^ which works out at almost exactly 29 rubles 
per absence. In other words, over this short time span, the 
cost to the economy of each day's absence had almost doubled.
This helps explain why Vesenkha officials were more con­ 
cerned with the fact that Soviet industry had lost virtually
as much through absenteeism in the first five months of 1929
69as it had for the whole of 1928, than it was with the sub­ 
stantial reduction in rates of absenteeism during that period
However, it is useful to keep a sense of perspective when 
discussing the cost of absenteeism, for it was by no means 
the costliest form of behaviour by the Soviet worker. In 
1927/28, for example, workers were estimated to have drunk 
spirits to the value of 1.5 milliard rubles, equivalent to 
the entire budget for capital construction that year. 7 ^
Moreover, if one might assume that the cost of a day's 
sick leave is the same as that of an absence then the day's 
lost through illness (including maternity leave) would have
cost the country a staggering 1.88 milliard rubles in 1931,
71 more than 260 per cent higher than the cost of progul.
****************************
67 T.A. Tirzbanyrt, Za trudovuyu distsiplinu, 2nd. ed., Mos­ 
cow-Leningrad, 1929, p.33.
68 Pravda, 1 December 1932.
69 Trud, 25 July 1929.
70 T.A. Tirzbanort, op. cit., p.55.
71 Calculated from Trud v SSSR: statisticheskii spravochnik, 
1936, p.96.
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It was never precisely calculated just how much 
labour turnover cost the economy. However, one author 
did note in this connection that the cost of hiring one
worker in American industry was the equivalent of 72
72 rubles. He does not suggest that the figure in Soviet
industry was lower, but makes the point that the 7 million 
workers that had to be hired in 1931 to achieve an overall 
increment to the working class of one million cost the 
economy a substantial amount, If we accept the American 
figures, for argument's sake, as being roughly applicable 
in Soviet industry, then the cost of hiring manpower alone 
would work out at well over 400 million rubles, more than 
half the cost of absenteeism. The total cost of turnover 
must have been considerably greater.
This highlights an important feature of absenteeism in 
relation to the statistics on labour discipline. Because 
it is relatively easy to keep records on, absenteeism tended 
to dominate the statistics during the period under review, 
at least until the 1932 law. For example, in the eight 
factories of Yugostal' studied in 1927/28, of the 103,568 
breaches of discipline recorded, no fewer than 77,828 (75.1 
per cent) were cases of unsanctioned absenteeism, with only 
5,276 (5.1 per cent) incidents of disobeying management or­ 
ders, 2,178 (2.1 per cent) sleeping at work and 2,950 (2.8
73 per cent) for leaving work early.
However, if progul accounted for three out of every four 
violations of labour discipline, why was there such a heated 
discussion over falling levels from May 1928 onwards at a 
time when absentee rates were being reduced substantially? 
In the economic year 1928/29 the rate fell by more than 26 
per cent to?4.46 days per worker from 6.04 days in 1927/28.
* * * * * * /'? * * * Vr * * * * * * * * * * /V /V * * * * Vc * *
72 S. Kheinman in Pravda, 9 December 1932.
73 G. Dukor, 'Sebestoimost', proizvoditel'nost' truda i
trudovaya distsiplina', in Bol'shevik, 1929, no.7, p.32.
74 Trud v SSSR. Spravochnik 1926-193Qgg. p.19.
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Apart from the aforementioned rising cost of each 
day's absence, the main cause of concern was probably 
the growing impatience on the part of the authorities 
with the perceived state of labour discipline, particularly 
since the introduction from 1928 of the seven-hour, three- 
shift working day.
The Government commission on labour discipline reflected 
this, reporting in 1929 that, although absentee rates were 
falling, this was more than compensated for by a rise in 
all other violations. 6 A commentator on these findings 
concluded:
"The important thing , insofar as the question of 
labour discipline is concerned, is that its overall 
condition does not guarantee the pace of work under­ 
taken by the enterprises."
In the absence of reliable statistics on other forms 
of indiscipline, one can neither prove nor disprove this, 
although the oft-repeated accusation that managements were 
turning a blind eye to viol ations was probably justified.
However, what may be gleaned from the statistics is 
that the total number of days lost for all reasons other 
than rest days and days when the factory stood idle was 
f al ling.
In 1927/28, for example, 10.6 per cent of days per 
calendar year were lost through annual leave, sickness and
all forms of absenteeism. Unsanctioned absenteeism accounted
78 for just 1.7 per cent.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
75 See 'The Seven-Hour Day in Soviet Russia', International 
Labour Review, vol. XXII, no. 3, September 1930, pp 329- 
357.
76 A. Sokol'skii, op. cit . , p. 5
77 ibid. , p. 6
78 Trud v SSSR. Spravochnik 1 926-1 930gg. , pp. 18-19.
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This is how the situation changed in the period under 
review:
TABLE 3
Progul and all no shows as a percentage of all calendar days
Year Unsanctioned Absenteeism Al ] No Shows
1928 1.6 10.6
1929 1.1 10.1
1930 1.2 10.7
1931 1.6 11.2
1932 1.6 11.1 5JV
1933 0.25 8.9 0 -li
1934 0.20 8.8
Source: Trud v SSSR; statisticheskii spravochnik, 1936, p. 96
However, as it was conservatively estimated that one 
hour in every seven was lost in unproductive work in 1927/28, 
it may be calculated that as much time was lost through the 
underutil isation of the working day as through all the 
above causes combined.
In other words, more than six times the losses caused 
by unsanctioned absenteeism were brought about through under­ 
util isation of the working day. This helps explain why the 
authorities sought to tackle this problem once absenteeism 
had been brought under control in 1933.
What was required, therefore, at the start of the period 
under review, was a complete change of attitude to work by 
the entire work force. This is where socialist competition 
played such a major role. It provided an example of worker 
behaviour that approximated that desired by management and 
Party.
* * /'c >'<• /V * * * /V * * * * * * * /V /V /V * Vc * * * /V *
79 T.A. Tirzbant»rt, op. cit., p. 37.
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One should also bear in mind that there is evidence to 
show that a growing proportion of the labour force was 
observing labour discipline at this time. Thus, among 
workers in the Donbas in December 1927, only 48.5 per cent 
had no unsanctioned absences during that month whereas 17 
per cent had four or more! By December 1928, the figures 
were 57.5 and 10 per cent respectively. In both years 
roughly one-third of all workers had been absent from 
between one and three
This introduces another specific feature of progu] 
in Soviet industry. In most other industrialised count­ 
ries there was no concept of a maximum number of days that 
might be taken off for no reason, whereas in the USSR 
the Government decree of 22 August 1927 81 had given 
workers the right to have up to two days off per month 
without attracting dismissal . Reports indicate that some 
workers were systematically taking advantage of this right.
It was in this context that the 15 November 1932 decree 83 
described the existing law as "an incitement to absenteeism". 
Certainly it was utilised throughout the First Five-Year Plan 
by workers as a means of getting the sack and thus expediting 
their getting a better job elsewhere. 8^ It became particul­ 
arly prevalent among skilled workers during the summer of
1932, when managers were most reluctant to let them go. 8 ^ 
It was probably this phenomenon that prompted the Government 
(the Party wisely did not add its signature to this decree)
to adopt a 1 aw that made it obligatory for management to 
sack a worker, and deprive him of ration card and housing, 
for just one day's unsanctioned absenteeism. 
****************************
80 A. Sokol'skii, op. cit. , pp. 18-19.
81 Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR, 1927, no. 87,
82 Metallist, 8 April 1929.
83 Izvestiya, 16 November 1932.
84 Z. Mordukhovich, op. cit., pp. 115-116; Metal 1 ist, 10 
July 1930; B. Fal'k and E. Kalachevskaya~i 'Itogi semi- 
chasovogo rabochego dnya v promyshlennosti 1 , in Voprosy 
truda, 1931, no. 5, p. 51; Zin. Grishin, op. cit . , p. 1 27 .
85 Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1933, nos l-2,P»26 (Pershman).
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In other words, until November 1932 managers had the 
option of sacking absent workers. It would appear that 
they were reluctant to do so. In the period from October 
to December 1928, for example, of 1484 workers reprimanded 
for absenteeism at the Proletarskaya Diktatura factory in 
Orekho-Zuevo, only 53 (3.6 per cent) were dismissed. ^6
Things had not improved significantly by November 1932, 
judging by figures during the last ten days of that month 
(i.e. after the new law had been introduced) at the Vor­ 
onezh sewing mill, where of 147 workers only 4 (2.7 per 
cent) had been sacked. °'
At Moscow's Serp i Molot works in the ten days prior to 
the November decree just 72 out of 875 truants (8.5 per 
cent) had been fired, whereas in the ten days following 
the new law 117 out of 355 (33 per cent) had been dismissed, 
an indication, perhaps, that workers were responding more 
quickly than management.88
However, there was an important difference between the 
situation in 1928 and that in 1932. For in the former
year absentee rates continued to fall, whereas in the latter 
they were rising sharply until the decree of 15 November, 
as the following table indicates:
if if * if if * if * * /'<• it it if if * if if i< if if >V if if if if
86 Trud, 14 March 1929.
87 N. Aleksandrov, 'Bor'ba s progulami na proizvodstve' 
in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya prava* 1933, 
no.5, p.57.
88 '0 bor'be s progulami', Bol'shevik, 1932, no.21,p.5.
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TABLE 4
Unsanctioned Absenteeism Rates in Soviet Industry, ]928-1934
(in days per quarter) 
January-March April-June July-September October-December
I II III IV
1928 1.57 1.39 1.48 1.28 £. ^
1929 1.17 0.96 1.05 0.91 f •>* ^ ol
1930 0.80 0.94 1.40 1.35 y-fl 4-3*
1931 1.31 1 .36 1.78 1.51 * ^ **W
1932 1.22 1.42 2.12 1.20 *•** £*^
1933 0.61 0.55 0.62 0.61 i'\<i o °\l
1934 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.45 \&l b 'V
Sources:
Trud v SSSR. Spravochnik 1926-193Qgg., p.74.
Byulleten' po uchetu truda: itogi 1^31 goda, Moscow, 1932,p85
S. Kheinman, K voprosu proizvoditeJ'nosti truda v SSSR, M,
1933, p.40.
Trud v SSSR (1934 god) Ezhegodnik, Moscow, 1935, p.198.
The period under review can thus be divided into three 
distinct periods as far as the absentee rates are concerned:
a consistent drop from the beginning of 1928 to the first 
quarter of 1930 (continuing a trend that had commenced with 
a high point of 12.4 days in the fourth quarter of 1920/21) 89 
then a steady rise until the autumn of 1932, followed by 
a sharp drop coinciding with the absentee decree of 15 
November.
Thus the fall in absenteeism coincided with the 'optim­ 
istic' phase of the socialist offensive up until the end 
of the Leninist Appeal on 1 March 1930.
* Vc * * * /V * * /V >V >V * * * /V * * Vc /V * * * * /'c *
89 Statisticheskoe obozrenie, 1929, no.2, p.40 (Il'inskii).
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A second major difference in the structure of absent­ 
eeism in 1928, compared with 1932 was its distribution 
between Group 'A' (producer goods) and Group 'B 1 (consumer 
goods) industries. Thus, in 1928/29, the worker in Group 
'A' lost on average 7.09 days in the year due to unsanctioned 
absenteeism, nearly five times more than a worker in Group 
'B' (1.50 days). This is only partly explained by the 
fact that the consumer goods' industries employed many more 
women workers, a proportion of whom would have a natural 
break from the monotony of factory life in the way of mat­ 
ernity leave (an average of 5.59 days), or that the textile 
mills, in particular stood idle for a total of nearly three 
days due to breaks in supply of raw material and organisat­ 
ional problems connected with the transfer to the seven- 
hour day, three-shift system.
The main reasons for such a pronounced difference in 
absentee rates would appear to be the larger number of 
new workers flowing into Group 'A' and the more arduous 
nature of work and working conditions in those industries.
No subsequent breakdown of figures for absenteeism 
between Groups 'A' and 'B' appeared until those for 1933, 
(i.e. until after the decree on progul), when the rates 
were 1.05 days per worker in Group 'A 1 and 0.66 days for 
Group 'B'. Although the former rate is still some sixty 
per cent higher than the latter, it may be seen that the
gap between the two groups had narrowed considerably since
91 1928/29. Nonetheless, the figures also indicate that
behavioura] patterns characterising a particular industry 
or group of industries did survive even the most profound 
changes in the laws governing industrial relations.
* •>'( i< * Vf Vc Vc * * V? /V /V * -k Vc Vc /V * Vc /'r >V -ft >V Vc V? *
90 'Poteri gosudarstvennoi promyshlennosti v svyazi s 
progulami i prostoyami 1 in Puti industrializatsii, 
1930, no.4, p.76.
91 Trud v SSSR (1934 god) Ezhegodnik, p. 142.
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There are regional figures, however, for absenteeism
in 1932 that allow conclusions to be drawn on differences
between the two groups before the November decree.
In Moscow regional industry, for example, the rate for 
1932 was higher in Group 'B' (at 5.44 days per worker) than 
in Group 'A' (4.99 days). However, if one examines the 
figures for the first six months of 1932, it will be seen 
that the rate is higher for Group 'A' (2.18 days) than for 
Group 'B' (2.13 days). It was precisely in the third quar­ 
ter (July to September 1932) that Group 'B' rates rose 
sharply, exceeding those for the previous six months. This 
is particularly evident in the data for the cotton industry, 
the rates for which almost doubled between the second and 
third quarters. "^
Thus, newspaper reports of skilled textile workers quit­ 
ting in the summer of 1932 might indicate that a high pro­ 
portion of absenteeism was deliberate in order to get the 
sack. This is also borne out by figures from Leningrad, 
which show absentee rates in regional cotton industry al­ 
most doubling between June and August 1932, "3 ancj pO -L nts 
too the poor wage structure which affected both the general
labourers and the highly-skilled workers and led to rapid
q A 
rises in the turnover rate. 7H"
Once the new absentee laws took effect, it would appear 
that light industry reverted to its traditionally lower 
absentee rate. Thus, if one compares the iron and steel, 
coal and cotton industries (with traditionally medium, high 
and low absentee rates respectively) the following picture
A»ro*i.*~^<i.&.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * # * * * * * /V * * * * * * if
92 Moskovskaya oblast': ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik 
Moscow, 1934, pp. 14-15.
93 P. Vasil'ev and Ya. Leipunskii, op. cit., p.99.
94 ibid., p.67.
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TABLE 5 
Comparison of Industries with High, Medium & Low Absenteeism
Industry 1 
Coal
Iron St Steel
Cotton
All industry
Sources: Trud
Trud
927/28
22.16
6.05
1 .83
6.04
v SSSR.
v SSSR
1928/29
18.03
4.19
1 .05
4.46
Spravochnik
(1934 god) E
1933 1
1 .93
0.54
0.68
0.93
1926-1930gg
934
1 .33
0.45
0.36
0.67
. p. 19
zhegodnik, pp. 142
(days per 
worker )
-143.
However, if we take the figures for August 1932, the 
worst single month for absenteeism without reason during 
the period under review a very different picture emerges:
TABLE 6
Comparison of Absenteeism at Enterprises in Various
Industries in August 1932 (days per worker)
Coal Mining October mine 0.93
Makeyev " 1.64
Lisichanskoe mine 1.29 
Dzerzhinskoe " 0.81
Iron 8c Steel Makeyev metalworks 0.53
Stalino " 0.50
Krasnyi Oktyabr- 0.47
Textiles Trekhgorka 0.47
Glukhovskoe 2.80
Melanzhevskii 2.56
All industry 0.78
Source: S. Kheinman, K voprosu o proizvoditel'nosti truda,
pp.39-40,
Thus it is not unreasonable to suggest that the unusual 
economic situation in the country, exacerbated by the
policies being pursued in Soviet industry (i.e. priority to 
heavy industry) artificially altered traditional patterns.
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The third major difference between 1928 and 1932, as 
far as absenteeism is concerned, was the rapid growth 
of the industrial work force, which nearly doubled from 
the beginning of 1928 to the end of 1932 (from 2,398,600 
to 4,676,400) 95 . This obviously had profound implications 
for the absenteeism rate, for although this was roughly 
the same in 1928 and 1932, there were in fact almost twice 
as many man days being lost, as the table below illustrates
TABLE 7
Absolute No. of Working Days Lost through Progul, 1928-1934
Year Av. no. of workers Absentee rate Days lost
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
2,5.98,673
2,860,918
3,404,901
4,167,300
4,668,500
4,576,400
4,949,000
5.72
4.09
4.49
5.96
5.96
0.93
0.67
14,864,409
11,701 ,154
15,288,005
24,837,108
27,824,260
4,256,052
3,315,830
Sources: For average number of workers per year, see
Appendix A.
Absentee rates, Trud v SSSR (1936) , p.96.
The above figures reveal not only the dramatic red­ 
uction achieved in days lost through unsanctioned absenteeism
following the November 1932 decree, but also that the rate 
almost trebled between 1929 and 1932 (especially if one 
bears in mind that the latter figure includes 1J months 
during which the new law was in effect - I have calculated
that the total days lost in 1932 without the decree would
Q 6 have been just under 30 million days.
* * Vc * Vc -Jf * * /V /V it Vc Vf * * Vf V> Vc Vc * /V /V * /V * Vc /V
95 Sotsia]isticheskoe stroitel'stvo v SSSR, M, 1934,pp.324-325
96 By taking the average of the ten months of 1932 before 
the decree and multiplying by 1.2 one arrives at an 
annual rate for the year of 6,42 days per worker and 
a total of 29,971,700days lost, calculated from S. Khein- 
man, K voprosu o proizvoditel'nosti truda, p.40.
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Although the figures in the above table for the total 
number of days lost through unsanctioned absenteeism
roughly correspond to those published for theyears 1930
97to 1934, I have not come across the figure for 1929 any­ 
where in my researches. However, Shvernik did report to 
the XVI Party Congress in the summer of 1930 that the 
total number of days lost for the half-year from October 
1929 to March 1930 (i.e. during the rapid rise of the shock
no
worker movement) was 5,520,000 . ° Thereafter, one assumes, 
any reference to the relatively low figures for 1929 would 
have proved an embarrassment to the authorities.
A
This conveniently introduces the last basis of comparison 
between absentee rates in 1928 and 1932 that will be dealt 
with here: the fact that socialist competition and shock 
work could have made no impact on the 1928 figures as the 
movement began only in 1929, and should have made maximum 
impact in 1932 when the number of workers engaged in comp­ 
etition topped three million. ^
On the face of it, the reverse happened for, as we have 
seen, absentee rates were falling in 1928 and rising in 
1932. Yet this does not tell the whole story. For in 
the 'optimistic' phase of the socialist offensive (i.e. 
from October 1929 to March 1930) when shock work experienced 
its most rapid growth, absentee rates reached unprecedentedly 
low levels.
The following table illustrates how the pattern developed 
from month to month:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * /v * * * * * * /v * * * * * *
97 The figures generally given for 1930 are 15,715,000, and 
for 1931 24,620,760, see Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1933, no.5 
p.53 (Aleksandrov).
98 XVI S"ezd, p.653.
99 See Appendix E.
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TABLE 8
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1929 --------- 0.33 0.29 0.29
1930 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.44 045
1931 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.58 0.64 0.560.54 0.500.47
1932 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.50 0.52 0.68 0.78 0.660.59 0.430.18
Sources: Trud v SSSR. Spravochnik 1926-1930gg. pp. 18-19. 
Byulleten' po uchetu truda; itogi 1931, p.85
S. Kheinman, K voprosu o proizvoditel'nosti truda,
p.40.
Thus the fall in absentee rates ends in February 1930, 
the month of the most intensive growth of shock work, and 
then rises steadily until August 1932 with sharper rises 
during the summer months. Thus, despite the continued 
numerical growth of the shock worker movement throughout 
the period under review (see Appendix E), the absentee 
rate more than trebled between the best month (February 
1930) and the worst (August 1932).
It would seem, therefore, that the socialist compet­ 
ition movement was unable to accommodate either the huge 
increase in the number of workers joining industry, or 
the deteriorating living and working conditions from 
1930 to 1932.
Nonetheless, had the rate of improvement from October 
1929 to February 1930 continued throughout the First Five- 
Year Plan, unsanctioned absenteeism would have virtually 
disappeared by the end of 1932, whereas even with the 
law on absenteeism it only fell to levels foreseen by the 
original Five-Year Plan.100
* * * * * * /v * /v * * * /v * * * * * /v * * * * * * * * *
100 B. Markus in Osnovnye voprosy truda v pyatiletke, Moscow 
Leningrad, 1929, suggests that the absentee rate (sanc­ 
tioned and unsanctioned) would fall to 5 days by the end 
of the economic year 1932/33. As absenteeism without
reason usually accounts for 75 per cent of all absences, 
the rate should have fallen to about 0.3 days per month.
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The Impact of the Law of 15 November 1932
It is important to emphasise that the law on dismissal 
for one day's unsanctioned absenteeism was intended to 
be implemented much more strictly than had the decree on 
turnover. Thus managers were obliged to fire absent 
workers whether they wished to or not. A contradiction 
had arisen between the political and economic definition 
of the truant. This was because absenteeism was no longer 
restricted to certain groups of workers (the least skilled, 
the heavy drinkers and work shy etc.) but now covered "a 
rather significant strat um 102 of workers, including some 
who did not readily fit the description of 'agents of the 
class enemy' (such as skilled, cadre and hereditary pro­ 
letarians ) .
For whereas in September 1931 it could be reported from 
Leningrad's Krasnyi Treugol 'nik works that "old, skilled 
workers are not absent or flitting. Virtually no one
I
leaves after five or six years," uo the situation had 
changed radically a year later, when the press was reporting 
an outflow of skilled workers, some of whom would be deliber 
ately absent for three days in order to secure dismissal.
A twin campaign was launched in the press following the 
introduction of the new law in order to bring pressure on 
managers to adopt a strict approach to the implementation 
of the law while portraying the actions of the absent 
workers in the worst possible light. Thus, the Party 
journal, Bol ' shevik, declared
"The truant is the enemy of socialism in staying away 
from work. Through this disorganising and destructive 
action he aids the class enemy."
>V * * * * * * * * * /V * * Vc Vc * * * * * * * * * * * -k if
101 Pravda, on 15 December 1932 (the second anniversary of 
the turnover decree) complained that the six-month ban 
on flitters was not being implemented.
102 Pravda, 1 December 1932, commented "Truants comprise a 
rather significant stratum of spongers and parasitic el 
ments from which society, constructing socialism, must 
cleanse itself without mercy, 'with an iron hand'".
103 Na trudovom fronte, 1931, nos. 26-27, p. 11
104 '0 bor'be s progulami', Bol 'shevik, 1932, no. 21, p. 3.
-116-
The same article claimed that the decree was sought and 
supported by the most advanced workers: ^ 5
"...leading shock workers and the best production 
workers have been demanding that decisive action 
be taken against truants - disorganisers of pro­ 
duction - and they welcome the Government decree 
on the struggle against truants and are actively 
assisting its implementation."
In the week following publication of the decree the 
central press carried reports of workers' meetings and 
individuals of unimpeachable proletarian background app­ 
roving of the measure: on 18 November 1932, Izvestiya 
related how four steel-rollers at Krasnyi Vyborzhets, 
each with a stazh of between 25 and 35 years and not a 
progul between them gave the decree their blessing; Trud 
on the same day carried a similar endorsement from a 52- 
year old shock worker, again with no progul, from the 
Ordzhonikidze metalworks; and on 20 November, Pravda 
gave an example of how 'advanced' workers could assist in 
implementing the decree, when a cadre worker from the 
Khar'k ov locoworks, with no unsanctioned absences since 
the Revolution, named three recidivist truants.
Other sources, however, were reporting quite different 
reactions from the shop floor, such as "they demand dis­ 
cipline, yet feed us badly", "they might as well chain 
us up and stop us leaving the factory" and "for one day's 
absence they take away your apartment, but they don't 
supply you with protective clothing". These, and similar 
statements, were characterised as expressing the views of 
'the class enemy'.106
However, the workers clearly were not alone in their 
cynical response to the new law. A union representative
* Vc * -A- it * * * * * * * * * 'A- * * * * * * * * * *
105 ibid., p.4.
106 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1933, no. 5, p.55 (Aleksandrov)
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at the Voronezh sewing mi]] complained that "if you fire 
every worker who has been absent for just one day then
you could end up with no workers at all". A graphic 
example,claimed the author,of political short-sightedness] 07
Another union official at the Kolemenskoe cement works 
issued instructions to the effect that "if the truant is 
a good worker, you can let him off with a reprimand". A 
clear case, claimed the author, of rotten liberalism. °°
The Bol'shevik article elaborated on this last def­ 
inition by declaring that it was a manifestation of 
'Rightist opportunism' and cited the case of the head 
of a machine-shop at Krasnyi Proletariat, who had dec­ 
ided that "a needed worker may be kept on even if he misses 
eight days".* The quality of the 'Rightists' that the 
article alluded to was, it would seem, worker adoration.
There were also reports of absenteeism with reason 
increasing after the introduction of the decree -1 -1 ° , as 
well as Party members and cadre workers being reinstated, -1- 1 
and unsanctioned absenteeism being sanctioned retrospective-
Further evidence that the new law artificially changed 
worker behaviour is provided by the results of a survey of 
eight Baku enterprises in late 1932. This revealed that, 
in the last four months of the year 30.2 per cent of all 
absences without reason were by workers with less than six 
months work at the given plant, 38 per cent with from six 
to twelve months and 31.8 per cent with over one year. 1 13
* * * * Vc * * * * * * * * * * * /v * * * * * * * * *
107 ibid. , p. 57
108 ibid. , p. 58.'
109 Bol 'shevik, 1932, no. 21, p. 6
110 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1933, no. 5, p. 58, (Aleksandrov)
111 K. Abashidze, 'Bor'ba s progulami v ZSFSR' in Voprosy 
truda, 1933, no. 5, p. 79.
112 M, Nadezhdin, 'Bor'ba s progulami i reforma rabochego 
snabzheniya', Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1933, no. 5, p. 46.
113 Voprosy truda, 1933, no. 5, p. 80. (Abashidze ).
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Such figures are consistent with patterns of absenteeism 
in other countries 114 , and Soviet industry during the 
early years of industrialisation 115^ with most absences 
being attributable to the category of workers that has been 
at the factory for six months or more. In December 1932, 
however, in the first full month of the new law's implem­ 
entation, the absolute number for the group with less than 
six months work was 110 (47.4 per cent),for the group with 
six months to one year 84 (17.2 per cent) and for the group 
with more than one year's work experience at the plant just 
38 (16.4 per cent). 1J6
Similar results are found in a survey of 10 enterprises 
in Moscow, where of 535 dismissed after the decree, 362 
(67.7 per cent) had less than six months work experience 
at the given plant, and at the Lenin works in Leningrad
where 124 out of 200 (62 per cent) fell into this categ­ 
ory. 1 ^
The authorities also kept pressure on managers to carry 
out the provisions on evicting truants from factory housing 
and depriving them of their food-and-goods card. A survey 
of 13 enterprises in Azerbaidjan revealed that by the end of 
the year only 0.4 per cent of truants had been evicted and 
10 per cent deprived of their cards. ^° A similar situation 
obtained at the Petrovskii works in Dnepropetrovsk, where 
of 1833 sacked workers, only 261 (14 per cent) had been
evicted and 349 (19 per cent) deprived of ration cards. U9
3 
Accusations of 'spinelessness' (myakotelost') and 'flabbi-
ness' (kisel'nost') abounded. 120
* * * * Vc * * * * * >V * * * * * * * * * V- * * -A- *
114 See J.M.M. Hill and E.L. Trist, Industrial Accidents, 
Sickness and Other Absences, London,1962, pp.5-6.
115 Puti industrializatsii, 1930, no.14, p.30 (Vovsi i 
Shostak).
116 Voprosy truda, 1933, no.5, p.80 (K.Abashidze)
117 Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1933, no.5, p.46 (Nadezhdin)
118 G. Aslanov and M. Kontorivich, 'Bor'ba s progulami v 
Azerbaidzhane', Voprosy truda, 1933, no.4, p.62.
119 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1933, no.5, p.57 (Aleksandrov).
120 P. FedorovV 'Sovety i bor'ba za trudovuyu distsiplinu' in 
Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, 1933, no.l, p.23.
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The combined effect of these measures and the manage­ 
ment take-over of provisions at the maior plants from
121 
4 December 1932, had a dramatic effect on unsanctioned
absentee rates, which showed significant falls everywhere:
TABLE 9 
Unsanctioned Absentee Rates before & after the Govt. Decree
Enterprise Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec (days per
	worker)
Oktyabr' mine 0.93 0.73 1.05 0.54 0.22
Makeyev " 1 . 64 1 . 59 1 . 57 1 . 29 0 . 34
Stalino metalworks 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.06
Krasnyi Profintern 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.08
Krasnyi Putilovets 1.32 1.05 0.89 0.67 0.14
Baltic Shipyards 0.87 0.69 0.46 0.37 0.11
Krasnyi Proletariat 1.00 0.73 0.60 0.28 0.06
Kolomenskoe loco. 0.70 0.56 0.66 0.42 0.06
Elektrozavod 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.04
Svetlana (Len) 1.85 0.57 0.49 0.34 0.07
Zinoviev factory 2.48 2.21 2.02 1.67 0.23
Proletarka 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.01
Trekhgorka 0.47 0.87 0.32 0.19 0.03
Glukhovskoe mill 2.80 2.39 2.59 1.46 0.31
Melanzhevskii mill 2.56 2.04 0.72 1.43 0.45
ALL INDUSTRY 0.78 0.66 0.59 0.43 0.18
Source: S. Kheinman, K voprosu o proizvoditel ' nosti truda ,
p. 40.
Continued pressure by Party and Government, backed up 
by the trade union and worker aktiv, ensured that absentee­ 
ism without good reason, never again approached the levels 
of mid-1932. However, despite clarifications on this 
matter, managements were reluctant to implement the decree 
to the extent of firing workers who were more than 15 min­ 
utes late for work as absentees. 122 This was enforced only 
in December 1938, when 20 minutes became the limit allowed.
* * * * * /v * Vc * * * * * * * *
121 Sobranie zakonov, 1932, no. 80, art. 489. (See Chapter
Four) .
122 Voprosy prof dvizheniya, 1933, no. 5, p. 52 (nadezhdin) ; 
B. Simakov, 'Kak realizuetsya v ChPO postanovlenie TsIK 
i SNK ot 15.xi.32 o bor'be s progulami', in Voprosy 
truda, 1933, no. 6, p. 77.
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Conclusion
By mid-1933 articles in the periodical press about 
turnover began to disappear, indicating that the author­ 
ities no longer considered it the priority problem of 
labour discipline that it had been since the summer of 
1930. At the same time satisfaction was being expressed
at the good results of the Government decree on absentee- 
123ism.
Attention henceforward began to shift to the more 
basic problem of underutilisation of work time, as the 
following quote illustrates: 124
"...The task of strengthening labour discipline is
not exhausted by the struggle against absenteeism. 
The class enemy, idler and truant still tries to 
disorganise production through subverting labour 
discipline at work, through aimless wandering 
about the workshop, hiding behind every fault in 
production and idle time occasioned by organisational 
reasons, and using them for the useless expenditure 
of work time..."
Until the end of the period under review the main thrust 
against indiscipline at work was directed at a more prod­ 
uctive utilisation of the working day. However, the problem 
was not solved within the time-scale of this study, although 
in January 1935, the trade union journal was able to announce 
that "the campaign for labour discipline and a better organ­ 
isation of work has led to a reduction in lateness, and a 
fuller utilisation of the working day". 125
However, as most reports still claimed that up to thirty 
per cent of work time was not being utilised, the costs of 
this problem to Soviet industry far outweighed those of 
absenteeism. 126 - However, the objective of a more or less 
stable work force had in the main been achieved by 1934.
****************************
123 'K itogam III plenuma VTsSPS', in Voprosy profdvizheniya, 
1933, no.7,p.9
124 ibid., p.9.
125 I. Reznikovskii, 'Trudovaya distsiplina na zavodakh
tyazheloi promyshlennosti Leningrad 1 , Voprosy profdvizh- 
eniya, 1935, nos. 2-3, p.64.
126 B., $ukhanevich, 'Profsoyuzy v bor'be za uplotnennyi rab- 
ochu den' 1 , Voprosy profdvizheniya, 1934, no.7,pp.41-52.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION IN ESTABLISHING 
LABOUR DISCIPLINE , 1928-1934
One of the paradoxes of the industrialisation drive in the 
USSR was that the Soviet worker entered the period under 
review protected by what was generally regarded as a 
radical and progressive labour legislation, only to wit­ 
ness the gradual whittling away of many of its most liberal 
provisions to be replaced by a number of restrictive laws, 
culminating in the infamous decrees of 1938 and 1940.
However, in many ways the Labour Code of the RSFSR, which 
was the foundation stone of labour relations during the New* 
Economic Policy, was in itself a paradox. Adopted after 
the rigours of Revolution, Civil War and economic devastation 
in 1922 it enshrined ideologically-based"-norms that ascribed 
qualities to the Soviet worker, that by no means all the 
labour force possessed. Moreover, most of those workers 
that did display such qualities of self-sacrifice and hard 
work were swiftly coopted into the ever-growing state bureau­ 
cracy. Those that remained on the shop floor generally took 
advantage of the existing rules and were enjoying a slow 
but perceptible improvement in their living conditions.
The contradiction that arose between the desired and 
actual forms of worker behaviour were resolved by passing 
functional legislation, which prescribed the norms deemed 
necessary. It was a distinctive feature of the period under 
review that the latter laws were of more consequence than 
the Labour Code which, ostensibly, was the fundamental law. 
Of course, such a state of affairs required ideological just­ 
ification and this was found in the theory of the sharpening 
of the class struggle.
Certain other features of the Soviet law and the role it 
played in Soviet society during this period deserve attention
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Of particular significance was the interplay between 
the so-called 'juridic al' and_:socio-political' (obshchest- 
venno-politicheskie) norms. In practice, the former set 
out the minimum rights for the Soviet worker, whereas the 
latter sought not only to place a maximum limit upon these 
rights, but also allow for them to be 'voluntarily 1 foregone 
As will be illustrated in the following Chapter, the latter 
norms became the basis for the movement of socialist com­ 
petition and shock work, which was to make redundant many 
of the exisitng laws. The fact that the 'voluntary' princ­ 
iple was honoured more in the breach than in observance 
served to assist this process.
The all-encompassing role of the Party-State (which 
in the present case gradually came to include the trade 
unions) had the effect of politicising industrial relations 
to the extent that violations of production discipline 
became subject to criminal as well as civil law. Of 
course, this applies equally to the manager and the worker. 
However, given the absolute priority given to the interests 
of production during this period, it might well have been 
the case that the manager who cut corners in order to fulfil 
the plan might be tolerated in a way that a worker who de­ 
manded his legal rights would not.
The next feature is the problem of law enforcement in 
such a vast country as the USSR, with a population that was 
still only semi-literate and an inefficient and unwieldy 
bureaucracy standing between the law and its implementation. 
Thus it was of little consequence whether legislation was 
introduced by Party, state or union bodies in a situation 
in which the Party bore ultimate responsibility for enfor­ 
cing the law. Nonetheless, the list of organisations that
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issued acts relating to labour discipline was a long one. 
it encompassed not just organs of State such as the Central 
Executive CommitteeXTsIK) , the Council of Peoples' Commiss­ 
ars (Sovnarkom), the Commissariat of Labour (Narkomtrud) and 
the Supreme Economic Council (Vesenkha), but also the 
Communist Party, the Komsomol and trade unions (VTsSPS). 
These acts might be decrees, resolutions, directive letters 
or appeals.
The most important of these would be printed in the 
national daily newspapers (Fravda, Izvestiya, Trud, Za 
industrializatsiyu, Komsomol ' skaya pravda etc. or in the 
various official publications or departmental bulletins. 
However, it was not required that a 1 aw be published for it 
to come into effect, and often they were published late 
or not at all.
The legislative inflation was such that the then Labour 
Commissar, Shmidt, declared in 1925 "it is better for the tim 
time being to leave the old muddle rather than to create a 
new one." 3 By 1927 it had got to the stage when "it 
was beyond the power even of a qualified Narkomtrud offic­ 
ial, dealing with this legislation on a permanent basis, 
to get to grips with
Thus, at the beginning of the period under review, the 
rule of law, of sorts, governed industrial relations. How­ 
ever, the poor state of labour inspection and the reluctance 
or fear of management to discipline the workers (particular­ 
ly after the Shakhty trial) led to an unsatisfactory state
of affairs in the factories and calls for changes in the law 
***************************
1 Lists of the relevant publications are given in P. Tarshis 
'Osnovnye zadachi i metody uproshcheniya trudovogo zakono- 
datel'stva', in Voprosy truda, 1930, no. 2, pp. 22-25.
2 ibid. , p. 23; for example the decree of Sovnarkom RSFSR 
dated 11 .January 1930 "On Measures to Reduce Labour Turn­ 
over in Industry was not published but referred to in a 
subsequent decree.
3 Voprosy truda, 1930, no. 2 p. 27 (Tarshis)
4 ibid. , p. 24.
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so as to shift power on the shop floor towards management. 
Indeed, the story of legislation in this period is the 
gradual encroachment of management or Party-inspired 
measures to limit the freedoms of the workers enshrined 
in the Labour Code .
Particular targets at the beginning of this process 
were the collective agreement, which management sought to 
turn into a two-sided document that would oblige the workers 
to raise productivity; the Rate.-Setting and Disputes Comm­ 
ittees (RKK), which were reinstating violators of labour 
discipline and thus undermining management control ; and 
the overall state of discipline on the shop floor.
Naturally enough, the trade unions initially resisted 
these encroachments and were assisted by the officials of 
Narkomtrud, who still saw their main task as codifying and 
simplifying the existing legislation, followed by super­ 
vision of labour protection. 5 Trud, on 26 February 1929 
claimed that the existing legislation was sufficient to 
deal with the problem of labour discipline, but complained 
that it was not being implemented.
However, the Party and management leaders were determined 
that radical changes would be made. A Party letter ^ 2l F^r 
cxr^ to all its local organisations had called for a decisive 
plan of action to improve discipline, accusing the unions 
(and some Party organs) of displaying 'tail endism' and 
hindering the work of management.
The result was the Government decree of 6 March 1929 
"On Measures for Strengthening Labour Discipline in State 
Enterprises" which gave managonent the right to impose fines 
on violators of discipline and obliged labour exchanges to
5 See I.Tolstopyatov, 'Ob itogakh i perspektivakh NKT SSSR' 
in Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie truda i profsoyuzy, M, 
1929, pp. 113-114.
6 Resheniya partii i pravitel ' stva, vol . 2 , pp. 9-12
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give preferential treatment to those with a clean discipline 
record. 7 As the Labour Code had given the RKK the right to 
decide disciplinary penalties for violators, and only the
Central Executive Committee could amend the Code, the 
Sovnarkom decree was technically in breach of the law. 
However, as the Party had been the main impetus behind the 
measure, and the raising of discipline had now become a 
political priority, the issue was as good as settled.
Just two days after the Sovnarkom decree was issued, 
Narkomtrud sent out a circular to all its subsidiary bodies 
calling for action against "absenteeism, drunkeness, sleep 
at work, hooliganism, artificial lowering of productivity, 
spoiling materials, machines and equipment, abuse and assault 
on specialists, carelessness and negligence in observing 
safety rules, theft, malingering etc." 8 Thi s could best 
be done by tightening up the work of the RKKs .
The hard line on violators of discipline was taken one 
stage further when the RSFSR Commissariat of Justice issued
Q
a circular asking labour courts to get tough with offenders, 
and on 26 March 1929, Trud published a VTsSPS circular 
calling upon unions to take a firmer line.
Thus it can be seen how a Party initiative has not just 
become law, but also activated other concerned organisations 
in order to struggle for the successful implementation of 
this policy. The Komsomol, meanwhile was making its own 
distinctive contribution to the campaign for discipline by 
launching a nationwide socialist competition. It is imp­ 
ortant to emphasise that the Party letter on discipline 
made no mention of competition or shock work, although 
Vesenkha, the managment organ, had immediately welcomed the 
initiative. 10
**************************
7 Sobranie zakonov, 1929, no.19,art. 167.
8 Izvestiya Narkomtruda SSSR, 1929, no. 14.
9 ibid., 1929.~nos:,22-23. 
10 See Chapter Five.
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Another 'extra-legal' component of the drive for discipl: 
ine that was attracting attention at this time were the 
Comrades' Courts (tovarishcheskie sudy), which like many 
other features of the Socialist competition movement had 
first made their appearance during the Civil War (in 1919) 
and had made a comeback later in the 1920's. Although 
the first courts in this new wave had appeared early in 
1928, by 1 June 1929 there were only 147 in all Soviet 
enterprises. Apparently the Tomskii leadership of the 
trade unions was cool towards the new courts, on the basis 
that the very idea was in contradiction to the basic func­ 
tion of the union, which was to defend its members, not 
to try them.12
Nonetheless, by the time Trud appraised the work of 
the courts on 20 March 1929, Tomskii was effectively 
ousted as leader of the VTsSPS. The trade union paper 
concluded that the courts had justified their existence, 
had cut out much legal red-tape, were good educative organs 
and ought to be expanded. A Moscow City conference of 
comrades' courts at the end of May 1929 had agreed with
this assessment and by mid-November 1929 there were 674
13 operating in Soviet factories. After a Government decree
of 30 December 1929 the movement really began to spread
and the courts were given a more active role in dealing
14 with minor violations of discipline.
The role envisaged for the courts was the creation of 
that atmosphere of moral guilt at the workplace, as 
Malenkov described it in the Party journal "a method of
social compulsion for use against backward elements". -1--3 
*************************
11 K. Digurov, 'Tovarishcheskie sudy na fabrichno-zavodskom 
predpriyatii i zadachi profsoyuznykh organov' in Voprosy 
truda, 1930, no.l, p.47
12 ibid., p.46
13 ibid., p.47
14 Sobranie zakonov, 1930, no.4,
15 G. Malenkov,'Fovyshenie proizvoditel'nosti truda i 
zadachi nizovoi partiinoi raboty, in Bol'shevik, 1929, 
no.6, p.79.
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Thus, the initial drive against violations of labour 
discipline in 1929 combined elements of legal and social 
compulsion. However, as Stalin's general line swept away 
opposition within the Party, the interests of production 
became so paramount that all areas of society, including 
the law had to be pressed into service for this overriding 
aim. No sooner had the old VTsSPS leadership been removed 
than the Stalin faction set about implementing aspects 
of its industrial policy, commencing with the law On One- 
Man Management"on 5 September 1929 16 and following that 
with the decree on the continuous working week. 17 On 
23 November 1929 the Government passed a law "On the Criminal 
Responsibility for Turning Out Poor-Quality Products"-18 and 
on 5 December 1929 a decree of the Party "On the Reorganisa­ 
tion of Managment in Industry" made the enterprise the basic
«\
link in the production process and sought to introduce cost 
accounting into every plant. ^
During this time Vesenkha and VTsSPS had issued a joint 
directive making the collective agreement a two-sided ob-
9 nligation. Again, taken together these separate acts 
form a cohesive policy, but not one that the worker on the 
shop floor might necessarily agree with.
Anticipating protests from the workers, who had seen 
their legal and economic position been weakened considerably
in the course of the year, the official journal of Narkomtrud
9 1 explained the situation thus:
"The most immediate task of the Soviet working class 
is the industrialisation of the USSR. The orientation 
and rate of industrialisation are of fundamental sig-
****************************
16 Resheniya partii i pravitel ' stva, vol.2, p. 125.
17 Byul leten f inansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel ' stva 
1929, no. 39, p. 30. ———————
18 Sobranie zakonov. 1930, no. 2. art. 9.
19 Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta , 14 December 1929.
20 Trud , 20 November
21 B. Tsaregorodtsev, 'Problemy planovosti v trudovom zakono 
datel'stve' in Voprosy truda, 1929, no. 12, p. 10 
(emphasis as in original)
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nificance to the legislative and contractual 
regulation of labour. As heavy industry must be
developed first and foremost, their wages must 
go up. Questions of wages constitute the most 
characteristic example of the subordination of 
work norms to the interests of the economic manage­ 
ment of the country; however, other work norms 
(hours, leave etc.) must not contradict the tasks 
set by the economic policy either."
22 Then the author arrives at the most delicate question?
"the limiting of maximum norms of freedom of 
labour and collective agreements represents 
the realisation of the principle of the sup­ 
remacy of the whole, i.e. the supremacy of 
the production and political interests of the 
working class at large."
23 Finally, hinting with foresight at what lay ahead:
"...in the immediate future (in connection with 
the shortage of skilled manpower in a situation of 
continual economic growth) the compulsory nature 
of work (compulsory labour in forms which are in 
accordance with the existing economic system) must 
acquire more significance.
Bearing in mind the fact that this was written when 
work days were being lengthened and days off waived as 
part of the shock work movement, the workers were begin­ 
ning to get a fair idea what was meant by "the compulsory 
nature of work". As early as 1 August 1929, Trud had 
noted that socialist competition was violating labour 
legislation.
Indeed, in the run up to the Shock Workers' Congress 
in December 1929 and the launching of the Leninist Appeal 
in January 1930, shock work and competition appeared to 
have taken over from legislation as the means of determin­ 
ing working conditions.
22 ibid. , p. 13.
23 ibid. , p. 14
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Clearly the old Labour Code was already redundant 
for the most part and, on 11 February 1930, a Government 
decree ordered Narkomtrud and VTsSPS to work out a new 
Code. The Labour Commissariat had swum against the tide 
of shock work when, on 27 February 1930, it issued a decree 
"On the Inadmiisability of Lengthening the Working Day and 
Non-Utilisation of Rest Days"24 > but the essence of shock 
work as being portrayed in the press was of worker heroes 
who gave not a fig for working hours or days off.
By the time that the socialist offensive had started 
to splutter, in the early summer of 1930, problems of 
labour discipline were to re-emerge with a vengeance. 
Peasants were flooding into industry from the newly collectiv 
ised farms and the gains in labour discipline achieved 
through the shock movement were wiped away. "Absenteeism
grows not by the day, but by the hour" commented an official
25 at the Krasnoe Znamya works in Ramenskii.
But it was labour turnover that was causing the most 
concern. From May 1930 until Stalin's switch of emphasis 
towards the mastering of technology, the question of turnover 
dominated the agenda for labour and management organs. 
The Party had signalled the end of the 'great leap forward 1
into socialism by issuing a decree "On Work to Reorganise
9 f\ the Way of Life" which put an end to the more Utopian
deeams of 'socialist towns' and 'living communes'.
The Party Congress in the summer of 1930 had set the 
course for eliminating unemployment, but it was not until 
the early autumn that a concerted attack was launched
***************************
24 Izvestiya, 28 February 1930
25 A. Khain, V.KHandros, Kto oni - novye lyudi na proizvod- 
stve, M, 1930, p.6
26 Decree of TsK VKP(b) dated 16 May 1930, Spravochnik 
partiinogo rabotnika,vyp.8, M, 1934, pp.733-734.
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This was to encompass the single most intensive 
period of labour legislation during the period under 
review, representing an attempt by legislative means 
to remedy a problem that socialist competition, on its 
own, could not solve.
The onslaught followed a by now familiar pattern. 
First the Party launched a rousing appeal "to all Party, 
economic, trade union and Komsomol organisations", then 
the State bodies and VTsSPS followed this up in a series 
of practical measures. Thus the Appeal, issued on 3 
September 1930, set out the parameters for the campaign, 
including a ral1ying-cal1 to shock workers to pledge to 
stay at their plants until the end of the Five-Year Plan, 
a demand that conditions for cadre and shock workers be
improved on a preferential basis, and a warning that a
27 merciless struggle was to be fought against the 'flitters'.
Just three days later Sovnarkom RSFSR issued a decree 
serving notice that the arbitrary quitting of one's job
would henceforth be regarded as tantamount to a violation
28 of labour discipline. This was followed by two decrees
issued on 23 September 1930: Narkomtrud, Vesenkha RSFSR 
and VTsSPS "On Supplementary Measures to Counter Labour 
Turnover and to Improve the System of Hiring", which 
ordered that the reason for a worker's dismissal be entered 
into his wage book (another example of functional legislat­ 
ion contravening the Labour Code) ™. ancj a Nar k;Omtrud 
RSFSR decree which sought to utilise as quickly as possible
on
the manpower still on the books of labour exchanges. u
On 8 September, the Presidium of VTsSPS approved new 
rules for Comrades' Courts (which they called Production- 
Comrades' Courts), the main task of which was defined as: 
"a struggle against all disorganisers of production and
O -I
those who harm socialist competition and shock work..."
v? * * * * * * * * * * # * >'<• * * * * * * * * * >v /v * * *
27 Pravda, 3 September 1930.
28 Izvestiya, 8 September 1930
29 Izvestiya Narkomtrud^, 1930, nos. 26-27.
30 ibid., loc. cit.
31 Trud, 9 September 1930.
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On 22 September 1930, together with Narkomtrud, VTsSPS 
issued a decree "On the Inadmissability of Work on Rest 
Days or Lengthening the Working Day", which implied that 
the decree on the same subject issued by Narkomtrud in 
February (see note 24) was having little effect. Manage­ 
ment was urged to overcome 'bottlenecks' in production by 
a more rational use of the labour force. 32
Implementing another provision of the Party appeal, 
on 25 September the Presidium of Vesenkha and VTsSPS 
decreed that shock workers be rewarded with medals and 
trips abroad to raise skills and that outstanding enter­ 
prises be awarded funds for extra communal facilities. 33
Then, on 9 October 1930, Narkomtrud peremptorily 
ordered the cessation of paying unemployment benefit and 
that the unemployed be sent immediately to work. 3^ This 
historic decree eliminating unemployment in the USSR did 
not come as a complete suprise for Shvernik had indicated 
that this was Party policy at the XVI Congress a few 
months earlier. 5
By presenting the ending of unemployment as a great 
triumph, the Party was able to take advantage of the 
favourable climate that ensued by expediting the issue 
of a decree "On Measures for the Planned Supply of Man­ 
power to the Economy and the Struggle against Turnover" 
on 20 October 1930, which gave Narkomtrud the right to 
transfer skilled workers from non-priority to priority 
industries. 3b ^ contemporary legal commentator described 
this decree as "one of those historic acts in which our
O J
revolution is so rich,"
it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it
32 Trud, 23 September 1930.
33 Izvestiya, 27 September 1930.
34 Sobranie zakonov, 1930, no.47, art. 488.
35 XVI S"ezd, p.658.
36 Pravda, 22 October 1930.
37 Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo na novom etape, p.5 (Stuchka)
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The decree also addressed the problem of luring, 
warning that managements would be held responsible for 
tempting skilled workers away from other plants. A 
clarification by the Supreme Court of RSFSR on 6 
November 1930 made luring a criminal offence. 38
This Party decree also called for a stop to be 
made in promoting shop-floor workers into management and 
urged further measures against 'flitters'. The Party line 
on turnover was implemented by the TsIK and Sovnarkom 
decree of 15 December 1930 "On the Procedure for the 
Engagement and Distribution of Labour and the Campaign 
against Labour Turnover". This major legislative act 
marked an important stage in the imposition of restrict­ 
ions limiting the freedoms enshrined in the Labour Code. 
It aimed to clamp down on 'flitters', who were termed 
'disorganisers of production' by banning them from work­ 
ing in industry or transport for six months if they left
39 work of their own volition. Although this proved hard
to implement, given the continuing shortage of skilled 
labour, it set a precedent which could be utilised when 
the law against absenteeism was introduced in November 
1932. The decree was similarly ineffective, initially 
in insisting that skilled workers and specialists work 
only in their own trades. This was to prevent, it was 
hoped, skilled craftsmen quitting their specialities to 
work as unskilled labour in industries where the pay was 
better.
The six-month ban on 'disorganisers of production' was 
incorporated into the new "Rules of Internal Order for 
Enterprises and Establishments in the Socialised Sector" 
approved by Narkomtrud on 17 December. For violations 
of discipline the worker might be given a reprimand,
>V Vc Vc Vc Vc /V •& Vc X Vc Vc Vc V? -k Vc >V •>'< >V •/'«• >V Vc Vc >'c /V * Vc Vc >'c
38 Izvestiya Narkomtruda, 1930, no.33.
39 Izvestiya, 17 December 1930.
40 Izvestiya Narkomtruda, 1930, no.36.
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referred to the comrades' court or, if the violation was 
systematic or malicious, fired and banned for six months. 
The new Rules also laid down what constituted good grounds 
for absenteeism (in effect, only a serious illness in the 
family, a natural calamity or the legal pursuit of civic 
or social duties). Just to emphasise that the Rules were 
intended for management as well as workers, the non-implem­ 
entation of fines for violations of discipline was itself 
defined as a violation, as was an "unsolicitous attitude to 
shock work and socialist competition'.' As for the workers, 
among the "acts of hooliganism and lack of conscientiousness" 
were the forging of passes and self-mutilation!
In order to accommodate those who had been barred for 
six months from working in industry, bJarkomtrud issued a 
decree on 23 December 1930 "On the Registration and Despatch 
of Persons Seeking Work" allowing such workers to be sent 
to "mass physical work" (peat-digging, clearing snow, loading 
and unloading etc.). This was to be handled by the 'staff 
offices' (upravlenie kadrov), the reorganised labour exchan­ 
ges. The statute of these 'staff offices' was confirmed 
by Narkomtrud on 28 December 1930 (on the basis, incidentally 
of another unpublished Sovnarkom SSSR decree of two days 
previous).^1
The elaboration of the new duties for Narkomtrud follow­ 
ing the elimination of unemployment was meant to be the 
first step in the transfer to the planned hiring of man­ 
power. A series of decrees in the New Year confirmed that* 
henceforth, enterprises were obliged to hire all labour (with
the exception of administrative and specialist staff) ex-
/ o 
clusively through the 'staff offices'.
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41 Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel'- stva, 1931, no.5, pp74Q-43. ———————————
42 Decrees of Narkomtrud SSSR on 4 January 1931 "On the 
Planned Supply of Manpower to the Economy" and "On the 
Procedure for Hiring Manpower", Izvestiya Narkomtruda, 
1930, nos. 1-2, 3; and on 13 January 1931 "On the Pro­ 
cedure for the Supply of Manpower to Construction in 1931" 
Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel'- 
stva, 1931, no.6, pp.36-39.
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Thus the flurry of legislative activity continued 
over into 1931. In early January the third session of the 
Central Executive Committee decreed that managements might 
not exceed their established wage fund in an attempt by 
the Government to cut down on the surplus labour being 
retained by the enterprises and the amount of overtime 
being worked to fulfil the promf inpl an.^ 3 In another decree 
issued on the same day, TsIK entrusted Narkomtrud with the
task of training two million extra workers and employees for 
industry. Anticipating the problems such an influx of new 
workers would create, Narkomtrud was also given the task 
of developing educational (vospitatel 'nuyu) work among the 
newcomers .
On 16 January 1931, Narkomtrud took another step in 
controlling the free flow of workers when it issued, in 
conjunction with Narkomput (the Commissariat of Transport 
and Communications), a decree "On the Return to Railway 
Transport Work People Formerly Employed in the Transport 
Service". Under the provisions of this decree all those 
who had left the railways in the previous five years were 
to report back to their former place of employment within 
five days! ^ This represented another stage in the semi- 
militarisation of railway work.
Two days later Narkomtrud issued a decree "On the Defin­ 
ition of Persons Regarded as Vicious Disorganisers of Pro­ 
duction" (in agreement with VTsSPS). ^ 6 First on this list 
were "those who leave work in the socialist sector without 
fair notice being given to management, or not waiting until 
a replacement be found, or before the agreed date", followed 
by "those leaving an enterprise more than once during a 
twelve-month period...". The reason for dismissal, it was 
confirmed, must be entered in the worker's wage book.
•k •}'( >V Vc •>'? •>'<• Vc /'c •>'' /V •>'< * •>'? i( •>'? /V >V •>'? /V Vc * Vr >'c /V Vc /V Vc
43 Sobranie zakonov,. 1931, no. 5, art. 60.
44 ibid. j no. 5 , art . 63.
45 Izvestiya, 18 January 1931.
46 Izvestiya Narkomtruda, 1931, no. 4.
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The next logical step in the tightening up on the 
freedom of the workers to move to other jobs or to 
'violate' discipline in any other manner would have 
been to introduce Work Books (trudovye knizhki), a 
sort of production passport which would list the 
worker's awards and punishments. The press was full 
of articles on this subject at this time but, as we shall 
see, events caught up with them and the idea was dropped 
along with that for a new Labour Code.
For suddenly, in February 1931, there was a percept­ 
ible shift of emphasis away from the 'hard line' legislat­ 
ive approach and towards an intensive programme for raising 
skills. Although this shift had been heralded at the 
third session of TsIK mentioned above, the basic momentum 
was provided by Stalin's "technology is decisive" slogan 
advanced in his speech to the gathering of industrial man­ 
agers on 4 February.
Why then was the 'hard line' approach abandoned for the 
time being? Had it achieved what it set out to do? Apparent 
ly not if one judges by the high turnover figures that per­ 
sisted through 1931 and 1932, particularly amongst skilled 
workers. Did the regime realise that they had pushed the 
workers too far? From the outset of the campaign great 
pains had been taken to present the 'hard line' as a res­ 
ponse to the demands of the workers themselves. Thus one 
of the first reactions to the Party appeal that launched the 
campaign came from workers at Moscow's Kalinin engineering
works (which had taken patronage over Narkomtrud in January
47 1930) in a letter addressed to TsIK, Narkomtrud and VTsSPS.
The letter catalogued the workers demands for action in such 
a way that it read like the Party's manifesto for the cam­ 
paign. For this reason it is worth listing all the points:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
47 Na trudovom fronte, 1930, nos. 26-27, p.4.
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J. Management must not hire manpower other than through 
the labour exchange.
2. Luring must be stamped out.
3. The suggestion of the Karl Marx shock workers on
socialist voluntary contracts should be implemented.
4. Stop speculation and overexpenditure of wages.
5. Level out rates for workers of similar skills.
6. Only the director or his deputy should have the right 
to hire and fire.
7. Use the skills of the existing labour force rationally.
8. Punish those to blame for idle time and non-punctual 
issue of tools.
9. Improve food and supplies.
10. Supply goods preferentially to those long-serving work­ 
ers .
11. Give preference to long-serving workers in housing, 
schooling and holidays.
12. Give longer holidays to long-serving workers.
13. Give their children first option of work at that enter­ 
prise or places in factory schools.
14. Strengthen the punishments for violation of labour dis- 
cipline.
15. In particular, amend article 47 of the Labour Code.
16. Utilise the comrades' courts to deal with absenteeism 
and other serious violations.
17. Deprive flitterj, money grubbers, deserters from the
labour front and violators of discipline of unemployment 
benefit.
18. Quitters, or those fired for violating labour discipline 
should be deprived of ration cards.
19. They should be evicted from factory housing.
20. Labour exchanges should take on flitters and violators 
only after a certain time has elapsed since the offence.
21. Severe measures should be applied to those 'unemployed' 
refusing work offered them.
22. The list of those qualifying to register at labour ex­ 
changes should be extended to cover all those on the 
electoral role.
When one considers how many of these demands were implem­ 
ented the regime had some justification in claiming, if this 
letter was a true reflection of feeling on the shop floor, 
that the campaign for tighter labour discipline had the supp­ 
ort of the workers.
When the 'hard line' was about to be abandoned, it was the 
Kalinin workers once again who led the workers' chorus in 
demanding the introduction of work books.^So why the shift 
of emphasis?
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48 Izvestiya, 14 January 1931.
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My guess is that it was a question of priorities. By 
the beginning of 1931 it was beginning to dawn on the 
Party leadership that all the enthusiasm and shock work 
in the world was meaningless if the skill was not suff­ 
icient to tackle the job in hand. The Party battles had been 
won, now was the time to channel the energies of the workers 
into the most productive direction and that meant'a massive 
commitment to skil1-raising and training. In the long run 
this was to prove as successful in improving labour discip­ 
line as any of the laws introduced during the winter of 
1930/31.
The Curious Episode of the Labour Code and Work Books
As noted above, the first call for a new Labour Code was 
contained in the Sovnarkom decree of 11 February 1930 which 
called upon Narkomtrud, in collaboration with VTsSPS and 
management organs, to elaborate a draft Al1-Union Code of 
Labour Laws which would reflect the new conditions brought 
about by the continuous working week, socialist competition, 
the shock brigade movement, the despatch of production 
workers to collective farms or to study etc.
In the summer of 1930 Narkomtrud had appealed to workers 
to submit suggestions on simplifying labour legislation. 
The September issue of Voprosy truda revealed that this 
had provoked little reaction^O reflecting perhaps the gen­ 
eral falling off in enthusiasm for the industrialisation 
drive that was apparent following the end of the Leninist 
Appeal. The next issue was the first to be edited by 
Kraval', the Vesenkha official who had led the attack on 
the Rate-Setting and Disputes Commissions in early 1929.
*****************************
49 Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo na novom etape, p.14 
(Voitinskii).
50 V. Ch, 'K voprosu ob uproshchenii trudovikh zakonovj 
in Voprosy truda, 1930, no. 9, p.70.
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It was in this issue that Tsikhon, the new Labour 
Commissar, gave a report on the All-Union Conference 
of Labour Organs which opened in Moscow on 14 November 
1930. At this gathering much attention was devoted 
to the introduction of both a new Labour Code and 
Work Books. Referring to the latter Tsikhon explained: 51
"with the aim of struggling against flitters and 
labour deserters, Narkomtrud SSSR is working on 
the question of introducing permanent work books 
for all working people. Such a book will assist 
in exposing alien elements in enterprises and will 
create the opportunity of compiling a picture of 
the worker's production record, insofar as here will 
be entered all honours bestowed and fines imposed 
on the worker. The introduction of the work book 
has the aim of stimulating a socialist attitude to 
production as in it will be noted all work done for 
hire and the attitude of the worker to socialist 
construction."
During the Conference Trud had printed an editorial
calling for a new Labour Code of Socialist Reconstruction
S 9 to replace the old Code. At the closing session of the
gathering a resolution was passed calling upon Narkomtrud 
to elaborate and submit for discussion a draft new Code 
by 1 January 1931, 53
That work was in progress on both initiatives was made 
evident early in the New Year. On 4 January 1931 Tsikhon 
threw the matter of Work Books open to public discussion 
in an article in Izvestiya. On 14 January 1931 the same 
newspaper printed the first replies, all of which were in 
favour of the introduction of Work Books. The letter 
accorded the most space came from the treugol'nik at the 
Kalinin engineering work in Moscow (and not, significantly ? 
from the workers' general meeting}. This confirmed Tsikhon's 
claim in the 4 January article that the idea had originated 
among 'leading shock workers', and made it clear that it
/v * * * * * * * /v * # * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
51 A. Tsikhon, 'Na bol'shevistskie rel'sy - k itogam
vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya organov truda', in Voprosy 
truda , 1930, nos. 10-11, p.8.
52 Trud, 17 November 1930.
53 Trud, 22 November 1930.
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was aimed first and foremost at violators of labour dis­ 
cipline. The letter from the Kalinin works was printed 
also in Na trudovom fronte 54, wi th a supplementary art­ 
icle that complained that the worker's existing documents: 
the union card wages book and work pass "do not tell the 
biography of the worker". 55 The previous issue of the 
journal, in a leading article, had stated that "it is 
impossible to ignore the initiative of the working masses 
themselves who have proposed the idea of work books, a 
kind of production passport for all workers." 5 ^
In an article in Narkomtrud's other journal, Voprosy 
truda, at the same time, Tsikhon revealed that the open 
discussion on the Work Books was to enable "the workers 
at large to decide for themselves which are the best ways 
and means of exposing alien elements in the enterprises 
and learning the production character (kharakteristika) 
of each worker."
Later in the same article Tsikhon turned his attention 
to the other initiative in hand, claiming that "the work­ 
ing masses are resolutely suggesting that Narkomtrud 
radically reviews and amends labour legislation in accord­ 
ance with the planned reconstruction of the economy. The 
New Code must serve the interests of production, the soc­ 
ialist organisation and rationalisation of work and the 
tasks of improving the material and cultural situation of 
the working class." 5 ?
Further evidence that the Code was still under prep­ 
aration came in another of the letters to Izvestiya on 
14 January 1931, this one. from a .brigade for the study of 
the new draft Labour Code at the AMO motorworks was entit­ 
led "Clip the wings of the 'flitters'". That a draft was 
in preparation was confirmed in the January issue of Vop- 
rosy truda, which claimed that it was being worked out at
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
54 Na trudovom fronte, 1931, no.2.,p.6.
55 A.P., 'Vvedem proizvodstvennye passporta 1 , in ibid, p./
56 Na trudovom fronte, 1931, no.l, pp. 3-4.
57 A. Tsikhon, 'Vypolnit 1 boevuyu programmu rabotu' in
1931, no.l, pp. 7, 9.
"at a shock pace".
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58
On 13 February 1931, Krava]' (who was also Deputy 
Commissar of Labour) revealed in an article in Izvestiya 
that a decree introducing Work Books had been submitted by 
Narkomtrud to the Government for approval. An article in 
the March-April issue of Voprosy truda still referred to 
"the suggested transfer to a system of Standard work books". 59
The last mention of the Work Books during this period 
comes in an article in Na trudovom fronte in May 1931 en­ 
titled "For a standard work book" (Za edinuyu trudovuyu
knizhku). The article claims that Narkomtrud had issued 
a decree in February 1931 asking for grass roots reaction 
to the idea, but had got no reaction:"^
"Even the workers at the Kalinin works, the initiators 
of this proposal, the workers at Trekhgorka, AMO, 
Krasnyi Treugol'nik and other plants, who at one time 
supported this suggestion or forwarded analogous ideas, 
have of late become quiet and are not displaying any 
further active interest in this matter."
The idea had not yet been dropped, however, and Narkom­ 
trud was reported to have set up a special commission in 
which Rabkrin and other organs played an active part. 
This commission had produced a draft work book and distrib­ 
uted it for discussion by interested parties.
Nothing more was heard of Work Books until their 
eventual introduction on 20 December 1938!
A similar fate would appear to have befallen the Labour 
Code. In January 1931 a Draft Code, edited by legal experts 
Grishin and Voitinskii, was approved by the directorate of 
the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law in the Comm­ 
unist Academy and ratified by the Section of Labour Law at 
the 1 All-Union Congress of Marxists working in the sphere
y- jc ,i- j.. ,.f ,u yf yc yc ,v ,'c /V * Vc /V it * * it it /V it * it * * it it
58 A. Belov, 'K proektu novogo KZoT', in Voprosy truda, 
1931, no.l,p.84.
59 P. Ognev-Levenstern, 'Spornye voprosy v zakonodatel'-
stve po naimu i otkazu ot raboty trudyashcheyusya', in 
Voprosy truda, 1931, nos.3-4, p.142.
60 Na trudovom fronte, 1931, no.15, p.13
61 Sbornik postanovlenii SSSR, 1938, no,58, art.329.
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of Soviet Construction and Law. In introducing the new
/• Q
Draft Code Grishin wrote:
"The fundamental demand of the new code is the clear 
reflection in it of the general line of the VKP (b) 
on questions of labour: the further consolidation of 
socialist competition, shock work and other manifest­ 
ations of work enthusiasm by the masses and of a comm­ 
unist attitude to work; the decisive turn to face pro­ 
duction and reorganisation of the unions, organs of Nar- 
komtrud, all organisations of the working class and all 
labour legislation on the basis of socialist competition 
and shock work; the consolidation of the planned basis 
in all spheres of labour; the Bolshevist solution to the 
problems of seeking labour resources, of training and 
supplying the economy with cadres; the further continual 
improvement of the material, cultural and living stand­ 
ards of the working class...the decisive battle for an 
iron labour discipline."
and, just in case anyone had missed the point 9 he added '.
"Arising out of the necessity to mobilise the masses for 
the struggle for the general line of our Party, for 
victorious socialist construction in our country, the new 
Labour Code must ensure the all-round support of initiat­ 
ives of the masses, the further mighty development of 
socialist work organisation on the basis of socialist 
competition, shock work and other forms of the collect­ 
ive nature of work. The Code must ensure the further 
consolidation of socialist planning in all spheres of 
labour and the mobilisation of the masses for socialist 
labour discipline, for iron proletarian order in social­ 
ist enterprises."
Despite admitting that there was a "problem in the 
inter-relationship between state-legal norms and those of 
public influence in the Code 1 ^ "^ the latter found ample 
reflection in the provisions of the new Draft. Indeed, a 
whole Chapter was devoted to "The Socialist Organisation 
of Work and Labour Discipline", which embodied rules on 
turnover, bonus payments for shock workers and the activities
r r
of Comrades' Courts. 00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
62 Zin. Grishin, '0 novom trudovom kodekse'(Tezisy), in 
Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo na novom etape, p.79.
63 ibid., p.81.
64 ibid., pp. 83-84.
65 ibid., p.84.
66 ibid., p.94.
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Then the Code appears to have shared the same fate as 
the Work Books. Writing in July 1933 in the trade union 
journal, Grishin uncharitably condemns his fellow compiler 
of the Draft Code, Voitinskii, as a Right-'1eftist'. 67 
In a book published in 1934, Grishin claims that: 68
"The Thesis for the new Code was dropped because it 
clearly failed to emphasise that, in the epoch of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the economic 
and political conditions are being prepared for the 
withering away of outwardly-compulsive standards of 
labour following the elimination of classes and the 
remnants of a class society."
It is my contention that both the Work Book and the 
Labour Code were dropped because both reflected a sit­ 
uation in which, ostensibly, the enthusiasm and discipline 
of the many would support a 'hard line 1 being taken against 
the few. The apathy that greeted appeals for suggestions 
on both initiatives suggests that this was not a true 
reflection of the situation.
By the time the drafts were ready, the Party leadership 
appears to have re-evaluated the policy of relying on 
such 'enthusiasm' and had made the raising of skills and 
the planned hiring of manpower for the economy its top 
priorities as far as the work of Narkomtrud was concerned. 
The immense extra work involved in handling Work Books and 
a new Code would have been counterproductive in this 
respect.
In the event the bulk of labour legislation in the 
subsequent period right up until the renewed campaign 
against absenteeism in the autumn of 1932 was directed
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67 Zin. Grishin, 'Bor'ba s general'noi linii partii v 
voprosakh trudy i trudovogo prava', in Voprosy prof-
dvizheniya, 1933, no.9, p.33.
68 Zin. Grishin, Sotsialisticheskaya organizatsiya truda, 
p.91.
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at raising skills 69 , extending benefits to shock workers 70 
reforming the wage system 71 , improving the system of hiring 
manpower 72 and tightening up on the rules for payment for 
defective output, idle time etc. 7 ^
The decisive switch of emphasis in 1931 away from the 
pace of industrialisation to the mastery of technology had 
swept away plans to introduce both the new Labour Code and 
Work Books, sparing the Soviet worker for a few more years 
the indignity of the tetter document and extending the life 
of the virtually redundant 1922 Code until the 1970 Al 1 - 
Union Principles of Labour Legislation were adopted in 1970.
The Campaign against Absenteeism
We have already discerned several distinct periods in 
the policy on labour legislation during the First Five- 
Year Plan: after an initial package of laws, enacted 
within the framework of 'juridic al ' norms, in 1929 had 
consolidated one-man management and made the necessary 
amendments and innovations in industrial relations as 
would facilitate the implementation of the general line on 
rapid industrialisation, there followed, from late 1929 
until the autumn of 1930, a period in which emphasis was 
placed on 'socio-political' norms enshrined in shock work; 
then the 'hard line' described above sought to clamp down 
on the violators of labour discipline through a mixture 
of legal and public pressure, ostensibly with the support 
of the vast majority of the working masses united in the 
shock brigades; this, in its turn, was replaced early in 
1931 by a policy which stressed the urgent priority of
* * * * /v * * * •>•<• * * * * * *
"69 See, for example, decree of Presidium of VTsSPS "On the 
Technical Instruction of Shock Workers", dated 8 March 
1931, Profsoyuzy SSSR: dokumenty i materialy, vol. II, M, 
1963, pp. 622-623;
70 See, for example, Instruction of VTsSPS, Narkomsnab and 
Tsentrosoyuz "On the Preferential Provision of Shock 
Workers", dated 7 April 1931, Trud, 7 April 1931.
71 See decree of VTsSPS and Vesenkha SSSR "On Re-Structur­ 
ing the Wage System in the Metal and Coal Industries", 
dated 20 September 1931, Trud 23 September 1931.
72 See decree of TsIK and Sovnarkom SSSR. dated 13 Septem­ 
ber 1931, Izvestiya, 19 September 1931.
73 See decree ot Narkomtrud, dated 1 June 1932 "On Property 
Responsibility", Izvestiya Narkomtruda, 1932, nos. 17-18
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mastering technology.
However, this last policy was implemented against a 
deteriorating situation in provisions, housing and 
working conditions which led to the maintenance of high 
rates of turnover, especially in the summer of 1932 of 
skilled workers, and absenteeism, not least among work­ 
ers deliberately being absent for three or more days in 
order to get the sack and expedite their departure for 
alternative work.
By the summer of 1932, both problems had reached 
threatening proportions: turnover in Group 'A' industries 
reached 14.1 and 14 per cent in July and August respectiv- 
ly, and the rates for Group 'B' industries - at 10.5 and 
11.7 per cent - were not far behind;74 the absentee rate 
for July was 0.68 days per worker (equivalent to 8.16 days 
per year) and for August 0.78 days (or 9.36 days per year). 
By comparison, in February 1930 (the best month in terms 
of labour discipline during the entire period under review) 
the absentee rate was 0.22 days per worker (or 2.64 days 
per year). In other words, the rate had increased by 
more than 350 per cent in eighteen months. Moreover, the 
size of the working class had increased substantially during 
that time and the 'cost' per absenteeism had risen as the 
technological processes utilised in Soviet industry in­ 
creased.
An early hint of a return to the 'hard line* was given
on 7 August 1932 when pilfering from collective farms be-
77 came punishable by death. Just before the previous
package of tough legislative measures had tailed off early 
in 1931, a Government decree had called for "the highest 
measure of social defence"(i.e. the death penalty) to 
be applied against violators of discipline on the railways.
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74 See Appendix B.
75 S. Kheinman, K voprosu o proizvoditel nosti truda, p.40.
76 Trud v SSSR. Spravochnik, 1926-193Qgg., p.19.
77 Sobranie zakonov, 1932, no.62, art. 360.
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On 15 November 1932 TsIK and Sovnarkom issued a brief 
decree amending article 47 of the Labour Code and allowing 
dismissal for just one day's absenteeism. 78 Unlike all the 
previous major legislative initiatives, this had not been 
preceded by a Party appeal , decree or directive. One is 
tempted to conclude that the Party wished to distance itself 
from any accusation that it might have been the original 
source for the clamp down, although this was quite clearly 
the case.
In addition to being dismissed from the factory for one 
day's unsanctioned absenteeism, the worker was to be deprived 
of his f ood-and-goods card and evicted from factory housing. 
In many respects these latter penalties probably made a 
greater impact than the first, for it served notice that 
the authorities fully intended to implement this decree.
b<5l.<i!\
Previous laws on labour discipline had not enforced and had*• IN
been violated almost with impunity. The best example of 
this was the turnover decree of 15 December 1930, which 
should have prevented the flitter from receiving work for 
a period of six months. In January 1932 The Times corres­ 
pondent reported "workers no longer have the slightest fear 
of losing their jobs. 'You will be sent away with a bad 
"character" ^ one worker was told. 'I hope so', he answered, 
'I have five in my pocket now and each time I add a new one 
to my collection I find better work. '"
As illustrated in the previous Chapter, the effects of 
the decree on absenteeism were felt immediately and keenly. 
In an attempt to ensure that this law was carried out to 
the letter on 20 November 80 and 26 November 1932 81 , VTsIK 
and Sovnarkom RSFSR; and Narkomtrud SSSR respectively
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78 Izvestiya, 16 November 1932.
79 The Times, 21 January 1932.
80 Izvestiya Narkomtruda, 1933, nos.1-2.
81 Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyiatvennogo zakonodatel ' - 
stva, 1933, no. 13, pp.4U-41.
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ordered that the provision on evicting truants from 
factory housing must be carried out immediately, without 
offering alternative accommodation or means of transportat­ 
ion and at any time of year (it was, remember, November!).
Even during the previous 'hard line 1 period Trud had 
been moved to declare, on 6 January 1931, in reviewing a 
case in which a worker had been evicted:
"It is necessary once and for all to explain to the 
officials of the judiciary that the proletarian court 
is first and foremost a class court. There neither is, 
nor can there be, a law in which a worker's family is 
turned out onto the streets in a January frost."
In January 1933, the Petrovskii works in Dnepropetrovsk 
attracted criticism for only having evicted 261 truants out 
of the 1833 sacked in December 1932. 82
The Party eventually exposed its hand when, on 4 December 
1932, a joint decree issued by the Central Committee and 
Sovnarkom SSSR "On Extending the Rights of Factory Manage­ 
ments in Provisions for Workers and Improving the Rationing 
System" placed the issue of food-and-goods cards in the hands
Q O
of factory management. New 'departments of workers' pro­ 
visions '_(_p_t:c]£l_Y_j:_abc^cJ^ - ORS) replaced the 
'closed workers' cooperatives (zakrytye rabochie kooperativy
- ZRK) in 262 of the country's largest enterprises. Ration 
books were to be distributed only to workers at the given 
plant and their families. As an article in Izvestiya on 
the following day, 5 December 1932, entitled "Subordinate 
Workers' Provisions to the Interests of Production", implied 
this decree was aimed as much at turnover as it was absentee­ 
ism.
***************************
82 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1933, no.5, p.57 (Aleksandrov)
83 Sobranie zakonov, 1932, no.80, art. 489.
84 An incomplete list of these enterprises is given in 
Za proletarskuyu ditsiplinu truda,M, 1933, pp.43-44.
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The pressure to fully implement both the absentee and 
provisions decrees led to further instructions being issued 
on each. A circular from the RSFSR Health Commissariat and 
Narkomtrud RSFSR on 13 December required doctors to desist 
giving sick notes to truants or drunks and called for the 
factory aktiv to organise raids on the homes of absent work 
ers especially before and after rest days.
On 19 December 1932 a Sovnarkom SSSR and Party Central 
Committee decree (signed by Molotov and Stalin) criticised 
local organisations for carrying out the 4 December decree 
poorly and insisted that January coupons be issued by 28
O £
December .
A final measure in 1932 which assisted the creation of 
a more stable population was the Government decree of 27 
December 1932 "On the Issue of Passports to Citizens of the 
USSR", introduced ostensibly: 87
"In order to obtain better statistics of the population 
in towns, workers' settlements and settlements built around 
newly-constructed factories, and also in order to secure the 
deportation from these places of persons who are not connect­ 
ed with industry ... and are not engaged in socially useful 
labour... and also in order to cleanse these places from 
kulak, criminal and other anti-social elements which find 
a refuge there..."
As the peasant population were not issued with passports, 
the decree put a stop to the free flow of migrants from the 
countryside into the town, while at the same time enabling 
the authorities to get rid of any unwanted or troublesome 
workers. On 31 January 1933, Izvestiya served notice that 
there was to be a reduction of workers by 2 per cent in 
industry and 26 per cent in construction during 1933. This, 
too, inevitably, would have a beneficial effect on turnover.
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85 Byulleten' finansovogo i khozyaistvennogo zakonodatel ' - 
stva, 1933, no. 14, pp. 43-44.
86 Sobranie zakonov, 1932, no 82, art. 501.
87 Izvestiya, 28 December 1932.
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We have seen in the previous Chapter the dramatic effect 
that these decrees had on the rate of absenteeism, which fell 
from 0.59 days in October (the last full month before the 
decree on dismissal for one day's unsanctioned absenteeism 
was published) to 0.08 days in January 1933. 88 On 18 
March 1933, Za industrializatsiyu published the findings of 
a Party investigation into the implementation of the Nov­ 
ember and December decrees, in which it was claimed that, 
by the end of 1932, 237,000 workers had been struck off the 
registers of 74 enterprises in heavy industry. Nonetheless, 
the Party accused managers of not being firm enough in 
dealing with offenders.
Pressure was being put not only on management to get 
tough with violators of discipline. On 11 February 1933 
Trud published a VTsSPS decree on labour discipline which 
warned union organs that "any toleration of truants and 
those guilty of specifically hindering the decisions of the 
Government will be regarded as an open display of opportun­ 
ism in practice and will ensure that severe measures are 
brought to bear against the leaders of these organisations."
With the restrictions on absenteeism and turnover at 
last appearing to have some effect, the authorities attention 
in the sphere of labour discipline could be diverted towards 
other problems. The above VTsSPS decree referred to "hidden 
absenteeism" (sleeping at work, unpunctuality) and an article 
in Trud on 23 June 1933 claimed that, at the Frunze motor- 
works, labour discipline was "limping on all fours" due to 
"internal absenteeism" (smoking, walking about, chatting etc) 
which accounted for 32 per cent of all work time. A survey 
into non-utilisation of the working day carried out by the 
Commissariat of Heavy Industry (Narkomtyazhprom) in the
* * * * •>'«• * * * * it /V * * * * * * * * Vc * * * * * * * *
88 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 1933, no.5, p.55 (Aleksandrov).
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summer of 1933 revealed that, on average, or\<^- o,<%&- <N- 
\so two hours out of a seven-hour working day (i.e. from 21.4 
to 28.6 per cent) were not being utilised, the equivalent 
of 66 days per worker for the entire year!
The year of 1933 was most notable, however, as far as 
labour discipline was concerned by i) the merger between 
VTsSPS and Narkomtrud in June 1933 90 , and ii) the Party 
takeover of responsibility for discipline on railway trans­ 
port, with the aim of introducing a discipline of the mil­ 
itary type among railway workers. 91 Political departments, 
made up of "communists and non-Party activists" were to be 
held responsible to the Party Central Committee and the 
Commissariat of Transport for this, although, as the Party 
decree of July 1933 establishing the departments made clear, 
even these cadres had not distinguished themselves : 9 ^
"Communists and non-Party activists not only fail to 
oppose slackers and other violators of labour discip­ 
line, but, on the contrary, are loafers and slackers 
themselves . "
In 1934, a Government decree amended the Labour Code 
provision that had hitherto guaranteed the worker at least 
two-thirds of his pay rates if the plan was not fulfilled, 
even when this was his own fault. Under the new law, he
would be paid on the basis of actual output if the under­
go 
fulfilment was due to him. This switch to payment for
work done, combined with the spread of progressive piece- 
rates and the abolitioning of the rationing system was to 
prepare the ground in 1935 for the rise of Stakhanovism.
**************************
89 Za industrializatsiyu, 18 March 1933
90 Izvestiya, 24 June 1933; on 21 August 1934, VTsSPS was 
given responsibility for issuing instructions, rules and
clarifications on labour legislation subject to confirm­ 
ation by Sovnarkom SSSR, Sobranie zakonov, 1934, no. 43, 
art. 342.
91 Decree of Sovnarkom SSSR and TsK VKP (b) "On the Work of 
Railway Transport", Sobranie zakonov, 1933, no. 40, art. 237
92 Izvestiya, 11 July, 1933.
93 Sobranie zakonov, 1934, no. 15, art. 109.
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Conclusion
By the end of the period under review the relevant 
legislation had been introduced to control, more or less, 
the problems of turnover and absenteeism. The more basic 
problem of 'internal' absenteeism (i.e. underutil isation 
of work time) was to prove harder to legislate against. 94
Although immediate responsibility for labour legislat­ 
ion had passed into the hands of the trade unions, the 
status and relevance of the law in this sphere had dimin­ 
ished significantly. 95 For it was management that had
direct responsibility for production, and this, as we have 
seen, was the overriding priority in Soviet industry at 
this time. Thus managers could and did utilise socialist 
competition to infringe the laws on overtime and rest 
Days. 96
On the other hand, the .managers themselves were 
held politically responsible for fulfilling quantitative 
plans and criminally responsible for failing to fulfil 
qualitative plans. 97 There was little incentive, there­ 
fore, for them to obey the letter of the labour laws. 
Indeed, by the end of 1934, a writer in the trade union 
journal was moved to complain that "the managers crudely 
violate Soviet laws, firing workers for the least reason, 
for example, for not answering the telephone promptly." 98
The legacy of such a cavalier attitude to labour It
continues to burden Soviet industry to this day. For ex­ 
ample, Brezhnev's last decree on labour discipline, pub­ 
lished in Pravda on 12 January 1980, was subsequently 
found to have been implemented in only 18.5 per cent of 
Soviet enterprises and not at all in forty per cent! 99
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